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ABSTRACT. 
 
The 2nd Century CE Indian philosopher Nagarjuna founded 
the Madhyamika (Middle Way) school of Mahayana 
Buddhism, which strongly influenced Chinese (Ch’an), 
Korean (Sôn) and Japanese (Zen) Buddhism, as well as 
Tibetan Buddhism. Nagarjuna is regarded by many Buddhist 
writers to this day as a very important philosopher, who they 
claim definitively proved the futility of ordinary human 
cognitive means. 
 
His writings include a series of arguments purporting to show 
the illogic of logic, the absurdity of reason. He considers this 
the way to verbalize and justify the Buddhist doctrine of 
“emptiness” (Shunyata). These arguments attack some of the 
basic tenets and techniques of reasoning, such as the laws of 
thought (identity, non-contradiction and the excluded 
middle), conceptualization and predication, our common 
assumptions of self, entities and essences, as well as our 
beliefs in motion and causation. 
 
The present essay demonstrates the many sophistries 
involved in Nagarjuna’s arguments. He uses double 
standards, applying or ignoring the laws of thought and other 
norms as convenient to his goals; he manipulates his readers, 
by giving seemingly logical form (like the dilemma) to his 
discourse, while in fact engaged in non-sequiturs or 
appealing to doubtful premises; he plays with words, relying 
on unclear terminology, misleading equivocations and unfair 
fixations of meaning; and he ‘steals concepts’, using them to 
deny the very percepts on which they are based. 
 
Although a critique of the Madhyamika philosophical 
interpretation and defense of “emptiness”, Buddhist Illogic is 
not intended to dissuade readers from Buddhism. On the 
contrary, its aim to enhance personal awareness of actual 
cognitive processes, and so improve meditation. It is also an 
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Foreword. 
 
This essay is a critical review of some of the main arguments 
proposed by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (c. 
113-213 CE), founder of the Madhyamika (Middle Way) 
school, one of the Mahayana streams, which strongly 
influenced Chinese (Ch’an), Korean (Sôn) and Japanese 
(Zen) Buddhism, as well as Tibetan Buddhism. Specifically, 
the text referred to here is Empty Logic - Madhyamika 
Buddhism from Chinese Sources (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1991) by Hsueh-li Cheng, of Hawaii University (Hilo). The 
main source-texts of this school of thought, to which Cheng 
of course often refers, are the “three treatises” – the Middle 
Treatise, the Twelve Gate Treatise and the Hundred 
Treatise.1 
                                                      
1  Here abbreviated to MT, TGT and HT, respectively. These 
texts are not all by Nagarjuna and no longer exist in the Sanskrit 
original, but in Chinese translation (by Kumarajiva, dating from 409 
CE). Thus, the main verses of the first treatise (MT) were by 
Nagarjuna; its commentaries were by Pingala. The whole second 
treatise (TGT) was by Nagarjuna. The third treatise’s (HT) main 
verses were by Aryadeva and its commentaries were by Vasu. I 
shall be content to refer to Cheng, mentioning his occasional 
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The title Empty Logic was not intended pejoratively by its 
author, but simply to mean ‘logic of emptiness’, the term 
“emptiness” (Shunyata) referring to the Buddhist doctrine 
that (briefly put, very roughly) things have no abiding core, 
no essence, no fixed nature. Cheng’s work is a clear 
exposition of Madhyamika history and logical techniques, but 
it makes no attempt to criticize those techniques. All criticism 
of Madhyamika or Buddhist logic, here, is my own. 
The present essay is not a religious tract and has no polemical 
intent. It is a work of philosophy, a fair-minded logical 
evaluation of certain propositions and arguments taken as 
philosophical positions open to discussion like any other. It 
examines and discusses a goodly array of Buddhist, and in 
particular Madhyamika, doctrines, but does not pretend to be 
an exhaustive treatment of all doctrines or of all aspects of 
those dealt with. 
However, I do not attempt here to develop a historical 
perspective, or to list the various tendencies and their 
interrelations. Cheng’s book includes an interesting 
                                                                                                               
references these treatises; but, in view of Cheng’s evident 
competence, I shall barely distinguish between his say-so and his 
rare word-for-word quotations of Nagarjuna. 
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exposition of the development of Madhyamika philosophy, 
from Nagarjuna in the 2nd century CE through to the 
Yogachara school and on. However, he fails to investigate in 
sufficient detail the development of Buddhist philosophy 
prior to Nagarjuna, barely mentioning several centuries of 
earlier Theravada (Hinayana) philosophy and the early 
phases (starting 1st cent. CE, and before) of Mahayana 
reaction (e.g. the Mahasanghikas)2. To better understand 
Nagarjuna’s motives and goals, it would be well to be 
acquainted with this background3. 
My naming the present essay Buddhist Illogic should not be 
taken to imply that I consider all Buddhist philosophy or even 
                                                      
2  Mahayana means ‘great vehicle’, Hinayana means ‘small 
vehicle’. The latter may be taken as a pejorative term coined by the 
Mahayanists, implying that their interpretation of Buddhism is 
superior. The alternative label, Theravada, is preferable. In my 
view, Mahayana was in many respects a more revolutionary than 
evolutionary development. 
3  A text I can recommend is Part I of The Diamond Sutra by 
Mu Soeng (Somerville, MA: Wisdom, 2000). It is also very 
instructive to look at the development of Buddhism from a point of 
view of comparative religion. For instance, the Mahayana 
argument “that their sutras needed to be kept secret for five 
hundred years” (p. 24) is familiar to students of Judaism (a similar 
argument is used there, e.g. to explain the historically late 
appearance of the ‘Ashuri’ Hebrew script used in Torah scrolls, and 
in other contexts). 
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all Madhyamika as illogical. It merely reflects my focus here 
on some of the (many) illogical arguments used in 
Nagarjuna’s discourse. Indeed, some of Nagarjuna’s 
arguments and beliefs have been refuted or rejected by other 
Buddhist philosophers. Buddhist philosophy is not 
monolithic, but a constellation of philosophies with as their 
common ground the (alleged) pronouncements of 
Buddhism’s founder. I do here challenge some underlying 
Buddhist doctrines, but only incidentally, not systematically. 
I would have named this essay less pejoratively ‘Buddhist 
Logic’ if I had found some interesting new thought forms to 
report. Buddhism and Nagarjuna do indeed use valid as well 
as invalid forms of reasoning, but these forms (those I found 
so far) are all familiar to us today, and so not notable except 
for historical purposes (where we would try and determine 
whether Buddhist usage antedates usage in Greek or other 
writings). However, my main justification is that much of 
Buddhism itself, and particularly Nagarjuna’s version of it, 
cheerfully proclaims itself free of or beyond logic, or illogical 
and even anti-logical. 
On a personal note, I want to stress my admiration for 
Buddhism in general, which has taught me much, both in the 
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way of living skills and through its philosophical insights. So 
I cannot be accused of approaching this subject with any 
antagonistic prejudice. I read Empty Logic eager to learn 
from it, rather than to find fault with it. As a philosopher and 
logician I am however duty bound to analyze and judge 
philosophies dispassionately, and this is what I do here. 
Generally speaking, I have little interest in criticizing other 
people’s philosophical works, because I could write thick 
volumes doing so. Life is unfortunately too short for that, so I 
prefer to pass it developing a constructive statement. 
Nevertheless, one generally learns a lot through debate, and I 
can say that challenging Nagarjuna has helped me to clarify 
various philosophical problems and possible solutions. 
Finally, let me say that the message of “Buddha” (the 
enlightened) Siddhartha Gautama (563-483 BCE), about 
“emptiness”, which as is well known is essentially non-
verbal, should not be confused with Nagarjuna’s or any other 
writer’s attempted philosophical interpretation, explanation 
and justification of related ideas. Thus, to refute the latter 
does not necessarily deny the former. 
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1.   The tetralemma. 
 
Western philosophical and scientific thought is based on 
Aristotelian logic, whose founding principles are the three 
“Laws of Thought”. These can be briefly stated as “A is A” 
(Identity), “Nothing is both A and non-A” (Non-
contradiction) and “Nothing is neither A nor non-A” 
(Exclusion of the Middle). These are not claimed as mere 
hypotheses, note well, but as incontrovertible premises of all 
rational human thought4.  
Religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, even while 
adhering to these laws in much of their discourse and paying 
lip-service to them, in their bids to interpret their own sacred 
texts and to make their doctrines seem reasonable to their 
converts, have often ignored these same laws. This is 
especially true of mystical trends within these religions, but 
many examples could be given from mainstream writings. 
                                                      
4  See my Future Logic (Geneva: Author, 1996. Rev. ed.), ch. 
2 and 20, and later essays on the subject (published on my 
website www.thelogician.net). 
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The same can be said of some aspects of Buddhist 
philosophy. 
The tetralemma5 is a derivative of the laws of thought, with 
reference to any two terms or propositions, labeled A and B, 
and their opposites non-A and non-B. Four combinations of 
these four terms are conceivable, namely “A and B” (both), 
“non-A and non-B” (neither), “A and non-B” and “non-A and 
B” (one or the other only). According to Aristotelian logic, 
these four statements are incompatible with each other (only 
one of them can be true, because if two or more were 
affirmed then “A and non-A” or “B and non-B” or both 
would be true, and the latter implications are self-
contradictory) and exhaustive (at least one of them must be 
true, since if they were all denied then “not A and not non-A” 
or “not B and not non-B” or both would be true, and the latter 
implications go against the excluded middle). 
Now, what Nagarjuna does is insert the term A in place of B 
(i.e. he takes the case of B = A), and effectively claim that the 
above four logical possibilities of combination apply in that 
                                                      
5  See Cheng, pp. 36-38, on this topic. He there refers to MT 
opening statement, as well as XVII:12a and XXIII:1a. Etym. Gk. 
tetra = four, lemma = alternatives. Term coined in contrast to the 
dilemma “A or non-A”. 
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special case – so that “A and A (=B)”, “non-A and non-A 
(=non-B)”, “A and non-A (=non-B)”, “non-A and A (=B)” 
seem logically acceptable. He then goes on to argue that 
there are four existential possibilities: affirmation of A (A 
+ A = A), denial of A (non-A + non-A = non-A), both 
affirmation and denial of A (A and non-A) and neither 
affirmation nor denial of A (not A and not non-A). He is 
thus apparently using the principles and terminology of 
common logic to arrive at a very opposite result. This gives 
him and readers the impression that it is quite reasonable to 
both affirm and deny or to neither affirm nor deny. 
But in Aristotelian logic, the latter two alternatives are at the 
outset excluded – “both A and non-A” by the Law of Non-
contradiction and “neither A nor non-A” by the Law of the 
Excluded-Middle – and the only logical possibilities left are 
“A” or “non-A”. The anti-Aristotelian position may be 
viewed, in a positive light, as an anti-Nominalist position, 
reminding us that things are never quite what they seem or 
that things cannot be precisely classified or labeled. But 
ultimately, they intend the death of Logic; for without the 
laws of thought, how are we to distinguish between true and 
false judgments?  
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The law of identity “A is A” is a conviction that 
things have some identity (whatever it specifically be) 
rather than another, or than no identity at all. It is an 
affirmation that knowledge is ultimately possible, and 
a rejection of sheer relativism or obscurantism. 
Nagarjuna’s goal is to deny identity. 
It should be noted here that Aristotle is very precise in 
his formulation of the law of contradiction, stating in 
his Metaphysics “The same attribute cannot at the 
same time belong and not belong to the same subject 
in the same respect” (italics mine). Thus, an 
alternative statement of the laws of thought would be 
the ‘trilemma’ (let us so call it) “either wholly A, or 
wholly non-A, or both partly A and partly non-A”, 
which excludes the fourth alternative “both wholly A 
and wholly non-A”. The Buddhist attack on the laws 
of thought draws some of its credibility from the fact 
that people subconsciously refer to this ‘trilemma’, 
thinking superficially that indeed opposite things may 
occur in the same place at different times or at the 
same time in different places or in various respects, 
without thereby giving rise to logical difficulty 
                                           The tetralemma                              17 
incapable of resolution. But it should be clear that the 
Buddhist position is much more radical than that, 
accepting thoroughgoing antinomy. 
Similarly with regard to the law of the excluded 
middle, which affirms the situation “neither A nor 
non-A” to be impossible in fact. People are misled by 
the possibility of uncertainty in knowledge, as to 
whether A or non-A is the case in fact, into believing 
that this law of thought is open to debate. But it must 
be understood that the thrust of this logical rule is 
inductive, rather than deductive; i.e. it is a statement 
that at the end of the knowledge acquisition process, 
either “A” or “non-A” will result, and no third 
alternative can be expected. It does not exclude that in 
the interim, a situation of uncertainty may occur. 
Nagarjuna’s position exploits this confusion in 
people’s minds. 
Nagarjuna interprets the limitation implied by the dilemma 
“A or non-A” as an arbitrary ‘dualism’ on the part of 
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ordinary thinkers6. It only goes to show that he 
misunderstands formalization (or he pretends to, in an 
attempt to confuse gullible readers). When logicians use a 
variable like “B” and allow that “non-A and B” and “A and 
non-B” are both in principle possible, they do not intend that 
as a generality applicable to all values of B (such as “A”), but 
only as a generic statement applicable to any consistent 
values of B. In the specific case where B = A, the said two 
                                                      
6  It is misleading to call this a ‘duality’ or ‘dichotomy’, as 
Buddhists are wont to do, because it suggests that a unitary thing 
was arbitrarily cut into two – and incidentally, that it might just as 
well have been cut into four. But, on a perceptual level, there is no 
choice involved, and no ‘cutting-up’ of anything. A phenomenon 
appearing is one single thing, call it ‘a’ (a proper name, or an 
indicative ‘this’), and not a disjunction. The issue of ‘dichotomy’ 
arises only on a conceptual level. Negation is a rational act, i.e. we 
can only speak of ‘non-a’, of what does not appear, by first bringing 
to mind something ‘a’, which previously appeared (in sensation or 
imagination). In initial conceptualization, two phenomena are 
compared and contrasted, to each other and to other things, in 
some respect(s); the issue is then, are they similar enough to each 
other and different enough from other things to be judged ‘same’ 
and labeled by a general term (say ‘A’), or should they be judged 
‘different’ or is there an uncertainty. At the later stage of 
recognition, we have to decide whether a third phenomenon fits in 
the class formed for the previous two (i.e. falls under ‘A’) or does 
not fit in (i.e. falls under ‘non-A’) or remains in doubt. In the latter 
case, we wonder whether it is ‘A’ or ‘non-A’, and forewarn that it 
cannot be both or neither. 
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combinations have to be eliminated because they are illegal 
(i.e. breach two of the laws of thought). 
The above-stated property of symbols, i.e. their applicability 
only conditionally within the constraints of consistency, is 
evident throughout the science of formal logic, and it is here 
totally ignored by Nagarjuna. His motive of course was to 
verbalize and rationalize the Buddha’s doctrine that the 
ultimate truth is beyond nama and rupa, name and form (i.e. 
discrimination and discourse), knowable only by a 
transcendental consciousness (the Twofold Truth doctrine). 
More precisely, as Cheng emphasizes, Nagarjuna’s intent 
was to show that logic is inherently inconsistent and thus that 
reason is confused madness to be rejected. That is, he was 
(here and throughout) not ultimately trying to defend a 
tetralemma with B equal to A – or even to affirm that things 
are both A and non-A, or neither A nor non-A – but wished 
to get us to look altogether beyond the distinctions of 
conceptualization and the judgments of logic. 
But as above shown he does not succeed in this quest. For his 
critique depends on a misrepresentation of logical science. 
He claims to show that logic is confused and self-
contradictory, but in truth what he presents as the thesis of 
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logical science is not what it claims for itself but precisely 
what it explicitly forbids. Furthermore, suppose logical 
theory did lead to contradictions as he claims, this fact would 
not lead us to its rejection were there not also a tacit appeal to 
our preference for the logical in practice. If logic were false, 
contradictions would be acceptable. Thus, funnily enough, 
Nagarjuna appeals to our logical habit in his very 
recommendation to us to ignore logic. In sum, though he 
gives the illusion that it is reasonable to abandon reason, it is 
easy to see that his conclusion is foregone and his means are 
faulty. 
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2.   Neither real nor unreal. 
 
But Nagarjuna also conceives ultimate reality (“emptiness”7) 
as a “middle way” 8 – so that the world of experience is 
neither to be regarded as real, nor to be regarded as unreal 
(“there is nothing, neither mental nor non-mental, which is 
real” and it “cannot be conceived as unreal,” reports Cheng). 
In this context, Nagarjuna is clearly relying on one of the 
above-mentioned logically impossible disjuncts, namely 
“neither A nor non-A” (be it said in passing). I want to now 
show why Nagarjuna’s statement seems superficially 
reasonable and true. 
As I have often clarified and explained9, knowledge has to be 
regarded or approached phenomenologically (that is the only 
consistent epistemological thesis). We have to start by 
                                                      
7  Beyond consciousness of “Shunyata” is a more vivid 
awareness called “Mahamudra”, according to Chögyam Trungpa, 
in Illusion’s Game (Shambhala: Boston, 1994). But such 
refinements need not concern us here. 
8  See Cheng, pp. 38-39, on this topic. He there refers to MT 
XIII:9a and XVIII:7. 
9  See my Future Logic, ch. 60-62, and later essays on the 
subject. 
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acknowledging and observing appearances, as such, without 
initial judgment as to their reality or illusion. At first sight all 
appearances seem real enough. But after a while, we have to 
recognize that some appearances conflict with other 
appearances, and judge such appearances (i.e. one or more of 
those in conflict) as illusory. Since there is nothing in our 
‘world’ but appearances, all remaining appearances not 
judged as illusions (i.e. so long as they are not logically 
invalidated by conflicts with other appearances) maintain 
their initial status as realities. 
That is, the distinction between appearances as realities or 
illusions emerges within the world of appearances itself, 
merely classifying some this way and the rest that way. We 
have no concept of reality or illusion other than with 
reference to appearance. To use the category of reality with 
reference to something beyond appearance is concept 
stealing, a misuse of the concept, an extrapolation which 
ignores the concept’s actual genesis in the context of 
appearance. To apply the concept of illusion to all 
appearances, on the basis that some appearances are illusions, 
is an unjustified generalization ignoring how this concept 
arises with reference to a specific event (namely, 
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inconsistency between certain appearances and resulting 
diminishment of their innate credibilities). Moreover, to 
claim that no appearances are real or that all are illusions is 
self-defeating, since such claim itself logically falls under the 
category of appearance. 
The illusory exists even though it is not reality – it exists as 
appearance. The real is also apparent – some of it, at least. 
Therefore, appearance per se is neither to be understood as 
reality (since some appearances are illusory), nor can it be 
equated to illusion (since not all appearances have been or 
can be found illusory). Appearance is thus the common 
ground of realities and illusions, their common characteristic, 
the dialectical synthesis of those theses and antitheses. It is a 
genus, they are mutually exclusive species of it. (The 
difference between appearance and existence is another issue, 
I have dealt with elsewhere – briefly put, existence is a genus 
of appearance and non-appearance, the latter concepts being 
relative to that of consciousness whereas the former is 
assumed independent.) 
None of these insights allows the conclusion that appearances 
are “neither real nor unreal” (granting that ‘unreal’ is 
understood to mean ‘non-real’). All we can say is that some 
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appearances are real and some unreal. Formally, the correct 
logical relation between the three concepts is as follows. 
Deductively, appearance is implied by reality and illusion, but 
does not imply them; for reality and illusion are 
contradictory, so that they cannot both be true and they 
cannot both be false. Moreover, inductively, appearance 
implies reality, until and unless it is judged to be illusion (by 
virtue of some inconsistency being discovered). 
More precisely, all appearances are initially classed as real. 
Any appearance found self-contradictory is (deductively) 
illusory, and its contradictory is consequently self-evident 
and (deductively) real. All remaining appearances remain 
classed as real, so long as uncontested. Those that are 
contested have to be evaluated dynamically. When one 
appearance is belied by another, they are both put in doubt by 
the conflict between them, and so both become initially 
problematic. Thereafter, their relative credibilities have to be 
tentatively weighed in the overall context of available 
empirical and rational knowledge – and repeatedly reassessed 
thereafter, as that context develops and evolves. On this 
basis, one of these appearances may be judged more credible 
than the other, so that the former is labeled probable (close to 
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real) and the latter relatively improbable (close to illusory). 
In the limit, they may be characterized as respectively 
effectively (inductively) real or illusory. Thus, reality and 
illusion are the extremes (respectively, 100% and 0%) in a 
broad range of probabilities with many intermediate degrees 
(including problemacy at the mid-point). 
To be still more precise, pure percepts (i.e. concrete 
appearances, phenomena) are never illusory. The 
value-judgment of ‘illusory’ properly concerns 
concepts (i.e. abstract appearances, ‘universals’) only. 
When we say of a percept that it was illusory, we just 
mean that we misinterpreted it. That is, what we 
initially considered as a pure percept, had in fact an 
admixture of concept, which as it turned out was 
erroneous. For example, I see certain shapes and 
colors in the distance and think ‘here comes a girl on 
a bike’, but as I get closer I realize that all I saw was a 
pile of rubbish by the roadside. The pure percept is 
the shapes and colors I see; the false interpretation is 
‘girl on bike’, the truer interpretation is ‘pile of 
rubbish’. The initial percept has not changed, but my 
greater proximity has added perceptual details to it. 
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My first impression was correct, only my initial 
judgment was wrong. I revise the latter concept, not 
through some superior means to knowledge, but 
simply by means of further perception and 
conception. 
Strictly speaking, then, perception is never at issue; it 
is our conceptions that we evaluate. It is in practice, 
admittedly, often very difficult to isolate a percept 
from its interpretation, i.e. from conceptual 
appendages to it. Our perception of things is, indeed, 
to a great extent ‘eidetic’. This fact need not, 
however, cause us to reject any perception (as many 
Western philosophers, as well as Buddhists, quickly 
do), or even all conception. The conceptual 
‘impurities’ in percepts are not necessarily wrong. We 
know them to have been wrong, when we discover a 
specific cause for complaint – namely, a logical or 
experiential contradiction. So long as we find no such 
specific fault with them, they may be considered right. 
This just means that we have to apply the rules of 
                                    Neither real nor unreal                        27 
adduction10 to our immediate interpretations of 
individual percepts, just as we do to complex theories 
relative to masses of percepts. These rules are 
universal: no judgment is exempt from the 
requirement of careful scrutiny and reevaluation. 
Now, judging by Cheng’s account and certain quotations of 
Nagarjuna therein, we could interpret the latter as having 
been trying to say just what I have said. For instance, Cheng 
writes11: “What Nagarjuna wanted to deny is that empirical 
phenomena… are absolutely real…. However, [this] does not 
mean that nothing exists. It does not nullify anything in the 
world” (my italics). I interpret this non-nullification as an 
acknowledgment of appearance as the minimum basis of 
knowledge. Nagarjuna may have had difficulties developing 
an appropriate terminology (distinguishing existence, 
appearance and reality, as I do above), influenced no doubt 
by his penchant for paradoxical statements seeming to 
express and confirm Buddhist mystical doctrine. 
                                                      
10  Adduction treats all conceptual knowledge as hypothetical, 
to be tested repeatedly – in competition with all conceivable 
alternative hypotheses – with reference to all available logic and 
experience. 
11  P. 42. 
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But if that is what he meant, then he has not succeeded to 
arrive at a “middle way” (a denial of the Law of the Excluded 
Middle), but only at a “common way” (a granted common 
ground). As far as I am concerned, that is not a meager 
achievement – the philosophical discovery of 
phenomenology! But for him that would be trivial, if not 
counterproductive – for what he seeks is to deny ordinary 
consciousness and its inhibiting rationales, and to thereby 
leap into a different, higher consciousness capable of 
reaching transcendental truth or ultimate reality. 
It is interesting to note that the Madhyamika school’s 
effective denial of reality to all appearance was not accepted 
by a later school of Mahayana philosophy, the Yogachara 
(7th-8th cent. CE). Cheng describes the latter’s position as 
follows12: “Every object, both mental and non-mental, may be 
logically or dialectically proven illusory. But in order to be 
illusory, there must be a certain thought that suffers from 
illusion. The very fact of illusion itself proves the existence 
and reality of a certain consciousness or mind. To say that 
everything mental and non-mental is unreal is intellectually 
                                                      
12  P. 25. 
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suicidal. The reality of something should at least be admitted 
in order to make sense of talking about illusion” (italics 
mine). That is the tenor of the phenomenological argument I 
present above, although my final conclusion is clearly not 
like Yogachara’s, that everything is consciousness or mind (a 
type of Idealism), but leaves open the possibility of judging 
and classifying appearances as matter or mind with reference 
to various considerations. 
The Madhyamika rejection of ‘dualism’ goes so far as to 
imply that “emptiness” is not to be found in nirvana, the 
antithesis of samsara (according to the earlier Buddhist 
viewpoint), but in ‘neither samsara nor nirvana’. In truth, 
similar statements may be found in the Pali Canon, i.e. in the 
much earlier Theravada schools, so that it is not a distinctly 
Mahayana construct. The difference is one of emphasis, such 
statements, relatively rare in the earlier period, are the norm 
and frequently repeated in the later period. An example may 
be found in the Dhammapada, a sutra dating from the 3rd 
cent. BCE13, i.e. four or five hundred years before Nagarjuna. 
                                                      
13  London: Penguin, 1973. This is supposedly the date of 
composition, though the translator, Juan Mascaro, in his 
Introduction, states “compiled” at that time, thus seeming to imply 
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Here, samsara is likened to a stream or this shore of it, and 
nirvana to the further shore; and we are told to get beyond the 
two. 
When you have crossed the stream of Samsara, you 
will reach Nirvana… He has reached the other shore, 
then he attains the supreme vision and all his fetters 
are broken. He for whom there is neither this nor the 
further shore, nor both…. 
Such a formula is legitimate if taken as a warning that 
pursuing nirvana (enlightenment and liberation) is an 
obstacle to achieving it, just a subtle form of samsara 
(ignorance and attachment); there is no contradiction in 
saying that the thought of nirvana as a goal of action keeps us 
in samsara – this is an ordinary causal statement. The formula 
is also logically acceptable if taken as a reminder that no 
word or concept – not even ‘samsara’ or ‘nirvana’ – can 
capture or transmit the full meanings intended (i.e. ‘not’ here 
should more precisely be stated as ‘not quite’). There is also 
                                                                                                               
an earlier composition. It is not clear in that commentary when the 
sutra is estimated to have been first written down. And if it was 
much later, say in the period of crystallization of Mahayana 
thought, say in 100 BCE to 100 CE, the latter may have influenced 
the monks who did the writing down. See ch. 26 (383-5) for the 
quotation. 
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no contradiction in saying that one who has attained nirvana 
does not need to leave the world of those locked in samsara, 
but can continue to exist and act in it though distinctively in a 
way free of attachment.  
But it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of 
‘emptiness’ as ‘neither samsara nor nirvana’, given that 
nirvana as a concept is originally defined as non-samsara; the 
truth cannot be a third alternative. At best, one could say that 
emptiness is a higher level of nirvana (in an enlarged sense), 
which is not to be confused with the lower level intended by 
the original term nirvana, nor of course with samsara. In that 
case, nirvana (in a generic sense of the term, meaning 
literally non-samsara) includes both a higher species and a 
lower one; and the statement ‘neither samsara nor lower-
nirvana’ is then compatible with the statement ‘higher 
nirvana’. There is a big difference between rough, poetic, 
dramatic language, and literal interpretation thereof. 
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3.   Nagarjuna’s use of dilemma. 
 
As we shall presently see, Nagarjuna often frames his 
arguments in dilemmatic form. So let me here give you a 
primer on the formal logic of dilemma. The form he tends to 
use is what logicians call ‘simple constructive dilemma’, 
which looks like this: 
 
If X, then Y – and if not X, then Y 
(the major premises, or ‘horns’ of the 
dilemma) 
but either X or not X 





where “X” and “not X” refers to some propositions under 
consideration and “Y” the (explicit or implicit) intermediate 
and final conclusion. In Nagarjuna, “Y” usually has the 
negative content “Z is meaningless or impossible or absurd”, 
i.e. it asserts that the propositions concerned (“X” or “not 
X”), or the concepts they involve, are faulty. 
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The reasoning process involved is thus the following: the 
major premises (or ‘horns’ or ‘prongs’), are intended to show 
that the two theses, “X” and “not X”, each leads to some 
proposition “Y”; the minor premise reminds us that these 
theses are mutually exclusive and exhaust all available 
alternatives (it “takes the dilemma by its horns”), and the 
final conclusion is that only “Y”, their common implication, 
is left over for us. This form of argument is easily validated, 
for instance by contraposing the major premises, to obtain “if 
not Y, then both X and not X”; since “not Y” implies the 
paradox “both X and “not X”, it follows that its contradictory 
“Y” is true.  
Note that the above dilemma is ‘two-pronged’, i.e. it 
considers two alternative theses, “X” and “not X”; it is also 
possible to – and Nagarjuna does so – engage in dilemmatic 
argument with three (or more) prongs in the major premise 
and a triple (or larger) disjunction in the minor premise. 
These have the form (briefly put)  
“if A or B or C…, then Y;  
but either A or B or C…;  
therefore Y”  
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and can be validated in the same way14. 
Sometimes, Nagarjuna’s argument is not properly dilemmatic 
in form, but only gives the impression that it is so. This 
occurs when the content of “Y” is merely “Z cannot be 
established as meaningful or as possible or as consistent” – 
i.e. when it signifies a doubt rather than a denial. Dilemma 
only works (i.e. can only be validated as just shown) if the 
major premises are proper “if/then” statements, i.e. provided 
“Y” is some assertoric proposition that logically follows “X” 
or “not X”. It does not work if “Y” is merely problematic 
given “X” and/or “not X”. The form “if X, surely Y” should 
not be confused with “if X, perhaps Y”; the former means “if 
X, then Y” and the latter means “if X, not-then not Y”; the 
latter is not logically equivalent to the former, but merely a 
subaltern of it. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, in the case of “if 
not X”, of course. 
When one or both of the major premises has this less definite 
form, all we can finally conclude is “maybe Y” (i.e. the 
content “Z might be meaningless or impossible or absurd”) – 
                                                      
14  Reductio ad absurdum: denying the conclusion while 
maintaining the minor premise results in denial of the major 
premise. 
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which is the same as saying that we reach no final conclusion 
at all, since “maybe Y” can be said ab initio with regard to 
anything. At best, we might consider “Y” as inductively 
slightly more confirmed by the argument, i.e. the “maybe” as 
having incrementally increased in probability; but that does 
not deductively prove “Y”. Dilemma, to repeat, can only be 
validated if the premises are assertoric; it has no validity if 
either or both of them are merely problematic. Yet 
Nagarjuna, as we shall see, sometimes considers such 
pseudo-dilemma as equivalent to dilemma, and the non-
conclusion “maybe Y” as equivalent to a negative conclusion 
“Y”. That is fallacious reasoning on his part.  
As we shall see by and by, Nagarjuna indulges in many 
other logical fallacies in his philosophical discourse. (I have 
drawn up a list of the nine most striking ones in Appendix 
1.) 
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4.   The subject-predicate relation. 
 
Nagarjuna’s assault on reason includes an attempted critique 
of verbal expression and the structure of language15. For him, 
words are conventions devoid of deductively absolute or 
inductively contextual meaning or relationships to each other. 
That he himself engages in criticism by means of language 
does not bother him, because he grants that it functions 
somewhat on a practical level, in a “conventional” way, 
within ordinary consciousness. His goal is as usual to take us 
beyond words and the illusions he claims they create, into the 
higher mode of consciousness that puts us in contact with 
ultimate reality. His means is to demonstrate that language is 
illogical and futile, putting forward at least two arguments: 
(a) He asks, “is the subject identical with or different 
from the predicate?” His answer is stated by Cheng 
as follows. “If the subject is the same as the predicate, 
they would be one and it would make no sense to call 
one a subject and the other a predicate… the sentence 
                                                      
15  See Cheng, pp. 117-118. He there refers to MT V:1-5, and 
TGT V:1 and VI:1. 
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would be a tautology. If on the other hand, the subject 
is different from the predicate, there would be no 
particular connection between them.” In either case, 
predication is found redundant. 
(b) Furthermore, “what is the status of the subject before 
predication? Does it already have predicates 
predicated of it or not?” (i.e. predicates “other” than 
the subject itself). “If a subject is without any 
predicate predicated of it, it is incomprehensible and 
non-existent. If a subject without a predicate is non-
existent, to what does our predicate apply? If on the 
other hand, the subject does have some other 
predicate predicated of it before we ascribe a 
predicate, what further function would be served by 
ascribing an additional predicate since it already has 
something predicated of it? If it needs this predicate, 
then a second and a third can in principle be applied. 
This would lead to infinite regress.” 
By such arguments, Nagarjuna seeks to give the impression 
that language is structurally unreliable and a stupid artifice. 
His arguments are shaped in such a way as to seem logically 
orderly and exhaustive, i.e. to consider all conceivable 
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alternatives and eliminate them one by one, so that we have 
no leg left to stand on. He thus apparently uses some of the 
methodology of logic to convince us. But of course the 
descriptions of the nature and role of predication underlying 
his arguments constitute merely one particular view16, so that 
his premises are not in fact exhaustive and only serve to show 
that his proposed view is faulty and to be rejected. 
Thus, consider argument 4(a). Its first premise about 
tautology is obvious and trivial, being itself tautological. 
More important, the second premise is not at all evident. The 
subject may well be “different from the predicate” and yet 
have a “particular connection” to it. There is no logical basis 
for Nagarjuna’s proposed implication; the antecedent concept 
(“different”) and the consequent concept (“unconnected”) are 
quite distinct. If X equals Y in all respects, then ‘if X, then Y’ 
and ‘if Y, then X’ must both be true (though it does not 
follow that if they are both true, X = Y, since X and Y may 
well not be simultaneous). X and Y are different, means ‘X 
does not in all respects equal Y’, and so implies that X and Y 
are either non-simultaneous, or that ‘if X, then Y’ and/or ‘if 
                                                      
16  A view reminiscent of Kant’s and other Western 
philosophers’, incidentally. 
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Y, then X’ is/are false. Whereas X and Y are unconnected, 
means that ‘if X, then Y’ and ‘if Y, then X’ must both be 
false, as any lesser such relations between X and Y. Thus, the 
former concept is wider than the latter, and does not imply it. 
The subject-predicate relation under discussion may and 
usually is posited as, for instance, a classificatory one – a 
relation between an individual and a class, or a subclass 
(species) and an overclass (genus), so that the former is 
included in the latter without being equal in scope to it. ‘Does 
not equal’ does not exclude ‘is greater than’ or ‘is smaller 
than’ or ‘exists before or after’, or any other non-equal 
relationship. Nagarjuna suggests that if the terms are not 
identical, they cannot be related by the copula ‘is’ – but this 
copula was never intended to mean total equation. Nagarjuna 
cannot change the convention that ‘is’ is different from 
‘equal’; or if he insists on doing so and himself practices 
what he preaches, we can simply invent another word for 
what we mean by ‘is’. 
Since Nagarjuna’s second premise is unwarranted, his 
attempted dilemma is dissolved.17 
                                                      
17  See Appendix 1: fallacies D and A. 
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Now consider argument 4(b). The first leg mentions a 
subject “without any predicate” and claims it 
“incomprehensible and non-existent”, so that eventual 
predication relative to it is senseless. The second leg 
therefore suggests that a subject can only have one predicate 
(if any, see earlier), and that ascribing more of them to it 
implies in each case that the preceding one did not fulfill its 
intended function (definition?) so that unending predication 
would be called for – an impossible task. But these 
arguments are worthless, because Nagarjuna clearly 
misrepresents predication; his view of it is a simplistic 
caricature. 
What do we in fact mean by a subject or a predicate? 
Primarily, an object of consciousness – an individual 
concrete or an abstract ultimately known through 
comparisons of such concretes18. This does not imply that we 
consider all existents as objects of consciousness, but only 
                                                      
18  By ‘concrete’ I mean an experienced or perceived object, a 
phenomenon. By ‘abstract’, an object of reasoning or conception. 
A third class of object I do not mention here (so as not to 
complicate the issues) – objects of self-knowledge or ‘intuitions’; 
suffices in the present context to say that, in relation to abstracts, 
they have the same position or role as concretes (namely, given 
data). 
42 Buddhist Illogic 
that as of the moment we think of something (as here) we 
must admit it as appearance and therefore as existent. 
Moreover, we need not and do not consider consciousness as 
invariably correct and all its objects as real – we may well 
conceive of an illusory object, which has no existence other 
than in the way of appearance. Secondly, this object (be it 
real or illusory) may be, and indeed has to be, cognized 
before we can name it and verbally predicate anything of it.19 
Predication, like its terms, is an object of consciousness 
before it is put into words. Consciousness of terms and 
propositions about them may be wordless; words are merely 
useful concretizations of intended objects of cognition. Also, 
before terms are brought together in a proposition, the objects 
intended by the terms have to be known (or believed, 
verbally or not) somewhat; the proposition serves to add to 
that knowledge of the terms, by observing or hypothesizing a 
certain relation between them.  
Nagarjuna tries to suggest the opposite, that we only know 
things in the framework of predication (and perhaps, of prior 
verbalization), and that predication merely elucidates or 
                                                      
19  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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restates knowledge (or belief) already present in the terms. 
But we may reply that something can well exist 
without/before being thought of, and be thought of alone 
without/before being verbalized; and even if/when named, it 
remains comprehensible without/before being made the 
subject of any non-verbal or verbal predications; and 
furthermore that predications are themselves objects of 
consciousness and that most of them enrich the meanings of 
both subject and predicate rather than merely redundantly 
repeating meanings already in them. Nagarjuna also 
apparently confuses predication with definition, when he 
considers that a single predication must suffice. In truth, any 
number of predicates may be ascribed to a subject; predicates 
are numerous because they are not tautologies of the subject; 
every term is a complex with a potential positive or negative 
relation to every other term. Even definition has no ambition 
to tell us everything about something, but merely claims to 
focus on one set of predicates, which seemingly abide 
invariably and exclusively with the subject; and a definition 
may turn out to be erroneous. 
In conclusion, Nagarjuna’s above arguments prove nothing 
but the incoherence of the particular view of discourse he 
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presents, and do not succeed in invalidating all discourse. 
The superficial form of his arguments is usually logical 
enough. But it is not enough to give logical form to our 
rhetoric, i.e. that the conclusion follows from the premises – 
the premises themselves have to be first be found obvious or 
reasonable. It is the premises of Nagarjuna’s arguments that I 
above contest as naïve and misleading; and my conclusion is 
merely that his conclusion is not convincingly established.20 
The theory of predication and underlying processes that I 
rebut his theory with may not answer all questions about 
these issues, but it is certainly more thought-out and closer to 
the truth. 
To the objection that his use of language to communicate his 
ideas and arguments implies an assumption (which he denies) 
that language contains knowledge of some reality, Nagarjuna 
replies that language is “conventional”. This vague 
accusation of divorce from all reality has little content, so 
long as it leaves unexplained just how – in convincing detail 
– such convention functions otherwise (for language 
evidently does function, as his using it admits). We can also 
                                                      
20  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
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point out that although words are in principle mere 
conventions, it does not follow that knowledge is 
“conventional”.  
First because that proposition, as a factual assertion, claims to 
know something beyond convention about knowledge; and as 
regards content, it claims the impossibility of any non-
conventional linguistic knowledge (including, presumably, 
the knowledge the proposition itself imparts); whence, to 
assert that linguistic knowledge is conventional is self-
contradictory. Secondly, all conventions imply factual 
knowledge: you have to know that there is a convention and 
what that convention is supposed to be and how to apply it 
correctly! You cannot have a convention about a 
convention… ad infinitum – it has to stop somewhere factual. 
Knowledge of conventions is also knowledge; a convention, 
too, is a reality in itself. It cannot float on an infinity of 
empty conventions, it has to finally be anchored on some real 
appearance.  
Thirdly, because the conventionality of words is 
misunderstood. Affixing a label on something, arbitrarily or 
by agreement, does not imply that the ‘something’ concerned 
need not be previously known. We can be aware of things, 
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and even think about them, without words. Words merely 
help us record rational products; giving us a relatively 
tangible instrument to manipulate. The value of words is not 
in making conceptual and logical thought possible, but only 
in making it easier (facilitating memory, classification, 
communication). Convention is therefore a secondary aspect 
of words; what counts is their meaning. A language 
composed only of meaningless words, each entirely defined 
by others, would have to be infinite in size, and would 
anyway communicate nothing outside itself. If the language 
is finite, like ours, it is bound to be based on some undefined 
prime words, and thus (since content is only verbal, here) be 
devoid of content, incommunicado. It could not even 
communicate its own conventions. 
Thus, Nagarjuna’s dismissal of language as such is an 
incoherent thesis, which upon closer scrutiny proves 
inconsistent with itself. 
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5.   Percepts and concepts. 
 
According to pre-Mahayana Buddhist (and other Indian) 
philosophers, the world we experience and think about is 
composed of “dharmas”21. This term has various meanings22, 
but the one focused on here seems to be equivalent to what 
we would call a phenomenon, or perhaps more broadly an 
appearance. A phenomenon is an object of experience; an 
appearance is an object of cognition of any kind, whether 
perceptual (phenomena), intuitive (objects of ‘self-
knowledge’) or conceptual (objects of rational knowledge, 
‘universals’). Dharmas are “momentary, particular and 
multiple”; they are “not supported by substance or self” yet 
have their “own or independent nature”; they are “distinct 
and separate, yet appear and disappear in accordance with the 
principle of causality”. Nagarjuna denies the “reality” and 
intelligibility of dharmas, using the following main 
arguments. 
                                                      
21  See Cheng, pp. 76-78, on this topic. He there refers to MT 
VII:1-2,23,25 and XV:1-2, as well as TGT IV:2, VI:1, VII, VIII:1. 
22  See Cheng, p. 128, for a list. 
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(a) He argues, “a momentary entity or impermanent 
dharma” can be “divided into non-enduring or non-
abiding” segments, each of which “has, analytically, 
no duration whatever. It disappears as soon as it 
appears. Therefore, it cannot be said to have true 
existence.” Yet, it is “supposed to have some 
duration.” Whence, “to say that an entity is 
impermanent is tantamount to saying that what 
abides is non-abiding,” which is “a contradiction in 
terms”. 
(b) Against the contention that “impermanence” does not 
signify “non-duration”, but refers to “the reality of 
the phenomenal” that each thing “arises, endures for 
a moment and then ceases to be”, Nagarjuna replies: 
“how [does each of these three] characteristics 
characterize a dharma?” Is it “simultaneously or 
successively”? It cannot be simultaneously, because 
“origination, duration and cessation are opposed by 
nature: at the time of cessation there should not be 
duration, and at the time of duration there should not 
be cessation.” It cannot be successively, because if the 
characteristics occur at different times, there would 
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be three different phenomena” and “how can 
different phenomena be true of the ‘same thing’?” 
(c) Furthermore, he argues: these three characteristics – 
origination, duration and cessation – must be either 
“created” or “non-created”. If they are the created, 
then each of them should in turn “have the three 
characteristics”, each of which in turn, “like other 
created things,” should have them, and so on ad 
infinitum. If, on the other hand, “each characteristic 
is non-created, how can it characterize a created 
thing?” In either case, then, we have a “conceptual 
problem”. 
(d) Moreover, he argues: “what is the relation between 
an object and characteristics?”23. Are they “identical” 
or “different”? “If identical, there would be no 
distinction between them, and it would be absurd to 
say that the one is object and the other, 
characteristics.” Nor could one say that they are 
identical in the sense that the object is “the substance 
                                                      
23  It is not clear here whether specifically the three 
characteristics of arising, enduring and ceasing are meant, or more 
generally any characteristics. But it does not affect the argument. 
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of” the characteristics, and the characteristics are 
“the manifestation of” the object. For to do so would, 
according to Nagarjuna, imply their relation to be 
“reflexive”, and therefore that “a thing would be 
subject and object at the same time”, which is 
“clearly impossible, because subject and object are 
different”. If, on the other hand, an object is 
“different from” its characteristics, “there would be 
no internal connection between them.” Therefore, 
“characteristics characterize objects” cannot be said. 
(e) He also argues, “whatever can be conceived to exist 
has a cause. All things are produced by a combination 
of various causes and conditions24. When the 
conditions change, things will also change and even 
disappear. To exist means to be caused, conditioned, 
generated or dependent on something. But by 
definition a dharma is an entity which has its own or 
independent nature.” Whence, he concludes, “to say 
                                                      
24  In Buddhist philosophy, causes are relatively internal or 
direct, conditions are relatively external or indirect. But the word 
‘cause’ may also be taken more broadly, to include such causes 
and conditions indiscriminately. See Lotus in a Stream, by Hsing 
Yun (New York: Weatherhill, 2000), for more details (pp. 80-82). 
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that a dharma exists would be the same as saying that 
an independent thing is dependent”, i.e. the claim 
“dharmas exist” is “a contradiction in terms” and 
“absurd”. 
Nagarjuna concluded from these arguments that the concept 
of dharma upheld by his predecessors, Buddhist or otherwise, 
was confused and untenable. Reality could not, therefore, be 
understood through such conceptual tools. But let us now 
look at his arguments more closely and critically. As we shall 
see, they are far from conclusive, and generally fallacious. 
Argument 5(a) is simply a claim that when a duration of 
time (moment) is infinitely divided, its constituent points of 
time (instants) have zero duration and, therefore, cannot be 
said to exist. This argument is already known to Western 
philosophy through the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea (born c. 
490 BCE), and has been amply contested since then by many 
philosophers, mathematicians and physicists, on various 
grounds25. My own (additional, yet essential) objection to it 
                                                      
25  See Ralph E. Kenyon Jr, Atomism and Infinite 
Divisibility, a doctoral dissertation presented to the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst, 1994. The full text is available on the 
Internet at http://www.xenodochy.org/rekphd/. 
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would be that Nagarjuna here fails to analyze how and in 
what order the concepts he uses arise.  
What is under discussion here (viz. the dharmas), are 
primarily phenomena, empirical givens. In fact, at any one 
moment of experience, what we perceive is one holistic 
phenomenon; the ‘cutting up’ of that total phenomenon into 
smaller, individual phenomena (different shapes, colors, 
sounds, etc.) is not in itself perception, but one of the first 
rational acts. We experience things in flux – coming, staying 
a while, going. To understand such motion, we construct a 
concept of time, which we gradually refine (with 
measurements, mathematics, Relativity theory). Motion is an 
experience, but time is a concept. The concept of time arises 
in response to the experience of motion, so it has to be 
tailored to fit and cannot be used to deny such experience. If 
a conflict occurs between the two, it is the concept and not 
the experience that has to be put in doubt and adjusted.26 
Now, what is the ‘infinite division’ of a phenomenon that 
Nagarjuna appeals to? It is not a physical act of slicing a 
phenomenon with a knife, or anything of the sort. For we 
                                                      
26  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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have no experience of infinite division in the physical realm; 
we may subdivide a material body or draw lines on a piece of 
paper or a computer screen only so far, not ad infinitum. 
Infinite division is an imaginary act. If the phenomenon is of 
the ‘material’ kind, the division may occur on a ‘mental’ 
image of it; if the phenomenon is already of the mental kind, 
the division can occur directly on it. But even in our heads, 
we do not in fact divide infinitely. We may slice the image, 
then mentally ‘zoom in’ and slice that slice, then zoom in and 
slice again a few more times, then we stop. 
Now, the zooming in is merely production of a new image – 
so we are not even, in fact, repeatedly subdividing the same 
image; we merely say ‘suppose this image is a detail of the 
preceding’. The new image has the same size as the 
preceding, but its scale is declared different. Furthermore, the 
subdivision process takes time, and we do not anyway have 
an infinity of time – so we have to stop it after a few sample 
shots, and then say ‘suppose I repeat this to infinity’. Thus, 
infinite division is not even a real act in the mental field, but 
a mere verbal statement – i.e. at best, a concept referring to 
the intention to ‘cut’ and memory of recurrent events, 
projected to a hazy ‘infinity’. 
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Furthermore, when we imagine division of a (two-
dimensional) phenomenon, we imagine (one dimensional) 
line drawn somewhere in the middle of it. But how is the 
geometrical entity known as a line (length devoid of width) 
first conceived? It is derived from experience of the visible 
boundaries of phenomena (with length and width) in relation 
to their surrounds; there has to be some difference between 
the two sides of a boundary for it to be visible. A line in the 
middle of an extended phenomenon is thus partly a concept, 
and not a pure percept. We never entirely see a line, we 
always have to some extent think it. We have to effectively 
accompany it with the thought ‘this line has no width’. Thus, 
the visualization of division does not in itself prove infinite 
divisibility. 
Nagarjuna, for all his supposed meditative introspection, has 
clearly not paid attention to how his concept of ‘infinite 
division’ arose in detail.27 His argument or ‘thought 
experiment’ is without substance, because he has in fact 
certainly not engaged in ‘infinite division’. He has not shown 
experientially that dharmas of zero extension in time are the 
                                                      
27  See Appendix 1: fallacy E. 
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building blocks of dharmas with duration in time. He has 
therefore not demonstrated that a contradiction exists in the 
concept of momentary dharma. 
Let us now move on to argument 5(b). It is true of all 
phenomena that they are momentary. It does not follow that 
all existents are momentary, but that need not concern us 
here. Nagarjuna’s predecessors or opponents are quite correct 
in their analysis of the momentary as something that appears, 
endures awhile then disappears. Nagarjuna is correct in 
saying that these three characteristics are opposed, i.e. cannot 
occur simultaneously. But his definition of simultaneity as 
“at the time of” is vague and misleading. His definition of 
succession as occurrence “at different times” is also 
incorrect. Both premises of his dilemma are therefore 
confused, as we shall now see. 
For the arising and the ceasing are conceived as at the 
temporal boundaries of the duration, and so not as in it nor 
quite as outside it. Arising occurs at the instant (the 
unextended point of time) the duration starts, and ceasing 
occurs at the instant the duration ends. The concept of arising 
refers to just that instant of flip-over from absence to 
presence, and the concept of ceasing to just that instant of 
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passing from presence to absence. The coming, staying and 
going are successive, in the sense that the arising and the 
ceasing are not simultaneous with each other. But each of the 
latter is instantaneous and contiguous (and in that sense only, 
simultaneous) with the duration (at either end of it). They 
cannot therefore be said to be ‘at different times’ from it. The 
arising cannot be said to be ‘before’ the duration and the 
ceasing cannot be said to be ‘after’ the duration; they are not 
time-consuming processes (though such processes may 
precede and cause them). The two limits of duration (be it 
brief or long) cannot actually be dissociated from it. The 
phenomenon remains one, even as we conceptually 
distinguish three ‘characteristics’ of it. 
We thus see that Nagarjuna’s argument is based on a stupid 
or deliberate fuzziness of definition.28 The confusions 
involved in his dilemma are entirely of his own fabrication; 
he sows them to have pretexts for criticism. He uses ‘at the 
same time’ to mean ‘in overlapping durations’ and ‘at 
different times’ to mean ‘in separate durations’, whereas 
what is under discussion is instants which are the edges of a 
                                                      
28  See Appendix 1: fallacy F. 
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duration. No wonder then that he concludes that there is 
either contradiction or separation. 
Now study argument 5(c). Two arguments are intermingled 
in it – one relates to the hierarchy of concepts and percepts29, 
the other relates to causation. 
Nagarjuna claims that the three stages (arising, staying, 
ceasing) of each phenomenon may be viewed as in turn a 
phenomenon. What he relies on here is a reification of the 
first and last stages; he tacitly implies that because they have 
separate names they too have durations. The distinctions 
between the three are thus erased. If we consider the 
conceptual development involved, we see that, in a first 
phase, ‘phenomenon’ refers to a unit of perception (a piece of 
the perceptual field isolated by mental projection, to be 
exact); in a second phase, we distinguish within this event or 
thing an instantaneous beginning, a momentary middle and 
an instantaneous end, and accordingly form concepts of 
arising, enduring and ceasing. The latter are abstract aspects 
of the concrete phenomenon, and therefore in a sense ‘present 
in’ it and ‘part of’ it.  
                                                      
29  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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But contrary to what Nagarjuna suggests, it does not follow 
that arising and ceasing in turn have a beginning, a middle 
and an end – since they are instantaneous. It does not even 
follow that the middle part of the initial phenomenon has 
another beginning, middle and end – since we have already 
abstracted the two ends of the phenomenon away from its 
middle. We thus have no basis for an infinite regression of 
concepts; we remain only justified in having one concrete 
phenomenon and only three abstract aspects of it. The 
“characteristics” are phenomenal in the sense of being 
distinguishable in a phenomenon; but not being themselves 
‘divisible’ in the same way as it, they cannot rightly be called 
phenomenal in the same sense as it. One cannot say that 
arising both arises and ceases at once, or say the same about 
ceasing; because neither of them has duration; that which 
arises has to be absent for a while then present for a while, 
and similarly in the opposite direction with ceasing. 
Furthermore, whatever produces the primary phenomenon 
also produces the three aspects of it we have distinguished in 
it; they do not require additional causes that will separately 
produce them. Even if we regard, as did Nagarjuna’s 
philosophical forerunners, everything in the phenomenal as 
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having been “created” (in the sense at least of being produced 
by preceding causes and conditions), perhaps in an infinite 
chain, it does not mean that such causality forks out 
repeatedly and endlessly.  
The “thing” caused, with all its characteristics, is one. 
Ordinarily, the cause causes arrival, a minimum stay, and if 
the event is momentary thereafter a departure. We may in 
some cases identify something as causing the arrival of that 
thing; a second as causing its staying on; and a third as 
causing its departure. But even then the cause of the arrival is 
also partially a cause of the staying on and of the departure, 
since without arriving a momentary event would not be able 
to stay or depart. Also, the cause of the staying on is a partial 
cause – in a negative sense of a hindrance – of the eventual 
departure. In such cases, however, ‘the cause’ of the 
phenomenon as a whole would simply be composed of a 
series of three subsidiary ‘causes’ – one determining the 
arising and a minimum momentary stay, the next prolonging 
the duration after arrival and preventing ceasing, and the last 
interrupting duration and determining ceasing. This is merely 
an analysis of causation and not a multiplication of causes ad 
infinitum. 
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Thus, we have replied to Nagarjuna that the thing 
characterized is not apart from its three characteristics, and 
they do not in turn each have three characteristics. Also, the 
respective causes of the three characteristics together sum up 
to the cause of what they characterize, and its cause is not 
apart from their causes. Nagarjuna gives the impression of 
making logical analyses, but in fact he glosses over details 
and nuances at his personal convenience.30 His arguments 
give an appearance of structure and order, but beneath them 
lies a great carelessness in observation. 
Now study argument 5(d). Are an object and its 
characteristics “identical” or “different”? An individual 
object could be regarded as the sum total of all 
characteristics, permanent and transient, observable in it. 
More precisely, if (or so long as) one or several, or one or 
several combination(s), of these characteristics is observed in 
the object and never in any other, we may consider every 
such single or collective characteristic as a sign of the object, 
i.e. as signifying its individuality or essence. The single or 
collective characteristic(s) exclusive to an object could thus 
                                                      
30  See Appendix 1: fallacy E. 
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be regarded as “identical” with it for all intents and purposes, 
without however wholly equating it/them to the object. For 
the object as a whole should be taken to include its non-
distinctive attributes or actions, as well as its distinctive 
essences.  
So the answer to Nagarjuna’s question is as follows. His 
terminology is as usual lacking in nuances31; for this reason, 
the choices he gives us seem restrictive and force us into 
dead ends. We have to first distinguish essential (distinctive) 
characteristics (or sets of them) from common (non-
exclusive) ones. The individual object is the totality of its 
facets and history, including both these types of 
characteristics. The essential characteristics could be 
considered as the “substance” of the object; the non-essential 
ones, as its “manifestation”. This would avoid any 
implication of “reflexive” relation. Thus, we can regard some 
characteristics as “identical” with the object (without 
however meaning equal to it); and others as “different” from 
it (which does not imply them disconnected from it). And we 
can well say that “characteristics characterize objects”, while 
                                                      
31  See Appendix 1: fallacy E. 
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remaining aware that the subject and verb of this proposition 
are of variable meaning. 
Of course, none of this tells us what the “relation” between 
an object and its characteristics precisely is, i.e. in what sense 
the later ‘belong’ to the former. We have above just accepted 
that there are relations, which we can in practice identify by 
observation and distinguish between statistically. To better 
understand the relational aspect, we need to develop a theory 
of ‘universals’ – what are these things and how do we know 
them? What we perceive are concrete objects; the 
‘universals’ are abstractions from these phenomena.  
Abstraction is performed by comparisons and contrasts 
between present phenomena and/or presumed memories of 
past phenomena. Abstracts are apparent as the various 
measures or degrees in the wave motions that constitute 
phenomena. Phenomena of light, sound, etc. have various 
intensities, frequencies, etc. These quantitative or 
mathematical variations are inherent in the phenomena of 
perception; some are measured roughly and ‘instinctively’, 
others, through conscious experiment and careful calculation. 
In either case, rational work is required to distinguish them 
out from their perceptual context, and from each other; and to 
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name, interrelate and classify them; and to keep our theses 
concerning them logically consistent. For this reason, we 
regard them as objects of another level of cognition, the 
conceptual, and say that abstracts are known by conception. 
In the Buddhist tradition preceding Nagarjuna, “dharmas” are 
already said to be “empty”. This can be rationally understood 
to mean, not that objects are devoid of essential 
characteristics (in the sense above defined), but that there is 
nothing non-phenomenal (or noumenal) to consider behind 
the phenomenal. I would agree with this proposition, and 
submit that when other Buddhist philosophers combat the 
idea of “essences”, they are not denying that abstract 
characteristics are distinguishable within phenomena and that 
some of those are distinctive, but are denying a particular 
philosophical development, namely the notion that “an 
object” is more than (or even other than) its evident 
phenomenal aspects and the inductively justifiable 
abstractions therefrom (which, to repeat, are merely 
measurements). The doctrine of “emptiness” initially 
opposed such fanciful reification as sidetracking our 
attention, and recommended we remain focused on what is in 
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fact apparent to us. Knowledge is knowledge of actual 
phenomena, not of some imagined ‘reality’ behind them. 
A lot of the confusion in this issue is due to failure to 
make two distinctions. If we perceptually knew all the 
phenomena ever existing in the universe, we 
obviously could not logically claim that there might 
be any further phenomenon hidden behind them. But 
because we conceptually know (having memory of 
our changing scope of knowledge, and in any case the 
uncertainty at all times that we have perceived 
everything) that we have access to only some of the 
phenomena in the universe, we can legitimately 
suppose that there might be yet unknown phenomena 
to consider, and that these might in yet unknown ways 
affect known phenomena. Furthermore, even if the 
totality of existents appeared to us, i.e. even if we 
experienced everything that ever is, was or will be, on 
a concrete level, we could still additionally abstract 
their similarities and differences, and their statistical 
regularities and irregularities, and point to such 
abstract aspects as underlying substrata or causes. 
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Thus, two distinctions are called for. The first is a 
distinction between a theoretical perceptual 
omniscience, from which viewpoint by definition no 
hidden phenomena are conceivable, and a practical 
relativity of knowledge to limited perceptual context, 
which viewpoint allows for supposition of unknown 
but subterraneously operative phenomena. In the 
former case, ‘existent’ and ‘apparent’ are co-
extensive, but in the latter case ‘existent’ is a genus of 
‘apparent’. Secondly, neither of these absolute and 
relative positions excludes a category of being and 
knowing other than the perceptual, viz. the 
conceptual, from being appealed to. In both cases, 
abstracts can still be posited as ‘underlying’ concretes. 
Here, the concept of ‘apparent’ is enlarged to include 
not only concretes (phenomena) but also abstracts 
(universals). 
On this basis, we can ask what Buddhism means when 
it says that “dharmas” are “empty”. Does it mean that 
phenomena have no other phenomena behind them? 
This may be affirmed by a proven omniscient Subject, 
but the rest of us have to always concede that there 
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are probably phenomena hidden to us (as we often 
discover later), which may impinge on those known to 
us. Does it, alternatively, mean that concrete 
appearances (phenomena) have no abstract 
appearances behind them? This cannot logically be 
claimed without self-contradiction, since such a claim 
is itself manifestly abstract; the fact of the claim must 
itself be taken into consideration. One may 
legitimately argue, discursively, about the objectivity 
or subjectivity of the abstract, but not about its 
ultimate validity in some way. Also, whether the 
abstract is present in the object or in the subject, it still 
abides – at least in the sense that there is no time 
duration when it is absent from existence. 
Nagarjuna’s doctrine of “emptiness” includes not only the 
previous denial of a noumenal world, but equally denial of 
the phenomenal world.32 It is an attempted one-upmanship on 
his predecessors. They were anti-rationalist, in the sense of 
rejecting a certain excess of rationalism, a sickness or error of 
rational projection that ignores, obscures or eclipses 
                                                      
32  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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experience. He typically takes a more radical and extreme 
posture and rejects all rationalism indiscriminately. But this 
is really a rejection of experience, a claim that ultimate 
reality is beyond it – i.e. it is in effect another form of 
noumenalism, a return to the sickness his predecessors 
combated. He pretends that his conclusion can be reached by 
logical means; but his means are evidently not logical. 
Finally, consider argument 5(e). Nagarjuna takes as one of 
his premises that all conceivable existents have causes of 
some sort. But that is debatable.33 We might accept a 
statement that all phenomena (i.e. perceived existents, 
concretes) have causes – though even that is debatable. For 
such a general statement can only at best be known 
inductively, by hypothetical generalization from cases where 
causality has specifically been established; strictly speaking, 
it is also conceivable that some phenomena (or perhaps some 
unperceived concrete existents) are eternal or spontaneous or 
free (i.e. uncaused in some sense). But what of conceived 
existents (abstracts) – do they also, as he claims, all have 
causes? That is even more debatable. When we speak of a 
                                                      
33  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
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kind of thing causing another kind of thing, we more 
precisely mean that instances of the former cause instances of 
the latter. As for large abstractions, like God or the universe 
as a whole, or even just existence, we can conceive them as 
existing without cause. 
As a second premise Nagarjuna takes the idea of his 
philosophical predecessors or opponents that a “dharma” has 
“its own or independent nature” as meaning that it is 
independent of causes. But this is not their intended meaning, 
which is only that dharmas are “distinct and separate”, i.e. 
each have a specific nature of their own. This is evident in 
their explicit position that, as we have seen, dharmas “appear 
and disappear in accordance with the principle of causality”. 
So Nagarjuna is playing on the equivocation of the term 
“independent”. He does so to load the dice in favor of his 
desired conclusion, making it seem as if they made self-
contradictory claims about dharmas.34 
Nagarjuna thus has not disproved the statement that dharmas 
exist. And in fact such a statement has no need of rational 
proof, if it is understood to mean that phenomena exist, for 
                                                      
34  See Appendix 1: fallacy F. 
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that is empirically evident. We know for sure of the existence 
of “existence” only through the experience of phenomena.35 
The concept of existence is based on that of phenomena, 
enlarging the latter to include hypothetical unperceived 
concretes, and at a later stage hypothetical abstracts and 
hypothetical objects of intuition (self-knowledge).  
What, anyway, do we mean by the “nature” of a thing? My 
understanding of the term refers to the ‘laws’ of behavior of 
the thing, signifying that things exhibit certain regularities of 
behavior (being or doing). For instances, something may 
have character X or do X always (while in existence), or only 
when Y occurs. Apparently, in our universe, things cannot be 
or do just anything we imagine for them. Maybe, if 
everything is just energy, they ultimately can; but the world 
as we observe it so far seems to contain things with limited 
behavior possibilities. We acknowledge this apparent fact by 
saying that existents have a ‘nature’. We do not thereby 
imply them independent of causes, as Nagarjuna suggests, 
but on the contrary say that if things have causes, they have a 
nature. Moreover, even something without causes may have a 
                                                      
35  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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nature, if it has limited behavior patterns. Only something not 
subject to ‘law’ at all has no ‘nature’. 
Phenomena may yet be ultimately not subject to ‘law’, i.e. 
devoid of ‘nature’. But to support that thesis, Nagarjuna 
ought rather to have emphasized, like his predecessors, the 
positivistic idea that phenomena exist in succession, each 
moment caused by a previous and causing the next, without 
an underlying continuity between them across time. This 
concept remains conceivable, if we gloss over our 
observations of regularity, arguing that regularity is only 
known by generalization. But generalization is justified as 
follows36. We observe certain things that are X to always be 
Y; we infer that all X are Y, because we refuse to assume that 
there are Xs that are not Y until we have observed such 
negative cases. On the other hand, to refuse to generalize 
would be to admit such imagined changes in polarity without 
empirical basis. 
Thus, generalization (duly controlled by particularization, 
when new observations belie it) is a more empirical rational 
act than non-generalization; it makes less assumptions. I have 
                                                      
36  See my Future Logic, ch. 50 and 54-55. 
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observed some Xs that are Y, and maintain that all are since 
some are; but I have not observed any Xs that are not Y, so 
how can I presume the latter possible without specific 
additional reasons? The notion that anything might become 
anything is thus a very hard thesis to prove – one would have 
to observe everything eventually turning into everything else, 
one could not appeal to any generalization whatsoever. One 
would also have to explain why different things were 
transformed in different sequences. One would therefore have 
to be omniscient to prove such a thesis. Or one would have to 
find some convincing indirect theoretical reason to believe it, 
such as experimental and mathematical evidence that all 
energies are convertible into all others (a unified field 
theory), which neither Nagarjuna nor anyone has succeeded 
in doing yet. 
To summarize, all five arguments proposed by Nagarjuna in 
relation to the concept of dharmas are faulty (the three middle 
arguments being inconclusive dilemmas37, the other two not 
self-contradictory), and indeed probably intentionally so. It is 
not the concepts he attacks that are absurd or contradictory, it 
                                                      
37  See Appendix 1: fallacy B. 
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is his own discourse that merits such condemnation. It may 
seem incredible that so many people for so many centuries 
have studied his work without crying ‘foul!’ – but, what can I 
say, that is the way of the human psyche. It can allow itself to 
be intimidated by someone’s prestige and submit 
unthinkingly to authority, or to gloss over incredulity in 
response to a promise of salvation dangled appetizingly 
before it. 
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6.   Motion and rest. 
 
Nagarjuna denies the knowability and possibility of motion 
and likewise of rest, and purports to refute them by various 
arguments38, thus (by negation) proving the truth of the 
“emptiness” doctrine. He does this by means of outwardly 
logical argument forms, like (two- or three-pronged) 
dilemmas or showing some propositions to be self-
contradictory or circular. But in all cases, it is evident that 
some of the premises he appeals to are arbitrary and designed 
to sow confusion so as to yield his foregone conclusions. I 
shall first present his arguments, then their rebuttal. 
a) According to Cheng, Nagarjuna divides the “path of 
motion” into three segments, the “already passed”, the 
“yet-to-be passed” and the “being passed”, and argues 
that if we examine each of these, we cannot find “the 
act of passing” in it, concluding that “motion is 
impossible and cannot be established”. The act of 
                                                      
38  See Cheng, pp. 78-83, on this topic. He there refers to MT 
II:1-21. Nagarjuna’s claim that motion is impossible is comparable 
to that of Zeno the Eleatic, but the latter does not deny rest like the 
former; furthermore, their arguments are very different. 
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passing is not to be found in the already passed, 
“because it has already been passed”; nor in the yet-
to-be passed, “because it is not yet”; nor in the being 
passed, “because if we are still examining whether 
there is the act of passing, how can we use the ‘the 
path which is being passed’ to establish the act of 
passing?” 
b) Similarly, Nagarjuna contends that motion cannot 
even “begin”, in any of these three segments. Not in 
the already passed, because is it is “the effect of” the 
beginning to pass, which “is over”. Nor in the 
beginning to pass, because it is “the starting point of 
change” (i.e. it precedes the yet-to-be passed), which 
“has no change yet”. Nor in the being passed, which 
“is possible only if there is an act of passing,” which in 
turn “is possible only if there is a beginning of 
passing”. Additionally, “since motion cannot even be 
started, how can we talk about a place to go?” 
c) Similarly, it is claimed that “the mover or moving 
entity cannot be established” and that “the mover 
cannot move”. For “if someone moves… we cannot 
say that ‘the one who has already moved’ moves 
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because his action is over”; and “we cannot say that 
‘the one who has not yet moved’ moves because that 
involves a contradiction”. Finally, we cannot say “the 
mover means ‘the one who is moving’”, since “there 
can be a mover only when there is an act of moving, 
yet whether there is an act of moving is the issue we 
are examining” and so we would be “begging the 
question”.  
d) It is also claimed doubly fallacious to say “the mover 
moves”, because we would be asserting that “the 
mover can be separated from the act of motion” and 
that “there are two kinds of motion, namely, motion in 
the mover and motion in the act of moving”. Here, 
Nagarjuna questions the very relation between mover 
and motion. Are the two “identical or different”? If 
the former, then “the mover would always be 
moving”. If the latter, then “the mover can exist 
without motion, and vice versa”. Both these 
assumptions are “absurd”, so “neither motion nor 
mover could be established”. 
e) Lastly, we might be tempted to conclude, from the 
preceding arguments against motion, that everything 
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is at rest; but Nagarjuna preempts this way out, by 
arguing that even “rest cannot be established” as 
follows. That which rests is either a “mover (or 
moving thing)” or a “non-mover (or non-moving 
thing)”. But “it is absurd to say that the mover rests, 
because this involves contradiction”; nor can it be said 
that “the mover rests when he stops moving”, because 
“when someone stops moving, he is not the mover 
anymore”. It is also impossible to say that “the non-
mover rests… because rest means cessation of 
motion,” and since “the non-mover does not move” he 
“cannot cease to move (rest)”. Since these are the only 
two alternatives, “rest is impossible”. 
f) Another argument with the same conclusion: rest 
“must happen at some place or at some time”. It 
cannot happen “at that which is already passed (or the 
past), or at that which is yet to be passed (or the 
future), or at that which is being passed (or the 
present)”, because “as pointed out previously, there 
cannot be motion in any one of these situations, hence 
there cannot be the cessation of motion, or rest.” 
Cheng goes on to explain: “For Nagarjuna, motion 
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and rest are relative to each other”, and he concludes 
“hence both are devoid of specific character or nature, 
and neither is real.” 
Thus Nagarjuna apparently shows that “one cannot hold that 
what is real is permanent or impermanent”. It would follow 
that the beliefs relating to motion and rest, generated by 
ordinary consciousness and by its logic, are illusory and 
invalid; whence, we ought to instead adhere to that other, 
superior way of knowledge defended by Nagarjuna – 
awareness of the void. All this is of course nonsense, as I 
shall now demonstrate.  
Let us start with argument 6(a). At first sight, it may be 
construed as an attempt to say, as the Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus did, that you cannot step into the same river twice 
– or indeed once, since as you are stepping into it, its waters 
have already moved on. But the intent of such a statement is 
merely to say that everything is always in motion. This is 
indeed one of the tenets of traditional Buddhism 
(“impermanence”, anitya), but not Nagarjuna’s intent here, 
which is a denial of motion as such. 
His argument states that actual motion (“the act of passing”) 
has to take place in past, future or present. Being by 
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definition present, actual motion admittedly cannot take place 
in the past or future, as the first two premises imply. But that 
does not mean that when the past was present, motion was 
not actual in it; nor that when the future becomes present, 
motion will not be actual in it. The label “actual” is not 
static, but refers dynamically to every instance of “the 
present”; as the present changes position on the time-line, so 
does the reference point of actuality. As for the third premise, 
it is misleading, for we can well (and indeed must) say that 
actual motion exists in the present.39 Nagarjuna suggests that 
we have to prove (“examine” and “establish”) that actuality is 
in the present before we can affirm it. But even if this were 
granted, the inferred third premise would be problematic, and 
not the assertion that actuality is not in the present; in which 
case, the dilemma as a whole would remain inconclusive, and 
not result in denial that motion is possible and knowable.40 
However, furthermore, we can prove that motion is actual in 
the present. We can refer to the appearance of actual motion 
in the present, and claim it as ‘empirical evidence’. Such 
experience is logically sufficient to prove the point at issue, 
                                                      
39  See Appendix 1: fallacy H. 
40  See Appendix 1: fallacy B. 
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even if only taken phenomenologically, as mere appearance, 
irrespective of the status of ‘reality’ or ‘illusion’ ultimately 
granted to particular motions, and irrespective of the issue as 
to whether what is perceived (the phenomenal) is material or 
mental or whatever. Additionally, we have to ask how the 
concepts of actuality, motion and present arise in the first 
place. They arise in relation to such experiences, and 
therefore cannot be required to be thereafter “proved” by 
unstated means and standards to be related to them.41 There 
is no inconsistency or circularity in our position; it is 
Nagarjuna’s position that deserves such criticism. 
Next, consider argument 6(b). Without a doubt, when 
motion begins, it must begin in past, future or present. But 
incidentally, a fourth possibility exists, which Nagarjuna does 
not mention – that of a motion without beginning; so we 
should say when and if motion begins. Even so, here all three 
horns of his dilemma are incorrect.42  
Motion may well begin in the past – even if later motion, in 
the more recent past, is a consequence of such earlier 
(beginning) motion; there is nothing illogical in this scenario, 
                                                      
41  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
42  See Appendix 1: fallacy B. 
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and Nagarjuna’s rejection of it is arbitrary.43 Motion may also 
well begin in the future – it has indeed not yet begun, but 
when and if it does, it will take place in the segment of the 
time-line we now call the future; this too is obvious and quite 
consistent. Nagarjuna seems to have trouble understanding 
the tenses of verbs, freezing some verbs (e.g. begin) in the 
present tense while mixing them with others in the past or 
future tenses.44 Lastly, motion, when (and if) it begins, begins 
in the present; “beginning of passing”, “act of passing” and 
“being passed” are one and the same in the present instant 
(point of time), though as the present stretches into a moment 
(duration) the concepts may diverge. Nagarjuna uses that 
ambiguity to suggest a conceptual conflict, but there is 
none.45 Incidentally, similar arguments could have been 
formulated with regard to “ending of motion”, and similarly 
rebutted. 
Let us now inspect argument 6(c). Here again, Nagarjuna 
tries to confuse us with mixtures of tenses, in his first two 
                                                      
43  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
44  See Appendix 1: fallacy H. 
45  See Appendix 1: fallacy F. 
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premises.46 We indeed cannot say that one who has already 
moved now moves, but we can say that he did then move; his 
action is now over, but was not over then. Nor indeed can we 
say that one who has not-yet moved is currently moving, but 
we can say without contradiction that he may well later 
move. As for the third premise, it is true that we cannot speak 
of a mover (or moving thing)47 without referring to a 
movement, but it is not true that whether there is a movement 
is an issue under examination. As indicated earlier, the 
present motion under discussion is an empirical given, not 
requiring further proof of whatever kind. The concept of it 
arises only in relation to such experiences (current, or at least 
remembered), and all discussion about it is subsequent; 
without such experience, the word ‘motion’ would be 
meaningless to all of us, including Nagarjuna, and there 
would be nothing to discuss.48 
                                                      
46  See Appendix 1: fallacy H. 
47  The terms ‘mover’ or ‘moving thing’ are clearly not 
intended here to have causal connotations, i.e. to tell us who or 
what is causing the movement or being caused to move. That is 
not the issue under discussion, note well. The terms are meant 
neutrally, to refer to the underlying entity undergoing movement. 
48  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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Whether or not motion necessitates an underlying entity (a 
mover or moving thing) is, however, an issue – we can 
legitimately ask the question. The assumption of a substratum 
to (empirical) motion is a more complex, conceptual act, 
subject to the usual checks and balances of inductive and 
deductive logic. On a naïve, pre-philosophical level, we 
would argue that we never experience instances of 
disembodied motion, but always things in motion. But further 
reflection puts this impression in doubt, for we cannot 
empirically equate a body experienced at one time to a body 
experienced at another time. Such equation is very 
conceptual, requiring a hypothesis of continuity. We may 
claim that hypothesis as inductively true, if it is consistent 
and repeatedly confirmed, and providing no counter-
hypothesis of equal or better coherence and credibility is 
found, but we cannot claim it as a purely empirical or 
deductive truth. 
“Whether there is an act of moving” is not an issue; the issue 
is whether there is an abiding “mover or moving thing” 
beneath that “act of moving”, or whether that “act of 
moving” is a mere event of successive experiences flashing 
forth. My own answer would be that even if there are no 
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individual entities behind successive appearances, we can at 
least point to existence as such as a substance, or the universe 
as a whole as an entity, and regard that as necessarily abiding 
in the midst of its successive, changing appearances. If this 
argument establishes a collective substratum, then individual 
substrata become more easily acceptable. 
Moreover, the concept of a substratum is not an arbitrary 
invention, but designed to register and explain the enduring 
similarities between successive appearances despite the 
dissimilarities we label as changes. We say that change has 
occurred because we notice that two appearances are in some 
respects different; we can also say that something has 
endured because we notice that the two appearances are in 
other respects the same. Without the hypothesis of some 
constant underlying change, we would have to regard the 
remaining similarities between the two appearances as mere 
coincidence. But it seems improbable to us that such 
repetition would be just happenstance; explanation seems 
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called for. It is to calm our surprise at such recurring 
coincidences that we posit a substratum or substrata.49 
As already explained in the previous chapter, this underlying 
constancy may in some cases be identified as something 
concrete (i.e. a phenomenon to be sought and found), 
whereas in other cases it remains merely abstract (i.e. just an 
appearance of sameness in some respect). The constancy may 
most appropriately be labeled a substance or entity if it is 
phenomenal. But even in cases where no phenomenal 
substratum can be pointed to or found, but only the repetition 
over time of an abstract characteristic, we may think of the 
latter as a substratum of sorts, for abstract existence is also a 
category of being. This is especially true if abstracts are 
regarded as objective; but it is also true if they are considered 
                                                      
49  To give an example. A bird stays awhile in my field of 
vision. Many of its features are constant (e.g. the shape of its 
head); some vary (e.g. its wings may be folded or spread out). If 
the bird appearance changed suddenly into the appearance of a 
rabbit, then a tree, then a car, then an elephant – I might well be 
tempted to consider appearances as without substratum. But 
because this does not happen, at least not within the brief and 
narrow scope of my experience of life, I opt for the thesis that there 
is an underlying entity (that I call a concrete “bird”). At a later stage, 
seeing many similar entities, having in common various anatomical 
and biological characteristics (such as wings, etc.), which 
distinguish them from other entities (e.g. winged insects), I 
additionally formulate an abstract class of “birds”. 
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subjective, for in such case the continuity of something 
within the Subject has to be admitted. 
Thus, Nagarjuna’s third premise is wrong in some respects 
and right in others. Ab initio, he is wrong in doubting motion 
and alleging a circularity, but right in effectively doubting a 
mover or moving thing. The former is not inferred from the 
latter, but vice versa. The former is empirical and requires no 
proof, the latter is hypothetical and requires proof. But reason 
is able to propose proof. The proof proposed by it is, 
however, inductive, not deductive. The room for doubt that 
inductive (as against deductive) proof leaves over, opens a 
window of opportunity for the thesis of “emptiness”; but that 
is not thanks to Nagarjuna’s wobbly reasoning.50 His 
Buddhist goal is still possible (perhaps through meditation), 
but not his discursive means. 
Now for argument 6(d). Let us first focus on Nagarjuna’s 
claim that if mover and motion were “identical” then “the 
mover would always be moving”. He ignores that we may 
well call that which is moving a mover during the duration of 
his motion, without implying that this label remains 
                                                      
50  See Appendix 1: fallacy B. 
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applicable before or after the motion.51 Furthermore, that 
motion and mover are precisely co-extensive in time does not 
imply that they are “identical”; if that was our belief, we 
would not use distinct words for them (or we would consider 
them synonymous) – our intention in doing so is to refer to 
distinct aspects of the whole event, the perceived change of 
place and the conceived substratum of such change.  
Likewise, his claim that if mover and motion are “different” 
they could exist separately is gratuitous. Two aspects of a 
single event may be distinguished intellectually without 
signifying that they ever appear separately on a concrete 
level. “Motion” and “mover” are two types of concept, 
formed relative to the same percepts. “Motion” as a concept 
refers to the abstract common character of all concrete 
motions, known by comparisons between them and contrasts 
to other things (such as restful events). “Mover” is another 
sort of concept, referring to a hypothetical explanation of the 
existence of constancies as well as variations observed in the 
course of motions, as above explained. Both refer back to the 
                                                      
51  See Appendix 1: fallacy H. 
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same collection of concretes, yet each concentrates on an 
abstract level on a different aspect of what was perceived. 
Furthermore, when Nagarjuna suggests that to say “the 
mover moves” implies belief that the mover can be 
concretely “separated” from the motion, and that there are 
“two kinds of motion” (one “in” the mover and the other “in” 
the moving), he is not showing commonplace theses to be 
fallacious, but merely attacking red-herring theses of his own 
interpolation. He takes advantage of the equivocation in the 
word separation, to confuse mental and physical, or more 
precisely intellectual (abstract) and phenomenal (concrete), 
separation. And he artificially adds a new and redundant third 
concept to those of motion and mover, referring to motion 
“in” each of them – although we never ordinarily regard 
motion as itself moving52 or a mover as having a motion 
besides the motion by virtue of which he is labeled a mover. 
Thus, both horns of Nagarjuna’s dilemma are based on mere 
equivocations, and therefore unfounded.53 
                                                      
52  This is not to be confused with the concept of acceleration, 
i.e. change of velocity. 
53  See Appendix 1: fallacies F and B. 
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Finally, let us examine argument 6(e). Here again, 
Nagarjuna is playing on words. Certainly, as his first premise 
remarks, we cannot without self-contradiction say that “the 
mover rests” – but we can consistently say that that which 
was previously moving is now resting. The label “mover” is 
not forever fixed once applied to something, but applicable 
only so long as that thing is considered in motion; thereafter, 
a new label must be applied to it, that of “thing at rest”. 
Nagarjuna himself admits this in the next breath, when he 
argues “when someone stops moving, he is not the mover 
anymore”. He adduces this to deny that “the mover rests 
when he stops moving”, and then goes on to define rest as 
“cessation of motion”, again contradicting himself. But 
anyway, “rest” does not exactly mean cessation of motion, it 
refers more broadly to absence of motion. Cessation is a 
special case of absence, and not co-extensive with it; 
something may be at rest without precedent motion as well as 
after motion.  
In his second premise, aiming to deny that the “non-mover 
rests”, he conversely implies that the “non-mover” was not 
previously moving and so could not have ceased to move and 
so cannot be at rest. But we can reply without self-
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contradiction that something may well be a non-mover at 
present, and yet have been a mover in the past (who ceased to 
move); or that anyway he may be at rest now without having 
in the past moved and then stopped moving. Our concept of 
time is built precisely to deal with such issues. The label non-
moving is not inalienable, but tied to actual situations of rest 
and inappropriate in all other situations; moreover, the 
concepts and labels of “non-moving” and “rest” are intended 
as identical (mere synonyms, and antonyms of “moving” and 
non-rest”). 
All these comments are of course obvious to everyone, but 
have to be made here to show point-by-point the tragicomedy 
of Nagarjuna’s word-games. Both premises of Nagarjuna’s 
dilemma are dissolved, being based on unfair fixation of 
terms.54 
With regard to argument 6(f). Nagarjuna here recalls his 
earlier arguments against motion, and infers from their 
alleged conclusion that motion is impossible, that cessation 
of motion, and therefore rest, are likewise impossible. We 
can answer: indeed, if there was no motion, there would be 
                                                      
54  See Appendix 1: fallacies H and B. 
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no cessation of motion; but since motion was not successfully 
disproved, it cannot be inferred that cessation of motion has 
also been disproved. Furthermore, even if motion and 
cessation of motion were disproved, it would not follow that 
rest is impossible or unknowable, for rest is a genus of both 
“cessation of motion” and “never in motion”, and to deny 
one species does not necessitate denial of the other (or else 
denial of anything would imply denial of everything).55 In 
short, if there was no motion in the world, it would just 
follow that everything is at rest – the universe would simply 
be static56. 
Thus, Nagarjuna’s cunning attempt to deny rest as well as 
motion, and thereby to invalidate “dualistic” reason and 
impose a “non-dualistic” consciousness, is easily disabled. 
Both motion and rest remain conceivable and consistent 
theses; his “logic” is fake throughout. Nevertheless, we must 
address his last assumption, that (as Cheng puts it) “motion 
and rest are relative to each other”. Let us here generously 
ignore his specification of rest as cessation of motion, and 
consider the term properly to mean non-motion, because the 
                                                      
55  See Appendix 1: fallacy C. 
56  A vision seemingly adopted by Parmenides, incidentally. 
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issue is important and moot. I have stated that motion has to 
be accepted as undeniable empirical evidence, because even 
if an apparent motion is judged illusory and not real, it 
remains classifiable as motion. 
We cannot explain-away (perceived) physical motion 
by supposing that it might be a figment of 
imagination, for we would still have to admit or 
explain-away the imaginary motion that we have by 
our very supposition posited as existing. “Imaginary 
motion” signifies a movement of projected mental 
entities – that too is a perceived, concrete event 
(differing from “physical” motion only in respect of 
presumed underlying location, substance and possible 
genesis – occurring “in the head”, made of some 
“mental” stuff, and perhaps “generated by the 
perceiver”). We might try to explain imaginary 
motion away too, by claiming that both physical and 
mental motion are “verbal constructs”, i.e. that motion 
is a word without reference to a concrete experience 
of any kind, but defined by putting together previous 
words. But this would just mean that we regard 
motion as abstract, conceived – whereas, we clearly 
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concretely perceive motions. The experience of 
motion has to be admitted, we cannot ignore it. 
Whether this experience is imaginary or physical is 
another (conceptual) issue, which does not affect it.57 
Now, the question arises, is rest equally evident? Prima facie, 
my answer would be: yes. Our experiences include not only 
appearances of motion but also appearances of rest. Whether 
perceived rest is at a conceptual level real or illusory is 
irrelevant; that it is perceived suffices to qualify it as 
empirical evidence. Here again, to claim that the concept of 
rest is based on a mental projection on dynamic physical 
phenomena, does not invalidate the concept, for we are still 
left within that thesis with the experience of static mental 
phenomena. Unfortunately, when we formulate theories of 
motion, in a bid to understand it, two broad hypotheses 
emerge: 
 One (the “divisionist” theory) is that motion is infinitely 
divisible, so that there is no time at which the moving 
thing (be it physical or mental) is at rest. This theory does 
not in itself exclude the possibility of rest, since it leaves 
                                                      
57  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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open the possibility that there are times and places devoid 
of motion; it only specifies that, at least when and where 
motion occurs, it is infinitely divisible.  
 The other (the “atomist” theory) is that motion is discrete 
or “atomic”, a fitful succession of instantaneous motions 
and momentary rests. According to this theory, motion as 
such takes no time (an instant is a point in time), only rest 
takes time (a moment is a duration of time). When 
something moves, it exists first in one place then in quite 
another without traversing intermediate places. The 
moving thing can never be said to have stopped existing 
momentarily, i.e. for any duration of time, since it 
switched places instantaneously, i.e. in zero amount of 
time. 
Both these theories are compatible with rest, as well as 
motion. But the second one implies rest as real, whereas the 
first one only allows for rest as real. Many philosophers, 
including Nagarjuna as a Buddhist58, go one step further and 
regard that everything is really in constant flux, so that rest is 
only (somehow) illusory. This thesis, note well, is a possible 
                                                      
58  We have already cited Heraclitus as the first Western 
philosopher known to have done so. 
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though not necessary offshoot of the first proposition, and 
logically implies it since not compatible with the second. 
Now, we cannot simply deny it as an arbitrary generalization, 
because it has a lot going for it in a large context of empirical 
and rational considerations. Namely, it seems implied by 
modern physics, which seems to reduce everything to wave 
motions (fields), and this idea in turn (generalized beyond the 
physical realm) provides us with a neat explanation of 
“universals” (i.e. abstracts) as the shapes and measures of the 
waves constituting all things59. 
So we have to conceive some respect in which rest might 
differ from motion experientially, so that although both are 
indubitably phenomenal (perceived, concrete, experiential, 
empirical), whether on a physical or mental level, we can still 
label the one illusory and the other real. We might propose 
that physical rest is only superficially apparent, due to our 
sensory inability to observe the motion which constantly 
underlies it; that is, because our sense-organs are limited in 
the degree of detail they allow us to perceive – limited in both 
                                                      
59  It might be that waves and universals can be assimilated 
by an atomist theory, but to my knowledge no one has tried and 
succeeded in doing this – so in the meantime we may assume it 
cannot be done. 
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space and time – we only perceive fragments of physical 
reality and those fragments we fail to perceive we treat as 
absent. Similarly with regard to imaginary entities (i.e. 
mental projections) – we may not be perceiving all their 
details. 
This thesis is credible and consistent, and indeed confirmed 
by various experiments. It does not appeal to a concept of 
illusion based on the mind-body distinction, but rather to an 
“optical illusion” effect (not limited to the visual field, but 
analogously applicable to all the sense-modalities, and to 
imagination). It does not say that what we perceive is wrong 
(which would lead to self-contradiction), but only that we do 
not perceive everything that is there (conceptual 
considerations may suggest this without self-contradiction). 
The issue is, does this thesis succeed in differentiating 
experienced rest from experienced motion, condemning the 
one as illusory and justifying the other as real?  
We might succeed, by saying that every (perceived) fragment 
of (infinitely divisible) motion is still motion, whereas a 
(perceived) fragment of rest may upon further division be 
found to conceal underlying motion. Thus, although both 
motion and rest are undeniably present on the perceptual 
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level (in both the material and the mental phenomenal fields), 
we may still on a conceptual level give the one ontological 
precedence over the other. The Atomist hypothesis implies 
both motion and rest to be equally real, but the hypothesis of 
Divisionism only demands that motion be real, allowing for 
the possibility that rest be real (limited or moderate version) 
or unreal (general or extreme version). We can thus 
conceptually ‘explain away’ the phenomenon of rest as 
imperfectly perceived motion. Since the perception of rest is 
not dismissed, but only conceptually ‘reduced’ from rest to 
motion that has been only roughly experienced, this is 
epistemologically acceptable. 
Let us now return to Nagarjuna’s premise that “motion and 
rest are relative to each other”. He does not ultimately believe 
in either motion or rest, remember, but considers these 
concepts tied within ordinary consciousness. In the light of 
our above analysis, we have to deny such a strong 
relationship between these concepts. It is possible to affirm 
both motion and rest, conceptually (through “moderate 
divisionism” or “atomism”) as well as empirically – although 
we may choose not to adopt this course for various reasons 
(such as our need for a theory of “waves” in Physics or a 
                                            Motion and rest                            97 
 
theory of “universals” in Philosophy). It is also possible to 
affirm motion, while denying rest – we have just done so, 
with reasonable consistency, at least on a hypothetical level 
(in “extreme divisionism”). A world in universal and 
continuous flux seems conceivable, even while admitting the 
empirical status of both motion and rest, by considering the 
coarseness or graininess of the objects of perception. We 
cannot, however, affirm rest and deny motion, or deny both 
rest and motion; motion must be in any case affirmed. 60 
 
                                                      
60  Concepts like motion and rest, or like space and time, do 
not concern abstracts. All our discussion, note well, has revolved 
around concretes; abstracts are ultimately just measures or 
degrees of these. As concretes come and go, so in a sense do 
their abstract features (since features are tied to what they feature, 
being but aspects of them) – but we regard two similar concretes 
as having not two but one abstract in common. That is the whole 
point of abstraction: to ignore plurality and concentrate on unity. 
We might however talk of change of an abstract, when the 
underlying concretes have changed so radically that they no longer 
display a certain abstract in common. For example, water may be 
changed into hydrogen and oxygen; the result is no longer water 
but other chemicals; in contrast, when liquid water is changed to 
steam, it remains water. 
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7.   Causality. 
 
Causality is a central concept in Buddhism. In Western 
philosophy, the term is applied generically to causation (a 
relation of “constant conjunction” between any two events61 – 
physical events, and likewise “psychological” events) and to 
volition (the relation between a conscious being and an action 
willed by it). For Indian and Buddhist philosophy, an 
additional connotation of causality is the moral concept that 
has become colloquial in the West under the name of karma 
(the belief that good deeds are ultimately rewarded and bad 
deeds punished, whether in a present lifetime or a later one – 
and indeed that we have to be reborn to bear the 
consequences of our actions, at least until we find 
“liberation” from this cycle). Buddhism additionally (and if I 
am not mistaken, originally and exclusively) has a concept of 
“co-dependency” (according to which, roughly put, nothing 
                                                      
61  These events may each be positive or negative; we shall 
clarify this further on. The point to note here is that cause or effect 
here may be motions or qualities, and their purported relation is 
“mechanistic”. 
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stands on its own, but everything exists only by virtue of its 
direct or indirect causal interrelationships with other things). 
A definition of causality traditionally cited in Buddhism is62: 
“When this is, that is; this arising, that arises; when this is 
not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases.” It is an excellent 
definition of causation, or more precisely the strongest type 
of causation – namely complete and necessary causation. It is 
better than the definition “constant conjunction”, proposed by 
some Western philosophers, which only refers to complete 
causation63. But the said traditional formula is not accurate. 
First because there are other, weaker types of causation, 
                                                      
62  For this formula, see p. 84. The discussion of Nagarjuna’s 
treatment of causality is found mainly in pp. 83-88. Cheng there 
refers to MT XV:1a,2a,2b, XVII:1-33, XX:1-4,16-17, XXIV:18,40, 
and Hui-cheng-lun, 72, as well as to TGT I-III. 
63  I am thinking of Hume, who (as I recall) apparently only 
refers to constant conjunctions of positive events, say A and B, 
failing to consider the flip side of constant conjunction between 
their negations, non-A and non-B. He also ignores (as do 
Buddhists, in the said definition) “hindrance”, i.e. cases of constant 
conjunction between A and non-B, and between non-A and B. Of 
course, if all such cases of causation are considered as implicitly 
intended in the expression “constant conjunction”, then it is equally 
acceptable. J. S. Mill’s later treatment is much better, though also it 
has its faults. Note additionally, that “when this is, that is; when this 
is not, that is not” seem to logically imply “this arising, that arises; 
this ceasing, that ceases”, so that the latter is redundant as 
definition, though well to point out and remember. 
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namely, complete but contingent, partial though necessary, 
and neither complete nor necessary – and derivatives of 
these. And second, because causation does not include 
volition. In truth, if we study the actual descriptions of “co-
dependency” in Buddhist texts, it is easy to see that the causal 
relations referred to do not all fall under the stated definition 
of causality (as “when this is, that is”, etc.) but range far 
more widely over the many other senses of the term. 
For earlier Buddhists, and Buddhists of other schools, 
causality is an objective fact, which gives rise to and implies 
“co-dependency” and thence “emptiness”. But for Nagarjuna 
and his school, all these concepts and tenets are ultimately 
mere “conventional” truths, without real validity. Thus, 
although they are Buddhist doctrines, and he admits their 
value as initial teaching tools, he regards it as necessary to 
ultimately disown them, so as to go beyond the discourse 
they involve, into non-discursive consciousness of actual 
emptiness. For him, it is useless and counterproductive to talk 
about emptiness, to analyze and reason it – it has to be lived. 
It should not surprise us, therefore, that he tries to disprove 
causality, to show all concepts of it to be confused and 
absurd. 
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(a) Let us first consider Nagarjuna’s argument 
concerning “production”, as presented by Cheng64. It 
has the same dilemmatic form as some of his 
arguments about motion and rest. He divides the 
“process of production” into three parts. The part 
“already produced” is “finished” and the part “yet to 
be produced” is “not yet”; so neither of these can be 
“established”. The part “being produced” can be 
“established” only if the aforementioned two parts 
have been; so it too cannot be “established”. Hence, 
“the act of producing is impossible”; and therefore, 
“there cannot be a producer”. They are both 
“unreal” and “involve contradictions or absurdities”. 
We can reply as follows. For a start, let us note that 
Nagarjuna (in Cheng’s account, at least) does not even define 
what he means by “production”, he merely takes the term for 
granted. The full causal connotation of the term is admittedly 
hard if not impossible to define (no one, to my knowledge, 
has so far succeeded in doing so), but I submit that no 
concept can definitely be proved or disproved without some 
                                                      
64  On p. 37. 
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definition, so we can doubt Nagarjuna’s “refutation” of 
production on this ground alone. But let us, like him, take the 
term as understood (I do suggest a working definition further 
on), and consider his reasoning anyway.  
The first two premises typically rely on a possible confusion 
in the reader between the present tense (“the act of 
producing”) and the past and future tenses (“already” and 
“yet to be” produced). Of course, if we artificially freeze the 
present tense in the present, as he does, we cannot find 
(“establish”) it in the past or future tenses.65 But if we 
consider the past as having once been the present or the 
future as the eventual location of the present, there is no 
difficulty in saying that “the act of producing” was in what is 
now and since then classed as “already produced” or will be 
in what is now and until then classed as “yet to be produced”. 
The reasons he gives in his two premises, “it is “finished” 
and it is “not yet”, beg the question and do not constitute 
proof that production cannot be “established” outside the 
present. 
                                                      
65  See Appendix 1: fallacy H. 
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His third premise, that the “act of producing” can be 
“established” in the present only by being so in the past and 
future, is gratuitous66, and only serves to again demonstrate 
that his conclusions are foregone. Why would we need to 
refer to past or future, to infer the present situation? We can 
well find the “act of producing” directly in the present, by 
empirical means. Watching someone go through certain 
motions, which are exclusively and invariably67 followed by 
certain perceived changes in his environment, we name the 
someone “producer”, his motions “production”, and the 
changes “products” (this sentence, by the way, can serve as 
an inchoate definition). Clearly, when I say this is empirical, 
I mean empirically-based. The statistical reasoning involved, 
and many other underlying presuppositions such as memory 
of past instances and comparison between instances, are 
conceptual and logical. We cannot establish production by 
means of a single present perception, but have to appeal to 
                                                      
66  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
67  To repeat, “exclusively and invariably” (making possible 
and necessary) is only the strongest case; weaker causations 
include exclusively but not invariably (only making possible), 
invariably but not exclusively (only making necessary), and others 
(partial contingent causation, i.e. conditional causation). 
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past perceived instances and ensure that future perceived 
instances keep concurring. Nevertheless, all that is more 
direct than what Nagarjuna proposes. 
In sum, Nagarjuna’s argument is merely an attempt to delude 
us, and in no way justifies his conclusion against the concept 
of production. As for the concept of producer, further 
discussion is required. I have already, higher up, discussed 
one issue involved, that of the existence of a substratum to 
motion – for the producer is conceived as an abiding entity. 
But of course, we also have to here point to the implied issue 
of causality. The term production is colloquially applied even 
to a machine, but ultimately it signifies human invention, 
initiation and supervision of a process – that is, consciousness 
and will. A machine is merely a tool of production, not a 
producer – the latter term only properly applies to human 
beings (or entities with similar powers). But we need not try 
to deal with this more difficult issue here, as it does not arise 
in the context of Nagarjuna’s above argument. 
(b) Another argument of Nagarjuna’s relates to whether 
an effect is “real in” or “unreal in” a cause (“or an 
assemblage of causes and conditions”). The meaning 
of this question will become apparent as we develop 
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his answer. For him, the question is fourfold, not just 
twofold – the effect might also be “both real and 
unreal in” or “neither real nor unreal in” the cause 
(see discussion of the tetralemma, above). Cheng 
relates his argument as follows. First premise: “if an 
effect is real in a cause,” it does not need to be 
“produced again” – “there cannot be causal 
production” since “nothing new is produced” in such 
case. Second premise: “if an effect is at the outset 
unreal in a cause and yet is produced by a cause, then 
in principle anything should be capable of being 
produced from anything else” – “there would be no 
particular or distinct relation between the two, and 
hence one would not be the cause of the other.” Third 
premise: an effect cannot be “both real and unreal 
in” a cause, “because real and unreal are 
contradictory in nature” and such things cannot be 
“together”. Fourth premise: “to say that an effect is 
neither real nor unreal in a cause is tantamount to 
accepting that there is no causal relation between 
cause and effect.” Conclusion: “none of these can be 
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established, and thus theories of causality should be 
renounced.” 
Many objections can be raised to this argument. For a start, 
we can again point out that Nagarjuna (or perhaps only 
Cheng) does not define causality precisely – so how can he 
succeed in disproving it? Similarly, the expressions “real in” 
and “unreal in” are left very vague. Nevertheless, we can 
rephrase his question as, more clearly: is the effect already 
present or not in the cause? His first two premises are then: if 
yes, it did not need to be caused; if no, how could it have 
been caused? My answer is this: Nagarjuna is ignoring or 
obscuring the (very Aristotelian) distinction between merely 
potential presence and actual presence.68 We can say that the 
effect is to some degree present, in the sense of potential, in 
the cause; it only becomes fully present, in the sense of 
actual, under appropriate conditions.  
For example: a healthy woman has in her womb, 
potentially but not actually, sons, grandsons, etc. 
Concretely, that potential has actual expression in her 
physiological characteristics (womb, eggs, genetic 
                                                      
68  See Appendix 1: fallacy F. 
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make-up, etc.); but her descendants are still not actual; 
they are actualized only when and if certain 
existential and biological conditions are met (she 
remains alive long enough, she has intercourse and is 
fertilized, she bears a son, then her son in turn finds a 
woman, and so forth). The woman is not the complete 
“cause”, in any case (other factors come into play, 
positively or negatively); the son, grandson, etc. are 
not to the same degree her “effects” (her son is more 
of an effect of hers than her grandson, etc.) since more 
and more conditions have to be met. 
These concepts are quite reasonable, so Nagarjuna’s 
attempted denial cannot be upheld. Furthermore, note that the 
things we call the “cause” and the “effect” do not merit this 
label until and unless causality takes place (and is known to 
have done so); it is only after such event that the terms 
become applicable, so that it is absurd to apply them to things 
while denying such event, as Nagarjuna tries.69 Also, it is 
important to clarify what we mean by “the” cause or “the” 
effect. Nagarjuna focuses on one of the conditions involved 
                                                      
69  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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(in the example given, a woman), and ignores the others (her 
healthy fertilization; successive generations of women and 
their fertilizations, in turn); likewise, he does not distinguish 
between direct effects (her son) and indirect ones (her 
grandsons, etc.). 
Thus, his first two premises are misleading – for an effect is 
potentially present in a cause, in the sense that certain 
conditions are actual in it; but the effect is not actually 
present in that cause, because certain additional conditions 
are not actual in it. When the latter conditions are actualized, 
they – together with the already actual former conditions – 
cause actualization of the effect. The sum of the earlier and 
later conditions may be referred to as “the” cause; whereas 
each of these sets of conditions can only properly be referred 
to as “one of the causes”; each is only a potential cause 
without the other. Similarly, we have to distinguish between 
an effect of this total cause, and an effect of an effect of it, 
and an effect of an effect of an effect of it, etc. In each case, 
additional conditions come into play, and what was admitted 
the cause of the earlier effect, may only be regarded as a 
cause (among others) of the later effect. Nagarjuna uses the 
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terms cause and effect without any effort at precision70; is it 
no wonder then that he formulates false premises.71 
With regard to his claim in the first premise that “nothing 
new is produced”, then, we would reply that there is novelty 
in the intensification of existence from a inchoate, potential 
degree to an overt, actual degree. As for the reasoning he 
uses in his second premise, the following may be offered as 
rebuttal. 
He argues that if an effect were not present at the outset in a 
cause, then any other effect might “in principle” emerge from 
the cause, so that in fact no relation would exist between the 
cause and any such effect. To make the issue clearer, let us 
remove the terms cause and effect from the sentence, since as 
already stated they may not be used before a causal relation is 
established. Indeed, “in principle” a thing might be 
accompanied or followed by just anything. This only means 
that, at first glance, before any data has been gathered, we 
                                                      
70  It is interesting to note that Cheng earlier (on p. 85) 
mentions, parenthetically, that a cause may be understood as “an 
assemblage of causes and conditions”. For it shows that 
Nagarjuna is aware that a cause is not necessarily monolithic, and 
indeed this awareness is found in Buddhist doctrine from its 
inception. 
71  See Appendix 1: fallacy E. 
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must have an open mind and look at the facts without 
prejudice, without anticipation – this is the epistemological 
principle he seems to be referring to, and the one we would 
admit. He cannot be taken to appeal to an ontological 
principle, that everything occurs by happenstance, without 
connection to anything else – for that would be begging the 
question, surely. But of course, Nagarjuna cunningly 
obscures the wide and deep gulf between these two senses of 
the term “in principle” to make his point.72 
But this is in itself interesting, because it shows that he is 
quite aware of the reason why we formulate a concept of 
causality and believe in it, and of the inductive process 
through which such a relation is established. If we lived in a 
world (or field of appearances, to be more precise) where, 
indeed, anything could happen, i.e. a world without any 
regularity, then we would have no basis for a concept of 
causality, and no such concept would even occur to us.73 But 
we notice in our experience that some things are constantly 
conjoined (and so forth – this is just one of the many types of 
regularity), and therefore – in order to record and explain 
                                                      
72  See Appendix 1: fallacy F. 
73  See Appendix 1: fallacy G. 
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such uniformities in our experience – we form a concept of 
causality. Furthermore, we use these very same observed 
regularities to determine whether or not the label of causality 
may be applied in particular cases. There is thus nothing 
arbitrary in the concept, nor in its applications; it is 
experience that suggests it, and experience that establishes it. 
There is nothing circular in the concept, either. Nagarjuna 
denies that causation can be established with reference to 
experience, saying that this “begs the question”74. Even 
though “we have seen sesame produce sesame oil, but have 
never seen sand produce sesame oil,” we are not justified to 
“seek sesame oil in sesame but not in sand” because 
“causation or production has not yet been established, and so 
one cannot legitimately make that claim.” But as just 
explained, this is not the order of things in knowledge. Both 
the concept and its particular applications come from the 
same experiences. We have a concept of causation because 
we observe regularities and these same regularities tell us 
where to apply it. There is no basis for a demand that the 
concept be known independently of experience. The reason 
                                                      
74  Cheng, p. 87. 
                                                 Causality                                   113 
 
why the concept seems to exist “independently” of any one of 
its empirical instances, is that it is the common feature of 
many and indeed all instances of regularity, and does not 
merely refer to the one regularity under scrutiny at one 
particular time. 
Thus, Nagarjuna should have said the following: if some 
thing and another thing are always apparent together and 
never apparent apart, then we may call the one “cause” and 
the other “effect” and their relation to each other “causality” 
(this is only the strongest form of causation, to repeat, but I 
do not want to needlessly complicate the issue here); but if no 
such regularity (nor a lesser degree of regularity) occurs in 
their appearances (i.e. our experience of them, in a first 
phase, and by generalization, their existences), then they 
cannot be called thus. Had he formulated the sentence in this 
way, he would have had no argument. He chose to confuse 
the issue or was himself confused, by anticipating application 
of causal terminology, and by failing to distinguish between 
epistemological and ontological aspects. 
Let us turn now to his last two premises. They logically add 
nothing to the present argument about causality, but they are 
interesting as denials by Nagarjuna himself of his previously 
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expressed or implied views about the tetralemma (see higher 
up). Here, he admits that contradictories (like “real in” and 
“unreal in”) cannot “be together”. Likewise, he admits that 
negative contradictories in conjunction (like “not real in” and 
“not unreal in”) are not a further kind of meaningful relation 
(in the present case, a “causal relation”). This shows that he 
understands the Laws of Non-contradiction and the Law of 
the Excluded Middle, and appeals to them when he finds it 
convenient for his ends. It makes us, once again, doubt his 
sincerity. 
(c) Cheng lists another five issues concerning causal relations 
raised by Nagarjuna, but does not present the latter’s 
arguments about them, other than to say that he “criticized 
each relation more or less the same way.” We may infer from 
this that Nagarjuna tried to show, using his usual methods, 
these various questions about causality unanswerable or 
absurd in some way. The questions he asked were the 
following. 
 Is a cause “identical” or “different” to an effect? 
 Do a cause and an effect “appear simultaneously” 
or not? 
 Does a cause “become” an effect or not? 
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 Does a cause “before it ceases to be, give a causal 
nature to” an effect or not? 
 Is a cause “within” an effect or is an effect “within” 
a cause? 
Let us consider what his arguments might be, and how we 
would answer his questions and preempt his skeptical 
conclusions. 
With regard to the first issue, my guess is that Nagarjuna 
would argue, as he did in similar circumstances75, that if 
cause and effect are “identical” there is no point in naming 
them distinctively, and if they are “different” there can be no 
connection between them. But we can easily reply that they 
are not identical, and that difference does not imply 
disconnection. 
With regard to the second issue, knowing Nagarjuna, he 
would presumably complain that if two things appear 
simultaneously we cannot regard one as causing the other; 
and if they do not appear simultaneously, how can we 
establish that they are linked? Philosophers who insist that 
causality requires that the effect temporally follow the cause, 
                                                      
75  With regard to the subject-predicate relation, in argument 
4(a), and the object-characteristics relation, in argument 5(d). 
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are focusing on one mode of causal relation, that in dynamic 
process (as for instance, in natural causation); but in truth, we 
also commonly acknowledge static causal relations (in the 
extensional mode)76, and even simultaneous events in 
dynamic processes may be causally ordered. It is only after 
we have established that two things, features or events are 
regularly together and/or apart to some degree, and therefore 
causally related, that the decision as to which to regard as 
cause and which as effect arises. This issue may in some 
cases be quickly resolved with reference to time’s arrow: the 
cause is the temporally earlier, the effect is the temporally 
later. But this is only one resolution, the simplest case. If the 
two items are simultaneous, we can still order them on other, 
more conceptual grounds. For instance, we will consider the 
more generic item as cause, the more specific as effect, 
                                                      
76  That this is acknowledged in Buddhism is evident in the 
traditional definition of causality earlier mentioned. The statements 
“when this is, that is; when this is not, that is not” refer to static 
causation; the statements “this arising, that arises; this ceasing, 
that ceases” refer to dynamic causation. These statements are (I 
seem to remember and presume) attributed to the Buddha himself 
in some sutra, and demonstrate commendable precision of 
thought. Static and dynamic causation may be viewed as two 
aspects of the same relation, or we may view the latter as a special 
case of the former (since given the former, we can infer the latter). 
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judging the former as a ‘deeper’ (more widely present) aspect 
of nature than the latter. 
With regard to the third issue, I am not sure what Nagarjuna 
means by a cause becoming an effect (or not). Perhaps he is 
referring to the frequently used Buddhist image of a seed 
becoming a plant? I would guess in such case that he plays on 
the ambiguity of the word “plant”, i.e. on whether it refers to 
any of its stages (including as a seed) or to a developed plant 
(excluding the seed). If so, we can forewarn that the word 
‘becoming’ has two colloquial senses: a stronger sense of 
mutation (for which let us reserve the same word) and a 
weaker sense of alteration (for which let us prefer the 
expression ‘getting to be’). In mutation, the change is from 
‘X and not Y’ to ‘Y and not X’; whereas in alteration, it is 
from ‘X and not Y’ to ‘X and Y’77. Thus, in our example, the 
plant is initially a seed, then ‘gets to be’ a developed plant; 
or, in other words, the seed (undeveloped plant) ‘becomes’ a 
developed plant. 
The fourth question is likewise unclear – what does he mean 
by the cause “giving causal nature to” the effect? I presume 
                                                      
77  See my Future Logic, ch. 17. 
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the pronoun in “before it ceases to be” refers to the cause, 
and that he is asking whether some sort of power of causation 
is transferred from cause to effect in causal chains. If that is 
his concept, or the concept he attributes to ordinary thinking, 
I would beg to differ. We do not regard that, in all causal 
chains, cause A gives its effect B the power to be cause B of 
effect C, i.e. that A does not merely cause B, but also causes 
B to cause C. This may be true when both the successions A-
B and B-C are invariable, i.e. in the one case of complete 
causation; for in such case, we may say that A is invariably 
followed by both B and C, i.e. that A causes C as well as B. 
But this is one special case of regular succession – when the 
causations involved are of mixed determination, the 
syllogism is not always possible. Furthermore, in some 
instances (where A is not a necessary cause of B) it is still 
possible for “B causes C” to occur in the absence of A, when 
B is caused by something other than A.  
One might anyway wonder at the legitimacy of an iterative 
causal concept “causing to cause”, in the above implied 
sense, for we regard “B causes C” as a relation and event that 
just “is”, a fact of (“caused by”, if you like) “Nature” – not as 
something that something else (viz. “A”), itself within nature, 
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might “cause”. The iterative concept occurs somewhat 
legitimately in volitional situations, where we may say that 
an agent A (a person) influences or forces another, B, to 
perform some action, C. But in such cases, the causality 
involved is very different, clearly. ‘A influences B’ is a sort 
of causality, but it does not mean A causes B in the sense of 
causation. Nor is ‘B does C’ a causation, but a volition. So in 
this case, the iterative concept is quite different in meaning. 
As for the fifth issue, I presume we have already dealt with 
the question as to whether the effect is “within” the cause 
when we discussed whether the effect is “real in” the cause. 
So only the question, is a cause “within” an effect? remains 
to be answered. Supposedly Nagarjuna has in mind here 
some kind of lingering existence of the cause in its effect. 
This could be conceived, and is indeed used as an 
explanatory hypothesis in some causal situations. Thus, 
Newton’s theory of motion of physical bodies after impact 
postulates that “energy” is the substratum of motion; the first 
body’s motion is an expression of the energy in it, and when 
it hits the other some or all of that energy is passed on to the 
second, which therefore moves or changes velocity and/or 
direction in accord with precise formulas. This theory 
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involves calculated predictions, which are empirically 
confirmed78. In this context, the second body is caused to 
move by the first, but the underlying cause of both their 
motions is “energy”.  
In that case, we might say to Nagarjuna that we have a case 
in point, where the cause is “within” the effect. I do not, 
however, think that this is necessarily or always appropriate, 
in every causal relation, or even in every causation, to say 
that the cause is “within” the effect. For we establish 
causation primarily with reference to constant conjunction of 
presences and/or absences of two things, without prejudice as 
to whether some third thing is passed on from the one to the 
other. For us, causation is at first just a happenstance of 
regularity observed in the field of appearances. A theory may 
later be inductively established that some sort of transfer 
always occurs in it, but this would at best be a generalization 
warranted by confirmed predictions, not a deductive 
necessity. We should at least remain open-minded to either 
outcome in principle. 
                                                      
78  Later, the energy transfer idea is found valuable in other 
contexts or domains. Later still, be it said in passing, the theory is 
corrected by Einstein, for greater empirical precision. 
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In sum, having with reference to his five vague questions 
anticipated Nagarjuna’s possible additional arguments 
against causality, we can safely say that his intended 
refutations of the concept are here again likely to be 
fallacious and inconclusive. 
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8.   Co-dependence. 
 
 One further argument mentioned by Cheng79 goes like 
this: Nagarjuna questions the legitimacy of an 
“ontological interpretation of causation” that claims 
“an entity which has essential nature” can be 
“something which is caused”. In his view such claim is 
contradictory, for “an entity is supposed to have 
essential nature and a thing of essential nature is not 
produced but independent of other things” and “to be 
caused is to be conditioned or to be dependent”. 
This argument evidently refers back to the belief of Indian 
philosophers that an existent is either permanent and 
uncaused or momentary and caused. But these temporal and 
causal notions are not as tied together as Indian philosophers 
assumed. If we look at their actual genesis in the formation of 
human knowledge, we see that they in principle allow for 
intermediate combinations, like “caused and henceforth 
permanent” or “momentary yet uncaused”. 
                                                      
79  See pp. 87-88. Cheng there refers to MT XV:1a,2a,2b, 
XVII:1-33, XXIV:18, and Hui-cheng-lun, 72, as well as to TGT II. 
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Furthermore, the concepts of “entity” and “essence” are very 
confused in Nagarjuna’s and the Buddhist mind. They do not 
fully realize that these concepts refer to continuities, 
individual (in the case of “entity”) or collective (in the case 
of “essence”), which are assumed so as to register and 
explain experienced repetition of objects. These are not 
mysterious, arbitrary inserts in the course of human 
knowledge, but statistical tools for recording and 
comprehending certain pluralities of experience.  
In attacking causality, Nagarjuna effectively also attacks the 
Buddhist concept of co-dependence, which is normally 
considered one of the main bases for, or the causal expression 
of, the fact and doctrine of “emptiness”. Here, as elsewhere, 
he is not antipathetic to Buddhist belief, but convinced that 
only by disowning all concepts and doctrines – including 
causality and co-dependence – can we in fact get in contact 
with what they merely point to. The finger pointing at 
something, however accurately, gets in the way and distracts 
us from that thing, and is therefore best dropped.  
Let us venture more deeply into the Buddhist doctrines at 
issue. I cannot here engage in their detailed analysis, 
thorough treatment requires a whole book (see my 
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forthcoming publication on causal logic). But I will make a 
few pointed remarks. The Buddha was previously understood 
as regarding all phenomena as mutually causally related, 
interdependent, ‘co-dependent’ – suspended together in the 
field of appearance without underlying causes and unable to 
exist in it without mutual sustenance. 
Admittedly, all that we perceive is a succession of present 
phenomenal fields. But by means of our rational faculty, we 
then subdivide such overall phenomena into constituent 
phenomena (discernment), and by comparison and contrast 
find them same or different in various respects and degrees 
(abstraction), and thereby variously group and name them 
(classification), and then interrelate them (e.g. causally, with 
reference to perceived regularities). Such rational work is 
admittedly hypothetical, but that does not mean it is 
automatically false. It does not have the same 
epistemological status as empirical evidence, but may be 
relied on with various degrees of probability, to the extent 
that it takes such evidence into account and is guided and 
regulated by the three Laws of Thought, and the rules of 
deductive and inductive logic derivable from them. 
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Our belief in “entities”, as already explained, arises in order 
to explain the apparent similarities between phenomena that 
have succeeded and replaced each other in our experience. 
Such phenomena are partly different (changed), but also 
partly the same (abiding). If they were only different, we 
would have no call for a concept of “entity”; but because they 
are also the same, we do need such a concept to register the 
fact. Note that sometimes, assumption of an “entity” 
underlying perceived phenomena is reference to an 
additional, not yet perceived phenomenon; other times, 
assumption of an entity is simply reference to a collection of 
already perceived phenomena, i.e. the entity is no more than 
the conjunction those phenomena. Once thus understood, the 
concept of entity is seen to have nothing antithetical to a 
positivistic approach to knowledge. 
Similarly with our belief in “essences”, which arises in 
response to our experiences of similarity as well as difference 
between phenomena, even in static situations. If, in our 
experience, nothing resembled anything else (extreme 
multiplicity) or if everything seemed identical with 
everything (extreme uniformity), the thought of “essences” 
would not even dawn on us. Assumption of an “essence”, 
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once we demystify it and remove its idealistic connotations, 
and understand it as an expression of work of comparison, it 
loses the scarecrow status given it in Buddhist epistemology. 
“Causality”, as we have already shown, may be similarly 
justified with reference to regularities of conjunction of 
phenomena (or more precisely, their presences and/or their 
absences). Thus, these fundamental concepts have empirical 
basis, they are not merely arbitrary constructs. 
Now, let return to Nagarjuna’s ideas. One of them is that an 
entity or essence cannot come and go or be caused. It has to 
be seen that this is a particular (not to say, peculiar) thesis 
proposed by Indian philosophers, and not one inherent in the 
concepts involved. This proposition is not analytically 
obvious, and may only be regarded as an additional 
hypothesis to be synthetically established. It is not deducible 
from the initial conceptions, which (as above described) refer 
to various sorts of uniformities or regularities; it would have 
to be demonstrated by induction (grounded in some sort of 
empirical evidence) that these uniformities and regularities 
coincide as proposed. Otherwise, it is arbitrary (from our 
ordinary consciousness point of view, though it may be 
obvious to enlightened consciousness). 
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The initial concept of an entity only stipulates continuity in 
the midst of change; it does not preempt that such assumed 
substratum as a whole may itself appear or be generated, or 
disappear or be destroyed. Indeed, the fact that we commonly 
speak of entities as limited in time and as susceptible to 
initiation or termination shows that we do not ordinarily view 
entities so rigidly. For example, those who believe in a soul 
may view it as naturally arising (an epiphenomenon of 
matter) or as divinely created (an injection into matter), as 
temporary or eternal (in past and/or future) – the concept of 
soul leaves such issues open to debate. Similarly, the initial 
concept of an essence only requires that the abstract exist 
wherever and whenever the concretes it is attached to exist; 
when and where the concretes come or go or are caused to 
come or go, the abstract may in a sense be said to similarly 
behave or be affected (though strictly speaking such concepts 
are inapplicable to abstracts, as already discussed). 
Another Buddhist idea, that of ‘co-dependence’, which might 
stated broadly as each thing exists only in relation to others; 
and furthermore, since each other thing in turn exists only in 
relation to yet others, each thing exists in relation to all the 
others. The relation primarily intended here is causality, note. 
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We tend to regard each thing as capable of solitary existence 
in the universe, and ignore or forget the variegated threads 
relating it to other things. We ‘do not see the forest for the 
trees’, and habitually focus on individual events to the 
detriment of overview or long view. 
For example, consider a plant. Without the sunlight, 
soil and water it depends on, and without previous 
generations of the same plant and the events that 
made reproduction possible and the trajectories of 
each atom constituting and feeding the plant, and 
without the cosmic upheavals that resulted in the 
existence of our planet and its soil and water and of 
the sun and of living matter, and so forth ad infinitum, 
there would be no plant. It has no independent 
existence, but stands before us only by virtue of a 
mass of causes and conditions. And so with these 
causes and conditions, they in turn are mere details in 
a universal fabric of being.  
The concept of co-dependence is apparently regarded by 
Buddhists as an inevitable outcome of the concept of 
causality. But reflection shows, again, that this doctrine is 
only a particular thesis within the thesis of causality. That is, 
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though co-dependence implies causality, causality does not 
imply co-dependence. Moreover, it is a vague thesis, which 
involves some doubtful generalizations. The above-cited 
typical example of co-dependence suggests three 
propositions:  
 everything has a cause (or is an effect), 
 everything has an effect (or is a cause); 
and perhaps the more radical, 
 everything causes and is caused by everything.  
The first two propositions are together what we call ‘the law 
of causality’. It has to be seen that these propositions do not 
inevitably follow from the concept of causality. The latter 
only requires for its formation that some regularity of co-
existence between events be found in experience, but does 
not in itself necessitate that every event in experience be 
found to have regular co-existence with some other event(s). 
The concept of causality is valid if it but has particular 
applications; the law of causality does not automatically 
follow – it is merely a generalization from some experiences 
with this property to all existents. There may well be things 
not found to have regular co-existents, and thence by 
generalization assumed to have no cause and/or no effect. A 
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universe in which both causality and non-causality occur is 
quite conceivable. Furthermore, the first proposition does not 
logically imply the second or vice versa – i.e. we may 
imagine things with causes but no further effect, and things 
with effects but no preceding causes. 
“Early Buddhists”, Cheng tells us, “believed in the principle 
of causality to be objectively, necessarily, eternally and 
universally valid.” Many Western philosophers have 
concurred, though not all. Today, most physicists believe 
that, on a quantum level at least, and perhaps at the Big Bang, 
there are events without apparent cause. I do not know if 
events without effect are postulated by anyone. In any case, 
we see that even on the physical level “chance” is admitted as 
a possibility, if not a certainty. The law of causality can 
continue to serve us as a working principle, pressing us to 
seek diligently for causes and effects, but cannot in any case 
be regarded as an a priori universal truth. Causal logic has to 
remain open-minded, since in any case these “laws” are mere 
generalizations – inductive, not deductive, truths. 
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Furthermore, the law of causality just mentioned is only at 
best a law of causation. Philosophers who admit of volition80 
cannot consistently uphold such a law as universal to all 
existents, but only in the ‘mechanistic’ domains of physical 
and psychological events. With regard to events involving the 
will, if we admit that a human being (or equivalent spiritual 
entity, a higher animal or God) can ‘will’ (somehow freely 
produce) a physiological event (i.e. a physical movement in 
his body) or a psychological event (i.e. an imagination, a 
mental projection), or even another soul (at least in the sense 
of choosing to reproduce), we have to consider this as an 
exception to such universal law of causation.  
Also, if we consider that the Agent of will is always under 
the influence of some experience or reason, we might 
formulate an analogical law of causality with reference to 
this. But influence is not to be confused with causation; it 
does not determine the will, which remains free, but only 
                                                      
80  And at least some Buddhists seem to. For instance, the 
statement in the Dhammapada (v.165) that “by oneself the evil is 
done, and it is oneself who suffers: by oneself evil is not done, and 
by one’s Self one becomes pure. The pure and the impure come 
from oneself: no man can purify another” – this statement seems to 
imply existence of a self with responsibility for its actions. 
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strengthens or weakens it, facilitating or easing its operation 
in a certain direction. Moreover, it is not obvious that will 
cannot occur ‘nihilistically’, without any influence; it may 
well be free, not only to resist influences but also to operate 
in the absence of any motive whatsoever. In the latter case, 
the law of causality would again be at best a working 
principle, not a universal fact that volition requires a motive. 
Let us now consider the more extreme statement that 
‘everything causes and is caused by everything’, which could 
be construed (incorrectly) as implied by co-dependence. To 
say this is effectively to say paradoxically (as Nagarjuna 
would no doubt have enjoyed doing!) that nothing causes or 
is caused by anything – for causality is a relation found by 
noticing regularities in contrast to irregularities. If everything 
were regularly co-existent with everything, we would be 
unable to distinguish causality in the first place. It follows 
that such an extreme version of the law of causality is 
logically untenable. Causality cannot imply that ‘everything 
causes everything’ or ‘everything is caused by everything’ – 
and to deny the latter statements does not deny the concept, 
note well. The concept is not derived from such a law, but 
independently from observation of regularities in experience; 
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our ability to discern such regularities from the mass of 
experience implies that there are irregularities too; whence, 
such an extreme statement cannot be consistently upheld. We 
must thus admit that things do not have unlimited numbers of 
causes or effects. 
Although ‘everything causes everything’ implies ‘co-
dependence’, the latter does not imply the former; so our 
refutation of the wider statement does not disprove co-
dependence, only one possible (extreme) view of it. My 
criticism of co-dependence would be the following. For a 
start, the doctrine presented, and the illustrations given in 
support of it, do not use the term causality with any precision. 
First, as we have suggested above, causality, is a broad term, 
covering a variety of very distinct relations: 
 causation or ‘mechanistic’ causality within the 
material and mental domains, and causation itself 
has many subspecies;  
 volition, or action by souls on the material or 
mental or spiritual domains, and will has many 
degrees of freedom; and  
 influence, which refers to limitations on volition 
set by material or mental or spiritual entities. 
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The doctrine of co-dependence glosses over the profound 
differences between these different senses of the terms 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’, using them as if they were uniform in all 
their applications.  
Also to be included as ‘causal relations’ in a broader sense 
are the negations of these relations. Even if some philosopher 
doubts one, two or all three of these (positive) relations, he 
would have to consider them. Concepts of ‘chance’ or 
‘spontaneity’ are not simple, and can only be defined by 
negating those of causality; likewise, the concept of 
‘determinism’ requires one of ‘free will’. It is only in contrast 
to causality concepts, that non-causality can be clearly 
conceived. Furthermore, co-dependence ignores that some 
things are not (positively) causally related to each other, even 
if they may have (positive) causal relations to other things. 
That something must have some cause or effect, does not 
imply that it has this or that specific thing as its cause or 
effect; there are still things to which it is not causally related. 
If everything had the same positive causal relation to 
everything, and no negative causal relation, there would be 
no such thing as causality, nothing standing out to be 
conceived. 
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Secondly, if we consider chains (or, in discourse, syllogisms) 
of causal relations, we find that the cause of a cause is not 
necessarily itself a cause, or at least not in the same sense or 
to the same degree. For instance, with reference to causation, 
we can formally prove that if A is a complete cause of B and 
B is a complete cause of C, then A is a complete cause of C. 
But if A is a complete cause of B and B is a partial cause of 
C, it does not follow that A is at all a cause of C. Similarly, 
when we mix the types of causality (e.g. causation and 
volition in series), we find that causality is not readily 
transmitted, in the same way or at all. It is therefore logically 
incorrect to infer transmission of causality from the mere fact 
of succession of causal relations as the theory of co-
dependence does. 
Thirdly, those who uphold co-dependence tend to treat both 
directions of causal relation as equivalent. Thus, when they 
say ‘everything is causally related to everything’, they seem 
to suggest that being a cause and being an effect is more or 
less the same. But something can only be regarded as a cause 
of things occurring after it in time or below it in conceptual 
hierarchy, and as an effect of things occurring before it or 
above it. Upstream and downstream are not equivalent. Thus, 
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‘interdependence’ cannot be taken too literally, using ‘causal 
relation’ in a too vague sense, without attention to the 
distinction between causal and effectual relationship. 
Fourthly, the doctrine of co-dependence suggests or calls for 
some sort of law(s) of causality, and as already discussed 
higher up, no universal or restricted law of causality is 
logically necessitated by the concept of causality, although 
such a law may be considered a hypothetical principle to be 
validated inductively. The concept of causality only requires 
that some causality occur, without prejudicing how much. So, 
though co-dependence implies causality, causality does not 
imply co-dependence. 
Fifthly, the concept of ‘co-dependence’ is upheld in contrast 
and opposition to a concept of ‘self-subsistence’. Something 
self-subsistent would exist ‘by itself’, without need of 
origination or support or destructibility, without ‘causal 
conditions’. Buddhism stresses that (apart perhaps from 
ultimate reality) nothing in the manifold has this property, 
which Buddhism claims ordinary consciousness upholds. In 
truth, the accusation that people commonly believe in the 
self-subsistence of entities is false – this is rather a construct 
of earlier Indian philosophy. 
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People generally believe that most things have origins (which 
bring them into existence), and that all things once generated 
have static relations to other existents (an infinity of relations, 
to all other things, if we count both positive and negative 
relations as ‘relations’), and that things usually depend for 
their continued existence on the presence or absence of other 
things (i.e. if some of the latter come or go, the former may 
go too). What is doubtful however, in my view, is the vague, 
implicit suggestion of the co-dependence doctrine, that while 
a thing is present, i.e. during the time of its actual existence, 
it has a somehow only relative existence, i.e. were it not for 
the other things present in that same moment, it could not 
stand. 
This is not essentially a doctrine of relativity to 
consciousness or Subject (though Yogachara Buddhism 
might say so), note well, but an existential incapacity to stand 
alone. This is the aspect of co-dependence that the Western 
mind, or ordinary consciousness, would reject. In our world81, 
once a thing is, and so long as it is, irrespective of the causes 
of its coming to be or the eventual causes of its ceasing to be, 
                                                      
81  We can, incidentally, imagine a world where only one thing 
exists, without anything before it, simultaneous to it or after it. 
                                          Co-dependence                             139 
 
or of other things co-existing with it in time and its 
relationships to those things, or of its being an object of 
consciousness, it simply exists. It is a done thing, 
unchangeable historical fact, which nothing later in time can 
affect. It cannot be said to ‘depend’ on anything in the sense 
implied by Buddhists, because nothing could possibly be 
perceived or conceived as reversing or annulling this fact.  
What Buddhism seems to be denying here is that ‘facts are 
facts’, whatever their surrounding circumstances, and 
whether or not they are cognized, however correctly or 
imperfectly. It is a denial that appearances, whatever their 
content and whether they be real or illusory, have occurred. 
We cannot accept such deviation from the Law of Identity. 
Such considerations lead me to the conclusion that ‘co-
dependence’ is not easy to formulate and establish, if at all. 
Nevertheless, I regard it as a useful ‘way of looking at 
things’, a valuable rough and ready heuristic principle. Also, 
to be fair, I remain open to the possibility that, at some deep 
level of meditative insight I have not reached, it acquires 
more meaning and validity. 
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9.   Karmic law. 
 
Finally, let us consider Nagarjuna’s comments on the moral 
principle of ‘karma’ (as we commonly call it). He denies 
karmic law – for him, “necessary connections between 
good deeds and rewards, and bad deeds and 
punishments” are, as Cheng describes82, “not objective 
laws in nature and society, but subjective projections of 
the mind”. This is of course not an argument, but a 
statement, so his reasoning cannot be evaluated. The 
statement is notable, considering the context of Indian and 
Buddhist belief. And again, Nagarjuna makes this statement, 
not out of a desire to oppose normative Buddhism, but in an 
attempt to be consistent with his own overall philosophical 
programme of consciousness beyond reason, the ‘middle 
way’. 
I will take this opportunity to make a few comments of my 
own regarding karma. The claim that there is moral order in 
the world is partly, but only partly, based on empirical 
                                                      
82  See p. 88. Cheng there refers to MT XVII:1-33, XXIV:18, 
and Hui-cheng-lun, 72, as well as to TGT II. 
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grounds. Without prejudice as to what constitutes morality, 
we can agree that certain actions have certain consequences, 
and that some of those actions and consequences happen to 
be morally orderly by our standards. The ‘actions’ referred to 
are actions of a person; the so-called ‘consequences’ referred 
to are things happening to that person beyond his control. 
It so happens that sometimes a person who has acted in a way 
he (or an observer) considers ‘good’ (e.g. being kind to 
others, or whatever) is soon after or much later a recipient of 
something he (or the observer) considers ‘positive’ for 
himself (e.g. health or children or wealth, whatever). 
Similarly, a ‘bad’ action may be followed by ‘negative’ 
events. In some of those cases, a causal relation may be 
empirically established between the ‘action’ and 
‘consequence’, without appeal to a moral principle. For 
instance, the man works hard and prospers. Such cases can be 
considered evidence in favor of a karmic law. In other cases, 
however, the causal relation is merely assumed to occur 
subterraneously, because it is not empirically evident that 
such ‘action’ produces such ‘consequence’. For instance, the 
man gives charity and prospers. It would be begging the 
question to use cases of the latter sort as evidence in favor of 
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karmic law, since it is only by assuming karmic law that we 
interpret the events as causally connected. 
Furthermore, it so happens that sometimes, despite good 
actions, no positive consequences are forthcoming or only 
negative ones follow; or despite bad actions, no negative 
consequences are forthcoming or only positive ones follow. 
The saint suffers and the evil man enjoys. These cases are all 
empirical evidence against karmic law, granting the value 
judgments involved, since we are not assuming karmic law to 
establish the causal relations between such actions and so-
called consequences (be they happenstance or evidently 
produced by the actions). Of course, one might mitigate this 
conclusion somewhat, by stating that one has to know all the 
life of a person because no one only suffers and no one only 
enjoys, and that anyway it is difficult to estimate the merits of 
a good deed or demerits of a bad deed. 
Thus, whereas karmic law might be viewed as a 
generalization from the cases where actions are empirically 
causally connected to consequences, it cannot be inferred 
from the cases where such connection is not established 
without presuming karmic law, and it is belied by the cases 
where the order of things predicted by karmic law is not 
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matched in experience. In order to nevertheless justify karmic 
law, religions may introduce the concept of rebirth, on earth 
as a human or other creature, or elsewhere, in heaven or in 
hell, suggesting that if the accounts do not balance within the 
current lifetime, they do in the long run balance. But again, 
since we have no empirical evidence of such transmigration 
and the process is anyway very vaguely described, such 
argument begs the question, making the assumption of 
karmic law superficially more palatable, but not providing 
clear concept or inductive proof of it.  
Some might hang on to karmic law all the same, by arguing 
that what we have been calling good or bad, or positive or 
negative, was wrongly so called. These postulate that a set of 
moral standards, of virtue and value, might be found, that 
exactly coincide with empirically evident causal processes, or 
at least which are not belied by such processes. Good luck. 
But what bothers me most about the assumption of 
karmic law is this: it logically implies that whoever 
suffers must have previously done evil. For instance, 
the millions of Jews (including children) murdered by 
the Nazis during the Holocaust. This seems to me an 
unforgivable injustice – it is an assertion that there 
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are no innocent victims of crime and that criminals 
are effectively agents of justice! Thus, in the name of 
morality, in the name of moral order – merely to 
satisfy a ‘rationalist’ impulse to uphold a ‘law of 
karma’ – justice is turned upside-down and made to 
accuse the innocent and exonerate the guilty. Clearly, 
the idea of karmic law is inherently illogical. We have 
to conclude that the world functions differently than 
such a principle implies. 
We seem to have reached, with regard to karma, the same 
negative conclusion as Nagarjuna, though perhaps through a 
different argument. If there is no karmic law, is there then no 
need for liberation, no utility to virtue and meditation? It does 
not follow. Even if souls come and go, like bubbles in water, 
it may be good for them to realize their true nature while they 
are around. ‘Virtue is its own reward’ and the benefits of 
meditation are obvious to anyone engaged in it. 
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10.   God and creation. 
 
Nagarjuna sought to show83 that it is “unintelligible to assert 
the existence of God as the creator or maker of the 
universe”84. He does this by means of several arguments, 
which I shall try to summarize, based on Cheng’s account, 
and to evaluate. Let me say at the outset that I personally do 
not believe we can prove or disprove the idea of God85, so I 
cannot be accused of having an ax to grind on this issue. If 
Nagarjuna’s conclusion is deemed a disproof and denial of 
the concept, I am showing it erroneous. But if it is deemed a 
mere denial that the concept can be proved, I agree with him 
                                                      
83  See Cheng, pp. 89-96 on this topic. He refers to MT XXII, 
as well as to TGT X, XII:1 and the last chapter. 
84  Note that Nagarjuna identifies God with the Indian deity 
Isvara. Cheng wonders in passing whether this was warranted; a 
more accurate identification would in my view have been with the 
Brahman of Hinduism. However, this need not concern us here, for 
the attributes used by him to describe God correspond to those 
any Western philosopher would grant. 
85  I normally follow a Jewish tradition that the word should be 
written incompletely, as “G-d” – but this has proven confusing for 
many people. The reason for the tradition is to avoid that the word 
be taken into an impure place or be physically torn or deleted. 
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but am showing his reasoning in favor of such conclusion 
logically inadequate. 
(a) One argument proceeds as follows: “if there is a fact 
of producing, making or creating… what is 
produced?” It is either the “already produced” or the 
“not yet produced” or the “being produced”. These 
three alternatives can, according to Nagarjuna, be 
“refuted in the same way as the concept of motion”, 
whence production “cannot be established” and 
therefore “it makes no sense” to affirm a “creator or 
maker”. 
The pattern and content of this argument are by now familiar 
to us (see higher up), all Nagarjuna does here is repeat it with 
reference to the universe and God. But since, as we have 
already shown, the argument against production is logically 
worthless, the conclusion against creationism and God drawn 
from it is also without credibility.86 But note additionally that 
Nagarjuna does not, as philosophers often do, make any 
radical distinction between “production” in the sense 
applicable within the universe (which is a mere reshuffling of 
                                                      
86  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
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preexisting elements) and “creation or making” in the sense 
applicable to the universe (which is ex nihilo, or at least a 
conversion of the spiritual substance of God into material and 
other substances). 
(b) The next argument we shall review is more 
interesting. Let us suppose that something 
(symbolized by an ‘x’) is “made or produced by 
someone or something”. Now, x has to be made either 
“by itself” or “by another” or “by both” or “by no 
cause”. But, firstly, x cannot be made by itself, for 
that would imply that “it makes its own substance”, 
and “a thing cannot use itself to make itself” for that 
would be “reflexive action”, i.e. the thing would be 
“both subject and object at once,” which is impossible 
since “subject and object are different.” Secondly, x 
cannot be made by some other thing, because the 
latter would be “causal conditions” and these ought to 
be considered as “its substance” and so would be “the 
same” and not “other”. It follows that x cannot be 
made both by itself and by another. Lastly, x cannot 
be made by no cause, because “there would be a 
fallacy of eternalism”. 
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It is not clear to me what or who is the subject, x, of this 
argument. It might be intended to be the universe or God. In 
either case, the argument seems to be that a thing can neither 
be self-created, nor be other-created, nor be both, nor be 
uncreated (i.e. neither). With regard to self-creation, I would 
agree with Nagarjuna that the concept is nonsensical. His 
second thesis, denying that something can be “made by 
another”, is however not convincing. He claims that the 
causes or conditions of something have to be counted as part 
(of the substance) of that thing, so that the alleged “other” is 
in fact not “other” (implying that the concept of other-
creation is self-contradictory). But we do not ordinarily count 
all “causal conditions” of a thing as part of it or of its 
substance; we might do so in some cases, if such antecedents 
are exclusive to that thing and no other factors can be used to 
define it, but usually we would regard them as separate 
events that bring it about.87 
The third thesis, against “both” self and other creation, could 
be admitted offhand since we have admitted his first thesis 
that a thing creating itself (wholly, ex nihilo) is impossible. 
                                                      
87  See Appendix 1: fallacy D. 
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Alternatively, we could interpret the third thesis as referring 
to something partly created by another, and then that part 
proceeding to create the remaining parts. If we so conceive 
Nagarjuna’s third option, as other and self creation in 
sequence, we have to disagree that this is impossible. As for 
the fourth thesis, that a thing may be created by neither self 
nor other, i.e. may be uncreated, again two interpretations are 
possible. One, which Nagarjuna mentions, is that the 
causeless was always there; Nagarjuna considers that 
impossible, in accord with Buddhist doctrine that eternity is a 
fallacious concept, but I have seen no logical justification of 
that viewpoint and to my Western mind eternity (of God or of 
the universe) is quite conceivable. Another interpretation, 
which Nagarjuna apparently ignores, is that something might 
arise spontaneously, i.e. pop into existence out of nothing; 
this is an idea which some find unconscionable, but we may 
accept it as at least imaginable.88 
To summarize, Nagarjuna conceives of four scenarios for 
creation, and claims to find reason to reject all four, 
concluding that the idea of God creating universe is 
                                                      
88  See Appendix 1: fallacy C. 
152 Buddhist Illogic 
unthinkable and therefore that God is unintelligible. We, 
however, are not overwhelmed by his arguments. Only his 
rejection of self-creation makes sense. His rejection of other-
creation is forced. His interpretations of “both” and “neither” 
are incomplete, and we can offer additional ones, which leave 
the issues open. The dilemma as a whole is therefore 
inconclusive, and Nagarjuna may not logically draw the 
conclusions he draws.89 However, let us return briefly to 
Nagarjuna’s second thesis, for he might be trying to 
formulate a more complex thought than appears. 
Let us suppose Nagarjuna is discussing whether God created 
the universe. If we take “the universe” as an open-ended 
concept including whatever happens to exist at any one time, 
then God was himself the whole universe before He created 
the rest of the universe90. Viewing creation thusly, we are not 
                                                      
89  See Appendix 1: fallacy B. 
90  Cheng at one point (p. 92) recalls Bertrand Russell’s 
argument against God and creationism – that while it is reasonable 
to inquire about the causes of particular phenomena, it is 
nonsensical to inquire about a cause for the totality of all 
phenomena. This is of course a very forceful argument, 
considering that (as we have seen) the concept of causality arises 
only in response to perceived regularities of conjunction between 
phenomena (here including in this term, as well as sensory or 
mental perceptions, intuitive experiences and conceptions). It is 
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talking about ex nihilo creation, which is a confused concept 
since it ignores or obscures the preexistence of something 
(God) doing the creating – but of an earlier universe, with 
only God in it, giving rise to a later universe, with God plus 
other things (matter, people with minds) in it91. The mystery 
of creation in that case is simply, how can a spiritual entity, 
such as the God we conceive, produce matter, either from 
nowhere (i.e. without self-diminishment) or out of itself (as 
the tsimtsum concept of creation of Jewish Kabbalah seems 
to suggest)? The latter idea, that God might have given 
something of Himself to fashion matter, does not seem too 
                                                                                                               
true that the search for causes of phenomena is always a search 
for other phenomena that might be regularly conjoined with them. 
But Russell’s argument is not logically conclusive. For if God 
existed, and we could one day perceive Him (or a “part” or “aspect” 
of Him), He would simply be one more phenomenon. In which 
case, creation would refer not to causation of the totality of 
phenomena (by a non-phenomenon), but simply to causation by 
one phenomenon of all other phenomena – which is a quite 
consistent viewpoint. If “the universe” is understood in a fixed, 
narrow sense, of course it is absurd to seek for a cause of it 
beyond it. But if the term is taken as open to all comers, no 
difficulty arises. A term with similar properties is the term “Nature” – 
if we understand it rigidly, “miracles” are possible; but if we take it 
flexibly, the concept of something “supernatural” like that becomes 
at best merely conventional. 
91  Of course, Nagarjuna would reject the proposition that God 
is eternal and at some time chose to create the world, since he 
does not admit of eternity. 
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difficult to accept philosophically (though some may 
consider it sacrilegious, as it implies that God either was 
diminished thereby or consented to transform part of His 
spirituality, if only a tiny speck of it, to the lower status of 
material substance). 
It should be pointed out here that ‘creation’ does not 
simply mean causality by God of (the rest of) the 
universe. The presumed type of causality involved is 
volition, a free act of will, rather than causation. 
Furthermore, God is not conceived as the direct cause 
of everything in the universe, but merely as First 
Cause and Prime Mover, i.e. as the cause of its initial 
contents and their initial movement, as well as of the 
‘laws of nature’ governing them. This might be taken 
to mean, in a modern perspective, the core matter 
subject to the Big Bang, the ignition of that explosion 
and the programming of the evolution of nature 
thereafter, including appearance of elementary 
particles, atoms of increasing complexity, stars and 
planets, molecules, living cells, evolution of life 
forms, organisms with consciousness and will, and so 
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forth (creationism need not be considered tied to a 
literal Biblical scenario). 
Once God has willed (i.e. created) inchoate nature, it 
continues on its course in accordance with causation, 
with perhaps room for spontaneous events (as 
quantum mechanics suggests) and for localized acts of 
volition (by people, and perhaps higher animals, when 
they appear on the scene). As already mentioned, 
there are degrees of causation; and when something 
causes some second thing that in turn causes some 
third thing, it does not follow that the first thing is a 
cause of the third, and even in cases where it is (thus 
indirectly) a cause, the degree of causation involved 
may be diminished in comparison with the preceding 
link in the chain (dampening). Similarly with volition, 
the cause of a cause may be a lesser cause or not a 
cause at all. It is therefore inaccurate to regard a First 
Cause, such as God is conceived to be relative to 
nature, as being ‘cause of everything’ lumped together 
irrespective of process. The succession of causal 
events and the varieties of causal relations involved, 
have to be taken into consideration. 
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Spontaneity of physical events and freedom of 
individual (human or animal) volition are not in 
logical conflict with creation, because they still occur 
in an existence context created by God. God may well 
be the indirect cause of spontaneous or individually 
willed events, in the sense of making them possible, 
without being their direct cause, in the sense of 
making them necessary or actualizing them. 
Furthermore, to affirm creation does not logically 
require that we regard, as did some Greek 
philosophers, God as thereafter forced to let Nature 
follow its set course unhindered. It is conceivable that 
He chooses not to interfere at all; but it is equally 
conceivable that He chooses to interfere punctually, 
occasionally changing the course of things (this would 
be what we call ‘miracle’, or more broadly 
‘providence’), or even at some future time arresting 
the world altogether. His being the world’s initiator 
need not incapacitate Him thereafter from getting 
further involved. 
All that I have just described is conceivable, i.e. a 
consistent theory of creation, but this does not mean 
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that it is definitely proven, i.e. deductively self-
evident or inductively the only acceptable vision of 
things in the context of all available empirical data. 
Note well that I am not trying to give unconditional 
support to religious dogmas of any sort. Rather, I am 
reacting to the pretensions of many so-called 
scientists today, who (based on very simplistic ideas 
of causality and causal logic) claim that they have 
definitely disproved creation, or who like Nagarjuna 
claim that it is logically not even thinkable. Such 
dogmas are not genuine philosophy. One should never 
let oneself be intimidated by either priestly or 
academic prestige, but always remain open-minded 
and consider facts and arguments impartially and 
fairly. 
Alternatively, Nagarjuna could be supposed to discuss in his 
second thesis whether God was created by something else. In 
that case, I would agree with his rejection of the idea. We 
could claim that God is uncreated, on the ground that we 
have conceived God as an explanation of the world appearing 
before us, and cannot go on looking for an explanation of the 
explanation and so on, ad infinitum. This position can 
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however be legitimately contested, on the ground that if we 
demand one explanation, consistency requires that we 
demand an infinite regression of them. So we are in a 
quandary, faced with either a lack of explanation or an 
overdose of explanations, neither of which is logically 
satisfying.  
We might oppose an atheist conclusion by arguing that if we 
consider it acceptable to offer no explanation for the world, 
then we could equally well be allowed to offer none for God. 
However, there is a difference between these two positions, 
in that the world is empirically evident before us, whereas 
God is not92; furthermore, explanations are meant to simplify 
problems, whereas the assumption of God introduces new 
and more complex questions compared to the assumption of a 
world without God.  
                                                      
92  The theory that God exists counts the existence of the 
world as empirical evidence for itself, since that is what the theory 
is constructed to explain. But this confirming evidence is not 
exclusive to that theory, since it is also claimed by contrary 
theories. This standoff could only be resolved, deductively, if some 
inextricable inconsistencies were found in all but one theory; or 
inductively, if some empirical detail were found which is explicable 
by one theory and not by the others. 
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In conclusion, the ideas of God and creation are certainly full 
of difficulties, as Nagarjuna asserts (though for the wrong 
reasons), but altogether abandoning them also leaves us with 
difficulties, which Nagarjuna does not consider. The 
currently most rational position is probably an agnosticism 
leaning towards atheism. This does not preclude a personal 
leap of faith, based not on reason but on more emotional 
grounds – that is precisely what we mean by ‘faith’93. It is 
interesting to note, concerning Buddhism, that “when 
someone asked Buddha the question whether the world was 
made by God, he did not answer”94. 
Cheng tells us that “the true Madhyamika approach” is 
“neither theistic nor atheistic”, but merely that God “cannot 
be conceived of as existing”. Nagarjuna does not really infer 
from the latter (though at times he seems to) that God does 
not exist, because “only a significant statement can be 
significantly negated or contradicted”. Thus, even 
agnosticism is rejected by him, since it considers the issue 
                                                      
93  Even Buddhism calls on its adherents to have faith – faith 
enough to pursue enlightenment by meditation or whatever 
practices, till they get there and see its truth directly for 
themselves. 
94  Cheng, p. 93. 
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meaningful. Clearly, I am disagreeing, and maintaining that 
God is (somewhat) conceivable, but is neither provable nor 
disprovable; i.e. a reasonably intelligible and consistent 
theological theory can be formulated, but it remains 
speculative as we have no way to verify or falsify it. 
(c) Other issues raised by Nagarjuna include the following: 
 He asks who in turn created God, and who in turn 
created that creator of the creator, ad infinitum? This 
is of course a serious logical issue, legitimately raised. We 
have already addressed it, without claiming to have finally 
resolved it. The important counter-argument to note here 
is that atheism, too, leaves an unanswered question: how 
come existence exists?95 
 Nagarjuna asks in what place God was staying when 
he created the world, and in what place he put the 
world he created, and whether he or another created 
those places; and he claims that such considerations 
give rise to infinite regress of creations and creators. 
This query is also legitimate, but more easily opposed. 
One might hypothesize that God takes up no space and 
                                                      
95  See Appendix 1: fallacy I. 
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created space as well as its contents. One might add the 
more modern view, that space is not independent of 
matter, nor ‘occupied’ by it, but a relation between 
material items. It is also interesting to note that modern 
physics postulates certain basic constituents of matter as 
without spatial extension. 
 He asks why, if God (as we conceive Him) is 
omnipotent and omniscient, and so unhindered by 
obstacles, He did not create the world “in its totality at 
one and the same time”. To me this question does not 
seem very unsettling – we can just answer, why not? I 
mean, if God had done so, Nagarjuna would be asking: 
why not create a world of process?96 
 He should rather have asked why, if God (as we conceive 
Him) is complete and self-sufficient, and so lacking 
nothing and so desiring nothing, He created the world at 
all. What might possibly have been His motive? That is a 
$64,000 question, for which no answer is forthcoming 
from anyone! Nagarjuna perhaps senses this question, 
when he argues that “God wanted to create all 
                                                      
96  See Appendix 1: fallacy I. 
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creatures” implies antecedent “causal conditions”, i.e. 
that “all things were produced from karma”. But it 
must be pointed out that if creation is an act of volition, it 
might well be without motive, and even if it has a motive 
such motive would be an influence but not a deterministic 
cause. There is no inconsistency in regarding free will as 
occasionally motiveless, or when motivated as unforced 
by its motives. That is precisely what distinguishes 
volition from mechanical action: it remains free and the 
responsibility of the Agent irrespective of all surrounding 
circumstances. 
 Nagarjuna also brings up “the problem of evil” (what 
we today call theodicy, i.e. the justice of God): if God 
(as we conceive Him) is omnipotent, omniscient and 
infinitely good, just and compassionate, why does He 
let “moral evil and physical suffering” exist in the 
world? “Evil men enjoy happiness and… good men 
suffer” and yet God will not or cannot prevent it. “If 
God cannot prevent evil he is not omnipotent, and if he 
can but will not, he is not all good.” Thus, at least two 
of the attributes we assign to Him, omnipotence and 
perfect goodness, are mutually contradictory, given 
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that “obviously, there is evil in the world” (and being 
omniscient, He must be aware of it). Therefore, God is 
either “not omnipotent” or “not all good” (or both), 
which in either case would mean a lack of the 
attributes we conceive him as having to have to be 
God, so that “he is not God” and “God cannot be 
conceived to exist”.  
This is of course a big issue for theists to face, and 
Nagarjuna’s reasoning here is generally valid. However, 
the problem is not logically insurmountable and 
Nagarjuna’s conclusion is too quick and radical. For we 
can suppose that God has a more complex accounting 
process in mind (regarding reward and punishment, tit for 
tat), or that He has instituted a system of trials for our 
ultimate greater good. What we view as inexcusable 
suffering of innocents, may in God’s view not be as 
serious as we think, because (as Buddhism itself 
ultimately suggests) suffering is superficial and illusory. 
We may even have volunteered to be born into this world 
of apparently unjust suffering, to fulfill some purpose for 
God. And so forth – the concepts involved are logically 
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too vague and uncertain to allow us to draw a definite 
conclusion. 
 
Before leaving this topic, I would like to make some 
comments regarding Buddhism in general. At its core, the 
Buddhist doctrine is not theistic, in the sense of believing in a 
creator, nor particularly anti-theistic, though effectively 
atheistic. However, having arisen in Indian culture, it adopted 
ideas of gods, in the sense of supermen or supernatural 
beings, who were however themselves still ultimately subject 
to the Four Noble Truths, i.e. though they were very high-
minded and heavenly, due to their good karma, they too 
eventually had to find liberation from the karmic cycle or 
face a lesser rebirth. At a later stage, as Cheng says, “the 
Buddha was deified”, not in the sense of being regarded as 
creator, but in the sense of having the other “main admirable 
characteristics of God or divine being” that we have listed 
above. Initially a saintly man, he was promoted by his 
disciples to the highest rank of godliness, above all the other 
gods just described, because no longer subject to ignorance 
and karma. He had, as it were, dissolved in the universal 
unity (reality, nirvana) underlying the world of multiplicity 
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(illusion, samsara), and thus merged with what might be 
called God. 
Another aspect to be mentioned is that of idolatry, i.e. the 
worship of statues representing gods. This practice was 
present in Indian culture when Buddhism arose, and in other 
Asian cultures when Buddhism later reached them. Buddhists 
soon adopted this practice too, making and worshipping 
statues of the Buddha, and later other presumed Buddhas, 
boddhisattvas and arhats (saints). For at least some Buddhist 
sects, prayer and offerings to such statues seems to be the 
main religious activity. It is very surprising that Buddhism 
did not from its inception firmly discard such polytheism and 
idol worship. One would have thought, considering the 
otherwise ‘scientific’ mindedness of core Buddhist doctrine, 
that it would have sharply criticized and inhibited such 
irrelevant and dubious tendencies. No doubt, the initial 
motive was tolerance, taking potential converts as they were 
and avoiding conflict; but this attitude effectively perpetuated 
primitive habits.97 
                                                      
97  I have never seen idolatry even questioned in any Buddhist 
text, ancient or modern! But anyway my historical analysis is 
confirmed in Christmas Humphreys’ Buddhism (Harmondsworth, 
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But it ought to be emphasized that the worship of 
carvings of Buddhas is in direct logical contradiction 
with the ‘nothing has a self’ doctrine of Buddhism, 
since it involves a mental projection of selfhood into 
statues. The fact is that, in the idol worshipper’s mind, 
the figure he calls to and bows to is somehow a part of 
or an emanation of or a conduit to the transcendent 
deity, and so possessed of a (derivative) ‘soul’. Thus, 
idolatry perpetuates one of the main psychological 
errors of people, according to Buddhism. If it is 
ignorance to assign soul to a living being, which at 
least seems to have consciousness, emotion and 
volition, how much more foolish it is to assign it to 
stone (or paper or even, finally, mental) images! 
Ordinary Buddhists surely cannot hope to attain the 
                                                                                                               
Mx.: Penguin, 1955. Rev. ed.). He states: “As it gently flowed into 
country after country… [Buddhism] tended to adopt, or failed to 
contest the rival claims of, the indigenous beliefs, however crude. 
In this way the most divers and debased beliefs were added to the 
corpus of ‘Buddhism’, and embarrass the student to-day” (p. 12). 
Later, he writes: “Certainly within a hundred years of the death of 
Asoka… from a human being the Buddha had become a super-
human being, and his spiritual Essence had entered a pantheon 
nearly as large as that of the Hinduism from which it largely 
derived” (pp. 48-49). 
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ideal of Buddhism by such practices, which have 
exactly the opposite educational effect. 
All this to say that, whereas the core Buddhist doctrine is not 
especially concerned with theological ideas or issues, but 
with promoting wise and loving attitudes and behavior 
patterns, tending to enlightenment and liberation, Buddhism 
in practice is, for most of its adherents still today, a theism of 
sorts. 
It should moreover be stressed that the attack on Creation is a 
distraction. The main underlying problem of the beginning of 
things remains, even for non-theists. Physicists have to face 
it, and so do Buddhists. In the latter context, in the beginning 
is the “original ground” of Nirvana. Its nature and essence is 
stillness, quietness, peace, perfection and fulfillment. All of a 
sudden, it stirs and subdivides; then more and more, till it 
engages in a frenzy of motion and distinctions. Samsara is 
born and proceeds. Since then, according to Buddhism, 
existence is suffering; and the meaning of all our lives is to 
intentionally return to the original mind state, by means of 
meditation and good deeds. So, what caused this madness? 
Was the original ground unstable or dissatisfied? Was it an 
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incomprehensible “spontaneous” event or was it a stupid “act 
of will”? Buddhism does not really explain. 
Very similar notions are found in Judaism. Note first 
the ambivalence about Creation, which is presumed 
by Rabbinical commentators to be an ‘act of love’ by 
God for his creatures (on the principle that whatever 
God does has to be good), but at the same time is 
admitted as an act that gave rise (at least since the 
Garden of Eden incident) to empirically evident “evil” 
in the world. In particular, while procreation is 
prescribed so as to perpetuate life, the sex act is 
viewed as involving the “evil impulse”. Note also the 
Jew’s duty to work his/her way, through study, prayer 
and other good deeds (mitzvoth), towards – according 
to kabalistic interpretations – a renewed fusion with 
God (teshuvah). If we draw an analogy between the 
Jewish idea of God (one, unique, universal, infinite) 
and the less personalized Buddhist idea of Nirvana, 
we see the equivalence between the questions “why 
did God create the world?” and “why did Nirvana 
degenerate into Samsara?” 
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11.   Self or soul. 
 
Nagarjuna, together with other Buddhists, denies the 
existence of a real “self” in man98, i.e. that the “I” of each 
person is a soul or spiritual entity distinct from his physical 
body. This concept, referred to as the “atman”, was regarded 
in Indian (Hindu) tradition as “the feeler of sensations, 
thinker of thoughts, and receiver of rewards and punishments 
for actions good and bad”, something that “persists through 
physical changes, exists before birth and after death, and 
remains from one life to the other”, something “constant and 
eternal” and “self-subsistent”, which was ultimately 
“ontologically identical with Brahman, the essential reality 
underlying the universe” (i.e. God). The atman, or at least the 
ultimate Brahman essence of every atman, was considered as 
the most “real” of existents, because unlike the transient 
phenomena of experience, it was “permanent, unchanging 
and independent.” 
                                                      
98  For this topic, see Cheng, pp. 74-76. He there refers to MT 
IX, XVIII:1a,1b,6, XXVII:4-8, and to HT II. 
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(a) Nagarjuna attacks this view, arguing that if to be 
“real” means to be “permanent, unchanging and 
independent”, then the phenomena apparent to us 
would have to be regarded as “illusions”, since they 
are transient, changing and dependent. It would 
follow that transience, change and dependence – 
being only manifested by phenomena – are also not 
“real”. To Nagarjuna this seems “absurd”, because 
“moral disciplines would lose their significance and 
spiritual effort would be in vain.” 
(b) Furthermore, he asks whether or not “changing 
phenomena”, i.e. “our bodies or physical 
appearances”, are “characteristics of the atman”, and 
if so, what the relation between the atman and its 
characteristics might be, are they “identical” or 
“different”? If they were “identical”, then atman 
would be subject to birth and death (and so forth) 
like the body, in contradiction to the definition of 
atman. If they are “different”, then the atman “would 
be perceived without characteristics”, which “it is 
not”, because “nothing can be perceived without 
characteristics”. On the other hand, if the atman is 
                                               Self or soul                               171 
 
“without any characteristic”, it would be “in 
principle, indefinable and hence inconceivable”. 
(c) Moreover, to the argument that “although the atman 
differs from the characteristics and cannot be 
perceived directly, its existence can be inferred”, 
Nagarjuna replies that “inference and analogy are 
inapplicable in the case of knowing the atman” 
because they are only “applicable among directly 
perceivable phenomena”. He therefore considers that 
“it is unintelligible to say that atman exists behind 
changing appearances.” 
Nagarjuna thus comes to the conclusion that “nothing has 
selfhood” and “atman is empty”. This does not constitute a 
rejection on his part of a “conventional” idea of the self, as a 
mere “collection of different states or characteristics” such 
that “the self and characteristics are mutually dependent”. 
This artificial construct of a self, being entirely identified 
with the perceivable phenomena we attribute to it, is not 
“permanent, unchanging and independent”. Allow me now to 
debate the issues. 
Let us start with argument 11(a). I would agree with 
Nagarjuna here, that reality and illusion should not be defined 
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as his predecessors do with reference to eternity, constancy 
and causal independence or their negations. As explained 
earlier, “reality” and “illusion” are epistemological 
judgments applied to “appearances”. These two concepts 
arise first in relation to phenomena. Phenomena (perceived 
things) are considered, in practice and in theory, to be prima 
facie “real”, and then demoted to the temporary status of 
“problematic” if contradictions are apparent between two of 
them, until either or both of these phenomena is/are dumped 
into the category of “illusion”, on either deductive or 
inductive grounds. There is no concept of “reality” or 
“illusion” apart from appearance; they merely refer to 
subcategories of appearances. 
At a later stage, these concepts are enlarged from perceptual 
appearances to conceptual and intuitive appearances. Both 
the latter appearances similarly have, as soon as and however 
vaguely they are conceived or intuited, an initial credibility, 
which we call the status of reality. But being less evident, 
more hypothetical, their effective status is closer to 
problematic, and they have to be immediately and repeatedly 
thereafter further defined, and tested for internal consistency, 
for consistency with empirical data, and by comparison to 
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alternative theses. The answers to these questions determine 
the degree of probability we assign to concepts or intuitions. 
Eventually, if they are found contrary to experience, or 
inconsistent with themselves or a larger conceptual context, 
or less credible than their alternatives, they are relegated to 
the status of the illusory. 
For us, then, all appearances are equally ‘real’ in the primary 
sense that it is a fact that they exist and are objects of 
consciousness99. Moreover, as earlier explained, with 
reference to inductive and deductive issues, pure percepts 
(concrete appearances, phenomena) are always ‘real’; but 
concepts (abstract appearances), including the conceptual 
admixtures in percepts, may be regarded as to various 
degrees ‘real’ (or inversely, ‘illusory’).  
This analysis of reality and illusion as ontological 
qualifications based on epistemological considerations, 
shows that there is no basis for Hindu philosophy’s 
identification of them with eternity, constancy and causal 
independence or their negations. The latter seems to be a 
poetic drift, an expression of devotion to God: the presumed 
                                                      
99  Some might say, exist as objects of consciousness – but 
even that is existence. 
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common ground of all selves is hailed as the only “real” 
thing, in contrast to which everything else is mere “illusion”. 
“Real” in that context means significant to the world, worthy 
of attention and pursuit – it is a value judgment of another 
sort. 
If we look to the epistemological status of the concept of 
God, we would say that it is conceivable to some degree; but 
not to an extreme degree, because there are considerable 
vagueness and uncertainty in it (see the previous topic of the 
present essay). An appeal to revelation is not a solution, 
because revelations to prophets are for the rest of us mere 
hearsay; and anyway different prophets have conflicting 
visions, so that even if we grant that they had the visions, we 
have to regard some (and therefore possibly all) of them as 
having misinterpreted their respective visions. Faith is always 
involved and required with reference to God. But even 
supposing God is admitted to exist, and that He is one100, 
                                                      
100  This characteristic of God, one-ness, is not mentioned by 
Cheng, but philosophical Brahmanism is ultimately monotheistic, 
even though many Hindus are in practice polytheistic. It should be 
mentioned, however, that one-ness is not logically implied by 
eternity, invariance and independence; i.e. one could conceive two 
or more entities with these characteristics (certainly the first two, at 
                                               Self or soul                               175 
 
eternal, invariant and completely independent, it does not 
follow that this is a definition of reality. The universe, which 
evidently exists, is also still real, even if it is but a figment of 
God’s imagination, even if it and all its constituents are 
transient, changing and dependent. A short-lived event may 
still be real; a flux may still have continuity, a caused event 
may still have occurred. 
Thus, we may confidently agree with Nagarjuna’s rejection 
of the Hindu definition of reality. We may, nevertheless, 
doubt his argument in favor of that rejection, namely that “no 
evil person could be transformed” if the phenomenal world 
were illusory in the Hindu sense. Even agreeing with him that 
people can morally improve, we have to consider that 
concepts of morality, or of good and evil, come much later in 
the development of knowledge than the concepts of reality 
and illusion, and so cannot logically be used to define or 
justify them. Furthermore, concepts of morality depend for 
their meaning on an assumption of volition operating in a 
world subject to time, change and causality; morality has no 
                                                                                                               
least – independence would be open to debate). Perhaps 
Zoroastrianism is a case in point? 
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meaning in a world with only determinism or chance, or in a 
static multiplicity or unity. 
Let us move on to argument 11(b). The question asked here 
is what the relation between a soul and “its” body and other 
perceivable phenomena (such as imaginations and emotions) 
might be. In my view, and I think the view of many ordinary 
people and philosophers, the soul is a spiritual entity (i.e. one 
of some stuff other than that of the material body or of mental 
projections), who is at once the Subject of consciousness (i.e. 
the one who is cognizing phenomena and other appearances – 
i.e. the “feeler of sensations and thinker of thoughts” 
mentioned above) and the Agent of volition (i.e. the one who 
evaluates, who makes choices and decisions, who puts in 
motion acts of will, who has attitudes and tendencies, and 
who is within certain parameters free of determinism, though 
not unaffected by influences and motives – i.e. the “receiver 
of rewards and punishments for actions good and bad” 
mentioned above). 
Thus, the relation of soul to other existents within the 
universe, according to this view, is that the soul is capable (as 
Subject) of cognizing to some extent concrete and abstract 
appearances, and (as Agent) of interfering to some extent in 
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the course of natural events, influenced and motivated by 
them through his cognition of them, but still free to impose 
his will on some of them. To affirm powers of cognition and 
will to the soul does not, note well, imply such powers to be 
unlimited or invariable; one may be free to act within certain 
parameters and these parameters may under various 
circumstances widen or narrow in scope. By ‘influence’, I 
mean that the events external to the soul may facilitate or 
make more difficult its actions, to degrees below 100% (such 
extreme degree being the limiting case of deterministic 
causality, i.e. causation). This view leaves open the issue as 
to whether the soul is of limited duration (i.e. bounded by the 
lifetime of the body, which it would be if it is an 
epiphenomenon of matter clustered in living cells and the 
complex organisms they compose), or eternal (which it 
would be if it is a spark of God). 
Returning now to Nagarjuna’s argument, we would say that 
soul is not “identical” with its perceptible “characteristics”. 
The soul may inhabit or be an epiphenomenon of the body, 
but is in either case something other than the body. The soul 
perceives and conceives the body (including visceral 
sentiments) and matter beyond it and mental phenomena 
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within it (i.e. imaginations), through sensory and brain 
processes, but these processes are not identical with its 
cognition of their results. The soul acts on the body (or at 
least, the brain), and through it on the matter beyond it and on 
the projection of mental images, but this action (that we call 
will, a power of spirit over matter101) is a special sort of 
causality neither the same as mechanical causation nor mere 
happenstance. The “characteristics” of the soul are thus 
merely perceptible manifestations (sensations, movements, 
emotions) of deeper events (consciousness, will) occurring at 
the interface of matter and spirit and more deeply still within 
spirit. 
This theory of the soul differs from the Indian, in that it does 
not imply that the soul is imperishable or that it does not 
undergo internal changes or that it is entirely causally 
independent. Nor does it imply that the soul is separable 
(though distinguishable) from the body, existing before or 
after or without its biological activity, in the way of a 
                                                      
101  Granting the universality of law of conservation of energy, 
we would have to presume that spirit’s will somehow releases 
energy locked in matter, rather than inputting new energy into it. 
Perhaps volition affects the wave-form of energy without affecting 
its magnitude. 
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disembodied ghost. So Nagarjuna’s criticism that birth and 
death are contradictory to a concept of soul is irrelevant to 
this theory; for his criticism only applies to the specific 
Indian definition of “atman”. But even if the soul is granted 
to be eternal, I do not think Nagarjuna’s criticism is valid; for 
even an eternal spiritual entity may conceivably have 
momentary effects – as in the case of God, as we conceive 
Him, creating or interfering in the world. Note that we 
commonly regard the human soul, too, as acting on (the rest 
of) the natural world, without considering it necessarily 
eternal. 
With regard to the second alternative of Nagarjuna’s 
argument, considering the possibility that soul be “different” 
from its perceivable “characteristics”, our reply would be, not 
only that they are distinct (though related as cause and effect, 
remember), but that we need not accept his claim that the 
soul’s imperceptibility implies it to be “inconceivable” and 
“indefinable”. We agree that the soul cannot be perceived, 
i.e. does not itself display perceptible qualities, i.e. is not a 
phenomenon with sense-modalities like shape and color, 
sound, smell, taste or touch aspects. But we may nevertheless 
to a considerable extent conceive and define it. The proof is 
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that we have just done so, above; furthermore, if Nagarjuna 
did not have a concept and definition, however vague and 
open to doubt, of soul to work with, he would have been 
unable to discuss the issue at all. There is no epistemological 
principle that the imperceptible is inconceivable and 
indefinable; if there were, no concept or definition would be 
admissible, not even those that Nagarjuna himself uses, not 
even those involved in the statement of that alleged principle. 
Concepts are precisely tools for going beyond perception. 
Complex concepts are not mere summaries of percepts, but 
imaginative departures from and additions to perceptual 
knowledge, nevertheless bound to the latter by logical and 
adductive rules. Even simple concepts, purporting to be 
summaries, are in fact regulated by these same rules. 
Which brings us to argument 11(c). Here, Nagarjuna 
contends that inferences and analogies from experience may 
be valid in specific cases, but not in the case of soul. He 
claims that we can for example infer fire indirectly from 
smoke, because we have previously seen fire directly in 
conjunction with smoke, whereas in the case of soul, we have 
never perceived it so we cannot infer it from perceptible 
“characteristics”. We can reply that, though fire and smoke 
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provide a valid example of inference, this is a selective 
example. Many other examples can be brought to bear, where 
we infer something never perceived from something 
perceived. For example, no one has ever directly sensed a 
magnetic ‘field of force’, but if you hold two magnets 
opposite each other, you feel the pull or push between them; 
you can also see a nail moving while a magnet is held close 
to it without touching it. The concept of force or field is 
constructed in relation to an experience, but is not itself an 
object of experience. 
Nagarjuna’s discourse is itself replete with such ‘indirect’ 
concepts. For instance, consciousness is imperceptible, 
perception is imperceptible, and so on. One of his favorites, 
namely “emptiness”, is per se without perceptible qualities. 
So he is using a double standard when he denies such 
concepts, in support of his denial that soul is intelligible. 
Such concepts are constructed by imaginative analogy (e.g. I 
may draw a magnetic force as a line or arrow) and by verbal 
definitions and descriptions (using words referring to 
relations first conceived with reference to empirical events – 
for instance, “whatever causes this motion, call it a force” or 
“force equals mass times acceleration caused”). Such creative 
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construction is merely a first stage; it does not in itself 
validate a concept. The proposed concept must thereafter be 
tested and tested again, with reference to the totality of other 
empirical knowledge and theory, before it can be considered 
as valid. Its validity is also a function of its utility, i.e. the 
extent to which it helps us to better understand and order our 
experience of the world. 
I personally do not regard that the concept of soul can be 
entirely based on such construction from experience. It seems 
evident to me that consciousness implies someone who is 
being conscious, a Subject-soul, as well as something one is 
conscious of, an Object. But I am sensitive to the objections 
by many philosophers, including Buddhist ones, that this 
thought may just be a prejudice incited by grammatical habit. 
And, as already admitted, if one introspects and looks for 
phenomenal manifestations of a self being aware, one finds 
none. Some, including Nagarjuna, would say that the concept 
of consciousness is itself in doubt, that all one can 
empirically claim is appearance. As for the concept of 
volition, let alone that of soul as the Agent of will, many 
doubt or deny it, in view of the difficulties in its definition 
and proof. 
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But I think it is very important to realize that all Buddhist 
accounts (at least all those I have encountered) of how an 
illusion of selfhood might conceivably be constructed by a 
non-person fail to avoid begging the question. A theory is 
required, which answers all possible questions, before such a 
revolutionary idea as that of denial of real self in man can be 
posited with confidence; and no theory without holes or 
inconsistencies has to my knowledge been proposed. We may 
readily admit the existence of an illusory self (or ‘ego’), 
constructed and suffered by a stupid or misguided real self. 
But an aberration or delusion with no one constructing it or 
subject to it, seems like an absurd concept to me. It implies 
mere happenstance, determinism, without any consciousness, 
volition, values or responsibility. 
Indeed, if you examine attempted such theories they always 
(overtly or covertly) describe an effective person (the 
pronoun ‘he’) constructing a false self. They never manage to 
escape from the sentence structure with a personal subject; 
typically: ‘he gradually deludes himself into thinking he has a 
self’. They do not provide a credibly detailed and consistent 
scenario of how unconscious and impersonal elements and 
processes (Nagarjuna’s “characteristics”) could possibly 
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aggregate into something that has the impression (however 
false) it is someone! A machine (or robot with artificial 
intelligence) may ‘detect’ things (for us) but it has no 
consciousness; it may ‘do’ things (for us) but it has no 
volition; it may loudly proclaim ‘I’ but it has no soul. 
There is also to consider the reverse process of 
deconstruction, how an ultimately impersonal artificial self 
(non-self) would or could go about freeing itself from 
illusion. Why would a non-self have any problem with 
remaining deluded (assuming it could be), and how if it has 
no personal powers would it intelligently choose to put in 
motion the prescribed process of liberation from delusion. A 
simple sentence like ‘to realize you have no self, make an 
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12.   Self-knowledge. 
 
Let us therefore consider how we might argue in favor of a 
soul, consisting of a Subject and his consciousness and an 
Agent and his will. If I do not mention feelings much here, it 
is only because I consider them derivatives of the other two 
powers of the soul; but the soul as author of evaluations 
(value-judgments, choices, affections) is intended here too. 
As already stated, I agree that the soul has in itself no 
perceptible (i.e. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or 
tactile) qualities, comparable to those in or around the ‘body’ 
(matter) or in mental projections (imaginations, dreams). This 
can be taken to simply mean that it is not made of material or 
mental substance, granting that “matter” (in a large sense, 
here, including physical and imaginary concrete phenomena) 
is whatever has these qualities; for this reason, let us say that 
soul is made of some distinctive substance, call it spirit.102 All 
we have done here is hypothesized, by analogy to the 
                                                      
102  We can leave as an open issue, parenthetically, the 
possibility that matter and spirit are respectively coarse and fine 
manifestations of one and the same substance. 
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phenomenal realm, an entity (soul) of different stuff (spirit); 
this is logically legitimate, provided we go on and justify it 
further. 
This concept of a soul is constructed to explain certain 
phenomena, on the basis of a mass of observations and 
theory-building. The soul is posited as the Subject of 
consciousness (or cognition) of, first, concrete phenomena 
(percepts) and, second, abstract appearances (concepts); and 
at a later stage as the Agent of will, the presumed cause (in a 
special sense) of certain perceptible actions of bodily organs 
(eye movements, speech, motions of arms and legs, and so 
on) as well as of intellectual organs (imagination, attention, 
thought processes, and so on). But if soul is reduced to such a 
conceptual construct, we only succeed at best in giving a 
general description of its powers and activities.  
Such a theoretical approach leaves us without justification for 
our day-to-day propositions concerning our own particular 
thoughts and deeds at any given time. For conception cannot 
proceed from a single event; it is the outcome of comparisons 
and contrasts between two or more events. Whereas, 
statements about an individual person’s present situation are 
not made in comparison and contrast to other persons or 
                                          Self-knowledge                             187 
 
situations. A general proposition can serve as major premise 
of a syllogism, but to obtain a particular conclusion, we need 
a particular minor premise. Indeed, to obtain the general 
proposition in the first place, we need to admit some 
particular cases of the same kind, which we can then 
generalize and apply to other particular cases (that is what 
syllogistic inference is all about). 
That is, when we say, for instances, “I believe so and so” or 
“I choose so and so” or “I wish so and so”, we are evidently 
not referring to phenomena perceptible at the moment (belief, 
choice, wishing have no immediate concrete manifestations, 
though they may eventually have perceptible effects), and we 
are evidently not conceptually inferring such propositions 
from any perceptual phenomena (i.e. what these propositions 
refer to are not abstract appearances). Yet these propositions 
are significant to each of us, and can fairly be declared true or 
false by us. Their truth or falsehood is, to repeat, not 
exclusively based on experience and on rational 
considerations, as Buddhists suggest, but is immediately, 
directly known by introspection. 
This is what I would call ‘self-knowledge’; and since this 
type of cognition is neither perception nor conception, it 
188 Buddhist Illogic 
deserves a special name – say, ‘intuition’. My use of this 
term should not be taken to imply acceptance of knowledge 
of other people’s souls, thoughts, wills or emotions (which is 
another issue, open to debate, solipsism not being excluded) 
– it is here restricted to self-intuition. I do not use the term 
‘introspection’, because this may be used with reference to 
perceptible phenomena, such as one’s mental imaginations or 
bodily feelings. 
Thus, in this view, the soul is cognized by three types of 
cognition: directly by intuition, and indirectly by 
conceptualization based on the soul’s perceptual effects and 
its intuited states and activities. Of course, ‘cognition’ is one 
and the same in all three cases; only the object of cognition 
differs in each case. If we limit our consideration only to 
perceptual effects and concepts derived from them, we can 
only construct a theoretical ‘soul’ and refer to ‘powers’ of 
soul. To obtain and claim knowledge of an individual soul 
and of its actual perceptions, conceptions, beliefs, intentions, 
acts of will, value-judgments, affections, etc., we have to 
admit a direct cognition other than perception, namely 
‘intuition’.  
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Thus, we could refer to soul with several terms: the ‘I’ of my 
own intuitions, the ‘self’ when assuming that others have an 
‘I’ like mine (on the basis of similar perceptible effects), and 
the ‘soul’ when referring to the conceptual construct based on 
my ‘I’, your ‘I’ and their perceptually evident (presumed) 
effects. Granting all this, it is no wonder that if we seek 
definition or proof of the ‘I’ in phenomenal effects, we will 
not find it! 
Let us now return to these intuited propositions, for a 
moment. Consider this well. If I say to you “I believe (or 
disbelieve or am unsure about) so and so” – did I infer this 
from anything and can you deny me? Sure, I have to mean 
what I say to you, be sincere. Sometimes, too, I may lie to 
myself, and claim to believe something (e.g. some 
complimentary claim about myself, or some religious or 
political claim), when in fact I do not really believe it. The 
human psyche has its complexities, and we can hide and not 
admit things even to oneself. In such cases, the truth of the 
statement can be verified with reference to a larger context, 
checking if my feelings and actions are consistent with my 
claimed belief. But this does not mean that all such personal 
claims are known by reference to perceptible side-effects, as 
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Buddhists claim. It only means that, just as in the perceptual 
and conceptual fields, appearances have an initial credibility 
but have to be faced off with other appearances, so in the 
field of intuition, an inductive process of verification goes on, 
through which some intuitions are found to be doubtful (due 
to their conflicts with other intuitions, and/or perceptible 
phenomena and conceptual considerations). 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that not all statements of 
the form “I-verb-object” (object being optional) are based on 
intuition alone. Some have perceptual and/or conceptual basis 
only, or also. For example, “I am thinking that we should go 
there” involves perceptual factors, perhaps a mental image of 
our bodies (mine and yours) walking along in some direction, 
as well as conceptual factors, perhaps a reasoning process as 
to why we should go there. But some such statements are 
purely intuitive, e.g. “I believe so and so” is final and 
independent, whatever the reasoning that led up to the belief. 
Furthermore, such statements need not be verbalized. The 
words “I”, “believe” etc. involved in the statement are of 
course products of conceptualization; but the intent of the 
sentence as a whole is a particular intuition, which the words 
verbalize. 
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Also to note well is that a proposition like “I believe so and 
so” cannot be based on a coded message from the brain, to 
the effect that “so and so should be declared as ‘your belief’ 
at this time”, for the simple reason that we have no awareness 
of any perceptible message of this sort. Therefore, such a 
statement is not a translation in words of a special kind of 
percept (just as conceptual statements are not). Perhaps the 
statement “I believe so and so” itself is the perceptible 
message from the brain? If so, we would be justified in 
denying any intuition of soul and its states and activities. But 
it is evident from introspection that we know what we want 
to say before we put it in words. The words merely verbalize 
an object already cognized; and this cognition must be 
‘intuition’, since it is neither perception (having no 
perceptible qualities) nor conception (since it is particular). 
It seems justified, in conclusion, to hypothesize, in addition 
to perception and conception, a third source of knowledge, 
called intuition, a direct cognition whose objects are the self 
(I) and its actual cognitions (I know what I am seeing, 
hearing, imagining, thinking, etc., right now), volitions (I 
know what I choose, decide, want, intend, will, etc., at this 
moment) and affections (I know what I like or dislike or am 
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indifferent to, what I hope or fear, etc., at this time). I know 
these most intimate of things – who can tell me otherwise, 
how would they know better than me what the imperceptible 
contents of my consciousness are? Soul and its presumed 
powers – cognition, volition, affection – cannot be conceived 
by comparison, since I do not see any souls other than my 
own; it can only be conceived by inference from perceptible 
and intuitive phenomena that we hypothesize to be its effects. 
The objects of intuition may be “empty” of perceptible 
qualities; but they may still have an existence of sorts, just as 
abstracts are not themselves perceptible but may credibly be 
affirmed. 
Suppose, for example, I meditate, watching my breath; my 
random thoughts cause my attention to stray for awhile103; I 
drag my attention back to the object of my meditation, my 
breath. Here, the direction and intensity of my attention 
require an act of will. The straying away of attention from the 
breath is not my will; my will is what makes it return to the 
                                                      
103  As we meditate, countless thoughts pop up, tempting us to 
follow them. Eventually, one manages to hook us, grabbing our 
interest and hurtling us through a series of associations. Thus 
totally absorbed, we forget our object of meditation for a while, until 
we realize we have been distracted. 
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breath. Phenomenally, the attention on the breath and the loss 
of this attention (or rather the breath phenomenon and the 
lack of it) are on an equal plane. What allows me to regard 
the one as mine and the other as not mine, is the awareness 
that I had to make an effort in the one case and that no 
effort104 was involved in the other case. This ‘effort’ is the 
intuited volition and that it is ‘mine’ signals intuition of soul. 
I may focus on the effort alone, or by an additional act of will 
focus on the fact that it is mine. There is no ‘reflexive act’ 
involved in this self-consciousness, because it is one part of 
me watched by the rest of me. 
Of course, this is all very mysterious. When we say “I think 
this” or “I will that”, we have no idea where this or that event 
came from or how it popped up. Certainly the deep source 
and manufacture of a thought or will of the soul is unknown 
to us, so we cannot claim to wholly own it. We do not have a 
plan of action before the thought or will, through which we 
consciously construct the latter. Each thought or will, finally, 
just is. There are no steps or stages, we just do it. But it is still 
not just happenstance; there is an author, ourselves. We are 
                                                      
104  The thoughts I strayed into may have involved voluntary 
processes, but my straying into them was involuntary. 
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able to distinguish, in most cases, between thoughts or wills 
that just ‘happen to us’, and others that ‘we author’; we may 
even identify them as voluntary or involuntary to various 
degrees. 
All this to say that Nagarjuna’s critique of soul and its 
powers, and of the knowability of these things, is far from 
conclusive. Buddhists are justified in doubting and inquiring 
into the issues, but from a purely philosophical point of view 
the Madhyamika conclusion of “emptiness” may be 
considered too radical and extreme. It may be obviously valid 
from the perspective of someone who has reached some 
higher form of consciousness (which, I know, I have not), but 
their rational arguments are not decisive. Most important, as 
we have seen, Nagarjuna bases his denial on one particular 
theory of soul (the atman theory), and has not considered all 
conceivable theories. To rebut (or more precisely, to put in 
doubt) his arguments, it is therefore sufficient to propose one 
alternative theory (as above done) that he has ignored; the 
alternative does not need to be proved – if it is just 
conceivable (coherent, consistent), that is enough.  
Nagarjuna does not, in my view, satisfactorily answer 
questions like ‘who is it that perceives, thinks, desires or 
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acts?’, ‘who is it that meditates in pursuit of liberation or 
eventually reaches it?’, when he explains away the soul as a 
mere cluster of percepts or concepts, as something 
(illegitimately) inferred from perceptible phenomena by a 
presumed cause-effect relation.  
In passing, it is worth noting that, although the doctrine of 
no-self is fundamental to Buddhism, not all Buddhists have 
interpreted it as a total rejection of soul (in some sense of the 
term). One Theravada school, known as the ‘Personalists’, 
dating back to about 300 BCE, whose adepts in the 7th 
century CE included almost one third of all Buddhist monks 
in India, “motivated by commonsense, maintained that in 
addition to impersonal events, there is still a ‘person’ to be 
reckoned with.”105 According to the Abhidharmakosha, a 
Mahayana work by Vasubhandu (4th century CE), the 
Personalists interpreted the no-self doctrine of the Buddha as 
signifying simply that “something which is not the true Self 
is mistaken for the true Self”. 
It is thus possible to understand the doctrine of not-self as a 
rejection, not of ‘soul’ (‘real or deep self’), but rather of ‘ego’ 
                                                      
105  According to Edward Conze, in Buddhist Scriptures 
(Penguin: England, 1959). See pp. 190 and 192-7. 
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(‘conventional or superficial self’). The ego is a confused 
construct of ‘selfhood’ by the soul, due to the latter’s self-
identification with delusive opinions (acquired by itself and 
through social influences), and consequently with certain 
attitudes and actions it engages in, in the way of a self-
protective reaction. By predefining itself and its world, the 
soul imprisons itself in patterns of response appropriate to 
that definition. It is up to the soul to rid itself of the ego-
centered viewpoint, by realizing the stupidity and 
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Not ‘empty logic’, but empty of logic. 
 
I shall stop here, save for some concluding remarks, though a 
lot more could be said. As we have seen, Nagarjuna is 
motivated by very good intentions: he wishes to help us 
achieve enlightenment or liberation, by freeing us from all 
obstacles to cognition of the “emptiness” underlying the 
phenomenal and conceptual world. For him, the principal 
obstacle is Reason: as he says, “if conceptualizations are 
permitted there will arise many, as well as great, errors”106. 
His strategy is therefore to invalidate for us our every logical 
tool.  
From a practical point of view, we might well agree with and 
congratulate Nagarjuna. When one is engaged in meditation, 
it is appropriate to stop all thought, or at least to dissociate 
oneself from all imaginative and rational processes till they 
stop by themselves. One may also make one’s whole life a 
meditative process, and legitimately choose to altogether 
                                                      
106  Cheng, p. 37 – quoting MT XVII:12a. 
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abstain from rumination and cogitation. There is no doubt in 
my mind that in such context thought is useless, and indeed a 
hindrance to progress, apart perhaps from some initial 
theoretical studies and reflections to put oneself on the right 
track, as well as a minimum of ongoing thought to deal with 
routine aspects of survival. 
But that is not what is at issue, here. Our concern in this 
paper is with Nagarjuna’s theoretical discourse, his 
philosophical theses and claims to ‘logic’. We may well 
doubt these, in view of the underhanded means he is willing 
to use to achieve his ends, including ignoring, eclipsing or 
distorting relevant facts, diverting attention from 
controversies or lying outright, begging the questions 
(circular arguments), stealing concepts (using them even 
while undercutting them), contradicting himself, 
manipulating readers in every which way. However noble his 
motives may be, they cannot justify such methods of 
discourse. 
One may legitimately ask whether Nagarjuna’s “Middle 
Way” corresponds to the Buddha’s original concept with the 
same name. The Buddha’s teaching is a practical one, 
eschewing the behavioral extremes, the fanaticism and 
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asceticism, that religious desperation and enthusiasm tend to 
generate. Nagarjuna’s is not a teaching of equal moderation 
in theoretical issues, but an extremist position, one I would 
characterize as nihilistic. This has been made evident again 
and again in the above exposition. 
When I picked up the book Empty Logic, earlier this year in 
Bangkok’s Khaosan Road, I was eager to learn more about 
Buddhism, and in particular about Nagarjuna and his 
Madhyamika school (having read many positive appraisals of 
them in other books, and some quotations). As a logician, I 
was especially pleased at the prospect that there might be a 
‘logic of emptiness’, perhaps forms of reasoning still 
undiscovered in the West. Unfortunately, thanks to Cheng’s 
very competent presentation, I soon discovered that 
Nagarjuna work contains no new field of logic, but is 
basically empty of logic, a ferocious mauling of logic. What a 
disappointment! 
Please note well that I have nowhere tried to deny107 
Buddhism’s thesis that ultimate reality cannot be accessed 
                                                      
107  To reject arguments offered in favor of a conclusion does 
not imply rejection of the conclusion concerned, since it might be 
reached by other arguments. 
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through rational means, but only through some fundamental 
change of cognitive paradigm. I nowhere claim to know what 
“emptiness” is, only what it is not. I remain open to such an 
idea, though I cannot claim to have achieved such deep levels 
of meditation that I can confirm it firsthand. I expected 
Nagarjuna to help me break through to such higher 
knowledge, not by attempting to destroy my lower 
knowledge but by proposing some evolutionary process. 
Just as conceptual knowledge complements and improves on 
perceptual knowledge, without dismissing all perception, so 
may we expect meditative knowledge to correct the errors of 
and enlarge what came before it, without ignoring and 
belying all conception. I would not resist a fundamental 
rejection of logic, if some convincing means were used to 
this end; it is not attachment which prevents me. The way 
offered by Nagarjuna is unconvincing to anyone with high 
standards of knowledge; it is merely a malicious parody of 
logic. What revolts me here is the shameless sophistry 
engaged in by Nagarjuna, in his impossible attempts to give 
logical legitimacy to his anti-logical ideas. (See Appendix 1 
for a list of fallacies he uses repeatedly.) 
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If someone sincerely believes that no words have true 
significance, would he write his skeptical words and expect 
others to understand them? If someone thinks or writes about 
motion, even to deny it, is he not thereby engaging in 
motion? If someone writes about causality, denying it so as to 
convince others to give up the idea, surely it shows that he 
himself believes in causality, in his ability to influence others 
and in their ability to choose a different cognitive path. Read 
his lips – if he did not believe in these things, why would he 
bother writing about anything? Like many Western skeptics, 
Nagarjuna does not take the trouble to harmonize his words 
and deeds, testing his thoughts on his own thinking; if 
knowingly indulged, this is hypocrisy. Like many religious 
apologists, Nagarjuna considers logic, not as a tool of 
research and discovery, but as a weapon of rhetoric in 
defense of preconceived ideas; if knowingly indulged, this is 
cheating. 
It is legitimate to draw conclusions about someone on the 
basis of his arguments; this is not to be confused with ad 
hominem argumentation, which is judging the arguments with 
reference to the person making them. We might excuse 
Nagarjuna as a sloppy thinker, but it is evident that he has 
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logical capabilities, so we must infer deceit. Occasional 
errors of logic are human – but such systematic misuse or 
selective use of logic is monstrous. He evidently takes people 
for fools, who will swallow whatever he dishes out. Worse 
still, he does not fear to intellectually incapacitate generations 
and generations of young people. Philosophy is a 
responsibility, like the medical profession. It should be an 
attempt to increase the mental health and efficacy of one’s 
fellow humans, not a pastime for dilettantes or jokers or a 
cruel con game. 
All this makes one wonder whether Nagarjuna himself 
achieved the supreme consciousness he attempts to guide us 
towards. If he is already enlightened, where are the honesty 
and sincerity, the realism and healthiness, the compassion 
and loving-kindness, one would expect from such 
consciousness? If he is not yet enlightened, how can he claim 
firsthand knowledge that abandoning logic is the way to such 
consciousness? In the latter case, he would have done better 
to stick to meditation, rather than speak out prematurely. 
The overall result of his philosophical action (at least, those 
aspects of it we have encountered here) is, 
counterproductively, to cast doubt on Buddhism itself. For if 
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one respected figure claiming, or being claimed, to have 
achieved enlightenment is uncertain to have done so, why not 
the others? But, as with all hearsay evidence on esoteric 
claims, Buddhists have to rely on faith, anyway. Also, 
fortunately, Buddhism is a lot richer, has much more going 
for it, than the few philosophical ideas and arguments treated 
in the present essay.  
And presumably the same can be said for Nagarjuna (I have 
not read all his work). If we view his arguments as serious 
logical discourse, we are bound to condemn him as above 
done. But perhaps we should view it all more generously as a 
guru’s tongue-in-cheek mimicry of logical discourse, 
intended purely as a koan for logically minded persons (like 
me) to mull over and go beyond. In that case, it is not the 
content of the discourse which counts for him, but its 
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The Heart Sutra states: form is no other than emptiness, 
emptiness no other than form. Form is emptiness, emptiness 
is form. And the same is true for sensation, perception, 
conception and consciousness.  
 
Hakuin comments: “Striking aside waves to look for water 
when the waves are water! Forms don’t hinder emptiness; 
emptiness is the tissue of form. Emptiness isn’t destruction of 
form; form is the flesh of emptiness… Form and emptiness 
are not-two. If you pass these strange apparitions without 
alarm, they self-destruct. Forms sensation perception 




                                                      
108  Zen Words for the Heart, translated in by Norman Waddell 
(Shambhala: Boston, Mass., 1996). “The Heart Sutra was probably 
composed in India about 1500 years ago”, which means a few 
hundred years after Nagarjuna. The commentary is by Hakuin 
Ekaku (1686-1768), a Japanese Zen master. 
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Appendix 1: Fallacies in Nagarjuna’s 
work. 
 
The following are the main fallacies that I have found 
Nagarjuna committing in his philosophical treatment of 
“emptiness”. 
A. Fallacy of the Tetralemma. 
This consists in treating the combinations “both A and 
non-A” (contradiction) and “neither A nor non-A” 
(inclusion of the middle) as formal possibilities. But these 
are in all cases (i.e. whatever “A” stands for) logically 
forbidden at the outset. 
B. Fallacy of the Inconclusive Dilemma. 
This consists in making a dilemma appear conclusive, 
when in fact one (or all) of its horns (major premises) is 
(or are) problematic rather than assertoric. Dilemmatic 
argument can be validated only when its major premises 
are all proper if-then statements, not when any of them is 
an “if – maybe-then” statement. 
C. Fallacy of the Denial of One and All. 
This consists in denying one theory about some issue, and 
making it seem as if one has thus denied all possible 
theories about it. The denial, to be thorough, must indeed 
consider all alternative theories before drawing such 
negative conclusion about the issue. 
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D. Fallacy of the Ungranted Premise. 
This consists in taking for granted a premise which is not 
generally accepted and which has not been adequately 
supported, or indeed which is generally unaccepted or 
which has been convincingly refuted. 
E. Fallacy of the Unclear Theory or Term. 
This consists in glossing over relevant details or nuances, 
which make all the difference in the understanding of the 
term or theory concerned. A term or theory should be 
defined and made precise so far as possible in the context 
of knowledge concerned, so that relative propositions can 
be properly tested. 
F. Fallacy of Equivocation. 
This consists in using a single term in two (or more) 
different senses within one’s thesis, so as to make it seem 
that what has been established in relation to one of the 
senses has been established in relation to the other(s). 
This is made possible by fuzziness in definition of terms. 
G. Fallacy of the Concept Doubting Percept. 
This consists in using a concept to put in doubt the very 
percept(s) which has (or have) given rise to it in the first 
place. The order of things, i.e. the genesis of the concept 
in knowledge, how it arises in relation to certain 
percepts, must always be acknowledged and respected. 
H. Fallacy of the Inappropriate Fixation. 
This consists in pretending that a term that has 
intrinsically variable meaning has fixed meaning. 
Notably, terms like “this”, “here” or “now” are 
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intrinsically variable, in that the same word is always 
used, even as the actual object, time or place referred to 
differs; such terms do not remain stuck to their referents 
once and for all. 
I. Fallacy of the Double Standard. 
This consists in being severe towards one’s opponent’s 
argument while being lenient with regard to one’s own 
argument, although the two arguments are formally 
similar or have similar strengths and/or weaknesses. 
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Appendix 2: Brief glossary of some basic 
concepts. 
 
Chögyam Trungpa (1940-1987), a modern philosopher of 
Tibetan Buddhism, popular in the West, wrote that Nagarjuna 
“much preferred to approach truth by taking the arguments of 
other philosophical schools on their own terms and logically 
reducing them ad absurdum, rather than himself offering any 
definitions of reality.”109 We have seen in the present essay 
that such claims to logic by Madhyamika philosophy are 
highly pretentious. 
Of Shunyata, the same disciple of Nagarjuna has this to say: 
“we impose our preconceptions, our ideas, our version of 
things onto phenomena, instead of seeing things as they are. 
Once we are able to see through our veil of preconception, 
we realize that it is an unnecessary and confused way of 
attaching handles to experiences without considering whether 
the handles fit or not.”110 This view, that conceptualization 
imposes something artificial and distortive on direct 
perception, may seem superficially credible, but upon 
reflection it is based on confusions. There are two aspects 
involved. 
The first aspect is psychological – the fact of distraction. It is 
evident during meditation that extraneous thoughts keep 
popping up against our will, like a sort of enervating 
                                                      
109 Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism. Boston, Ma.: 
Shambhala, 1973. (P. 191.) 
110  Op. cit. (P. 207) 
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background noise. The brain continuously offers the mind 
topics of conversation, spontaneously or by association. We 
may with effort ignore them, but eventually one may grab our 
attention and drag us through a long interlude of useless 
images and inner sounds, memories, anticipations, discourse 
and emotions. Such “thoughts” obstruct our attempts at 
concentration, although if we persevere in our meditation 
they dampen and eventually disappear. During ordinary 
observation or thinking, too, there is a similar interference of 
irrelevant reflections, which hinder cognitive efficiency and 
efficacy. But it does not follow that cognition is thereby 
incapacitated. 
Another aspect of Trungpa’s statement is epistemological – 
the fact of fallibility. Human thought is admittedly not 
automatically and always correct in its observations, 
conceptualizations, categorizations and verbalizations, 
predications and generalizations, argumentations and other 
rational processes in pursuit of knowledge. However, it does 
not follow that thought is automatically and always wrong! 
Indeed, one could not make such a generalization without 
thereby denying one’s own skeptical claim; so one must 
admit some efficacy to rational cognition, including the 
ability to spot one’s own errors.  
What our study of Nagarjuna’s arguments has clearly shown 
is that his rejection of human reason is not based on any 
profound understanding of the processes involved in it. 
Rather, his personal failure to carefully observe and reflect on 
the actual genesis in human knowledge of the concepts he 
criticizes made them seem arbitrary to him. But although we 
all often err in our thinking, and few of us take time or have 
the intelligence to analyze its founding concepts, it does not 
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follow that these concepts are invalid and useless, and that 
they can or should be abandoned. 
Let us here very briefly recall what we said about some of 
these basic concepts in the present work. The reader can then 
see clearly that these concepts are not “preconceptions” that 
throw a “veil” over the percepts they are based on, but merely 
attempts to summarize information, so that more and more of 
it can be taken into consideration in any judgment, be it 
verbal or not. They are not “unnecessary and confused… 
handles”, applied without regard to whether they “fit or not”, 
but legitimate tools of knowledge, which like all tools have to 
be properly used to do their job. Human knowledge is not 
built on a purely deductive model or by arbitrary imposition, 
as Trungpa’s (and Nagarjuna’s) skeptical statements imply, 
but is an inductive development from experience. 
 Motion, rest. The facts of motion (in the broad sense of 
change) and rest (constancy) are given in experience, 
found both within present phenomena and in the 
comparison and contrast between present and 
remembered phenomena. The concepts of motion and rest 
are developed in opposition to each other, with reference 
to such experiences. 
 Entity, individual. Comparing and contrasting our 
memories of successive moments in the stream of 
phenomena appearing before us, we observe that some 
aspects seem different and some seem the same. From 
such experiences (assuming ‘memory’ and ‘time’) we 
infer the existence of ‘change’ and the existence of 
‘substrata’ to change (or individual entities). The 
inference involved is adductive, i.e. hypothesis, logical 
prediction and continued confirmation in experience. 
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 Essence, kind. Comparing and contrasting two or more 
such entities, we observe that some seem to have certain 
characteristics in common and exclusively (statistical sine 
qua non). A characteristic apparently common to two or 
more phenomena (concretes) is called an abstraction, 
being a presumed unity (of measure) in plurality (of 
instances). When (or so long as) such an abstraction is 
found distinctive, it is called an essence (or essential 
characteristic) and it can be used for purposes of 
definition. Individuals with the same essence are said to 
belong to the same kind or class. 
 Naming, verbalization. Phenomena are first referred to 
in discourse by pointing and saying ‘this’ (or ‘here’ or 
‘now’ or the like) to include, and ‘but not that’ (or ‘there’ 
or ‘then’ or the like) to exclude. Entities and kinds, 
concepts derived from collections of similar and distinct 
phenomena, may be associated with (respectively proper 
or common) words for the purposes of memory and 
discourse. Verbalization need not be final, but may be 
adapted as required; i.e. what is included or excluded 
under a name is flexible, provided consistency is 
maintained. 
 Nature. The nature (or identity) of some individual or 
kind is the sum of the (categorical or conditional) ‘laws’ 
exhibited by it, i.e. a generalization of the apparent 
regularities in its attributes and behaviors, subject to 
review and particularization if new appearances do not 
match the old. Attributes or behaviors which seem devoid 
of law in this sense are regarded as either personal events 
or happenstance. 
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 Predication. Predication may be particular or general, 
possible or necessary, categorical or conditional, 
inclusion or exclusion of one phenomenon or abstract 
appearance in some abstraction. This may mentally occur 
with or without words. In any case, predication is a 
tentative act, a proposition, subject to checks and 
balances suggested by inductive and deductive logic. It 
has no dogmatic finality, but is controlled with reference 
to experience and reason. 
 Causation. This refers to certain regularities of relation 
between two or more phenomena or abstractions, say ‘A’ 
and ‘B’. The most typical is constant conjunction 
between A and B, but the term is also applicable to 
negative cases (not-A and not-B, A and not-B, not-A and 
B). There are also many degrees of causation, according 
to the number of factors involved. Causation is thus a 
statistical concept, intended to record and communicate 
certain observations. It is one of a larger constellation of 
causal concepts, including volition and influence, as well 
as spontaneity or chance. 
 Self, soul. The Subject of consciousness and Agent of 
will, presumed to inhabit humans (and other entities, like 
higher animals or God). That this special core substance 
(spirit) is presumed (induced rather than deduced) does 
not necessarily mean that it is invented. To induce it we 
refer to phenomena experienced, conceptual 
considerations and possibly direct personal intuitions of 
self. Although no single item is definite proof of soul, a 
large number of indices may suggest its existence. 
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